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Abstract
So many of our daily activities now take place “in the cloud,”
where we use our devices to tap into massive networks that span
the globe. Virtually every time that we plug into a new service, the
service requires us to click the seemingly ubiquitous box indicating
that we have read and agreed to the provider’s terms of service
(TOS) and privacy policy. If a user does not click on this box, he is
denied access to the service, but agreeing to these terms without
reading them can negatively impact the user’s legal rights.
As part of this work, we analyzed and categorized the terms of
TOS agreements and privacy policies of several major cloud
services to aid in our assessment of the state of user privacy in the
cloud. Our empirical analysis showed that providers take similar
approaches to user privacy and were consistently more detailed
when describing the user’s obligations to the provider than when
describing the provider’s obligations to the user. This asymmetry,
combined with these terms’ nonnegotiable nature, led us to
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conclude that the current approach to user privacy in the cloud is
in need of serious revision.
In this Article, we suggest adopting a legal regime that
requires companies to provide baseline protections for personal
information and also to take steps to enhance the parties’ control
over their own data. We emphasize the need for a regime that
allows for “data control” in the cloud, which we define as
consisting of two parts: (1) the ability to withdraw data and
require a service provider to stop using or storing the user’s
information (data withdrawal); and (2) the ability to move data to
a new location without being locked into a particular provider
(data mobility). Ultimately, our goal with this piece is to apply
established law and privacy theories to services in the cloud and
set forth a model for the protection of information privacy that
recognizes the importance of informed and empowered users.
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“You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.”
—Scott McNealy, Chairman and former CEO of Sun
Microsystems, 1999

I. Introduction
What price for your privacy? As social interactions and
business activities have shifted online, or into “the cloud,”
personal information has become a currency with an undervalued
exchange rate. What data are consumers willing to trade in
exchange for convenience and services online? Would they be as
willing to engage in this trade if their privacy rights were more
protected and if they had the ability to exercise meaningful
control over their data?
Technological and social changes have stimulated many
developments over the last decade as the Internet became
ingrained in society and social interactions. Substantial
technological changes require the law to adapt. When our
perceptions change, policymakers amend the law accordingly to
address evolved expectations. In this Article, the perceptions and
law that we are concerned about are those associated with
privacy, especially privacy in the context of services provided over
the cloud.

INFORMATION PRIVACY AND DATA CONTROL

345

This is not the first time that conceptions of privacy have
been shaped by technology. The Right to Privacy, published in
1890, was the seminal work of Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis that substantially influenced privacy law in the United
States in the twentieth century.1 The publication of this piece was
spurred by the authors’ concerns about intrusions into personal
privacy by the press, especially considering the technological
improvements that had enabled the production of small,
affordable cameras.2
Portable cameras were just the beginning of technology that
prompted major changes in privacy law and theory. Around the
middle of the twentieth century, computers were becoming more
pervasive and powerful, enabling the creation of databases that
could hold and process huge amounts of information. The idea of
informational privacy developed in greater detail around this
time, as people realized that personal privacy could be threatened
not just by appropriation of one’s name and likeness, but by
access to and use of other information about a person.3
While these informational privacy concerns were becoming
more visible, the future of connecting computers in a global
telecommunications network was just a glimmer in the eyes of
some of the more innovative researchers. Today, in exchange for
our personal information, we have access to free e-mail and free
data storage, and we can use free services to keep in touch with
former classmates and colleagues around the country and around
the world. Thanks to Facebook, attendees of modern high school
1. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A
Mixed Legacy, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1891–93 (2010) (describing the impact of
the article on the landscape of privacy law).
2. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 137 (2006) [hereinafter SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON]. Recent
research posits that the authors’ concern about privacy stemmed from Warren’s
experiences with the press when he married Mabel Bayard, the daughter of a
politician. See Amy Gajda, What If Samuel D. Warren Hadn’t Married a
Senator’s Daughter?: Uncovering the Press Coverage That Led to “The Right to
Privacy,” 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 35, 43–44 (explaining the suggestion of Warren
and Brandeis that everyone has the right to keep the press away).
3. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and
a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814,
1836–37 (2011) (describing the myth of anonymity on the Internet).
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reunions who live on opposite sides of the country can focus on
catching up on events of the last week instead of the last ten
years.
As with any improvement in technology, however, there are
also tradeoffs. Free services online are often funded by
advertising revenue, and these ads are made more effective by
utilizing the user’s personal information to target ads to their
interests. To set up accounts for services online, consumers must
typically click the ubiquitous box indicating that they have read
and agreed to the website’s terms of service (TOS) and privacy
policy. These agreements often contain broad provisions for what
the provider is permitted to do with the consumer’s information,
while giving the consumer few, if any, options for redress. In the
majority of cases in which services are marketed to individual
users, there is zero negotiability in these terms, and almost no
one reads these terms anyway.
In this Article, we urge the creation of baseline regulations
that would guarantee a minimum level of protection of consumer
privacy while preserving market vitality. One of the essential
elements for this baseline regime would be the protection of the
consumer’s right to control his data. People are often denied
meaningful control over their personal information and the other
information that they store with these services. Companies often
do not address beforehand how a consumer can exercise control
over their information in the event that the service is terminated,
and many companies reserve a nonrevocable license to use the
consumer’s intellectual property that is stored with its service.
We view this right of data control as consisting of two parts:
(1) data mobility, which we summarize as a right to move one’s
data and terminate a relationship with a particular service
provider, under which providers would be required to provide
data to departing customers in a generally accepted file format
such that customers do not become “locked in”; and (2) a broader
right of data withdrawal that would permit a consumer to
withdraw his information from the records of any entity,
including a third party, through a notice-and-takedown process.
In Part II, we explain the idea of cloud computing and
introduce a number of issues related to it. In Part III, we turn to
an examination of privacy fundamentals, first examining
different theoretical approaches to privacy before turning to a
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discussion of privacy law in the United States and an
examination of statutes and case law. In Part IV, we describe
issues relating to companies and customer data, including
concerns about TOS agreements, privacy policies, and data
security. In Part V, we turn to the results of our empirical
analysis of the TOS agreements and privacy policies of a sample
of cloud service industry leaders. Finally, in Part VI, we offer our
recommendations based on our empirical work, as well as our
research into privacy issues and the cloud.
II. Cloud Computing Fundamentals
In examining the legal implications of privacy and cloud
computing, it is important to understand some of the background.
In this Part, we will examine some of the technical background of
the current technologies before discussing cloud computing and
its advantages and disadvantages in more detail. We will also
introduce some legal issues that arise in the cloud context and
briefly review various calls for action that have sounded with
respect to the cloud, such as calls for amending legislation,
proposing legislation, or calling for standards or increased
transparency.
A. Background Technology
Before the World Wide Web (Web) became so prevalent, there
were two paradigms of computer use. The first was mainframe
computing, and under this paradigm, users worked at “dumb
terminals” that were connected to a large mainframe system,
which in turn processed the users’ requests.4 As microprocessors
became available, the personal computing paradigm took over,
and the files and data were under the users’ physical control.5
4. William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing
Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1197 (2010).
5. Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and
Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
359, 362 (2010).
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The personal computing paradigm has weaknesses, however,
including the low degree of scalability of individual systems, the
need for technological expertise to assemble and maintain
computer systems, and a low level of redundancy such that data
loss through equipment failure is a significant danger.6 Under the
traditional model of information technology (IT) management,
based on this paradigm, a lot of space and human capital is
required to maintain and secure the systems of a large
enterprise.7
Moving our technological worlds to the cloud is another
paradigm shift that some view as the future of computing.8 Mark
Weiser predicted in 1991 that the third wave of computing, after
mainframe computing and personal computing, would be
ubiquitous computing, where computers become so small,
inexpensive, and ubiquitous that they virtually disappear.9
Today, technologies continue to improve, but the truly ubiquitous
nature of modern computing is not because of the computer’s size
6. See Robison, supra note 4, at 1200–01 (explaining the inefficiencies that
occur when everyone has his or her own computer).
7. Mark H. Wittow & Daniel J. Buller, Cloud Computing: Emerging Legal
Issues for Access to Data, Anywhere, Anytime, 14 NO. 1 J. INTERNET L. 1, 5 (2010).
Wittow and Buller note that these limitations are mitigated by the use of things
like centralized disk storage, the use of more advanced servers with smaller
hardware footprints, and system virtualization. Id. Virtualization is one of the
major technologies behind some applications of “cloud computing,” where spaces
on hard drives are turned into “virtual machines” that segment the processing of
different requests. VMWare, Virtualization Basics, http://www.vmware.com/
virtualization/virtualization-basics/how-virtualization-works.html (last visited
Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. See Ilana R. Kattan, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored
Communications Act Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in
the Cloud, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 617, 621 (2011) (noting the transitions
between paradigms); Soghoian, supra note 5, at 364 (noting that cloud
computing has been deemed by many commentators to be the future of
computing). Some suggest that the decentralized cloud computing model has the
potential to make such services comparable to utilities, with data centers being
the equivalent of power plants in the electrical utility context. Kevin Werbach,
The Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1817 (2011). If cloud providers are
utilities, the argument for regulation of services on the cloud becomes stronger.
Id. at 1818.
9. Gary M. Olson & Judith S. Olson, Human-Computer Interaction:
Psychological Aspects of the Human Use of Computing, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
491, 499 (2003).
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or power. The Internet and high-speed connections allow people
to be in touch not only with each other, but with service providers
that can essentially rent out processing power and storage space
over the Internet. Moving some functions to the cloud can allow
users access to high-end services and technology without having
to trade quality for mobility.10 This future of computing, however,
may challenge the default assumption that a user will be able to
control her own data.11
1. The Internet
The history of the Internet is often traced back to the late
’60s and ARPANET.12 Even before ARPANET, however, some
recognized the possible future value of computers being connected
using communication lines.13 Regardless of how the ideas
emerged, there is no doubt that the Internet is a pervasive
element of today’s society.
To say that the Internet has become a staple of modern life is
an understatement. The Internet has had a substantial effect on
the world and how people interact.14 Cyberspace is a major social
10. Additionally, increasingly large networks of computers can be used to
create “ad hoc supercomputers” through distributed computing. Paul M.
Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2064
(2004) [hereinafter Schwartz, Property].
11. Werbach, supra note 8, at 1820.
12. See J.R. OKIN, THE INTERNET REVOLUTION 318 (2004) (describing the
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network, created in the late 1960s, that
eventually became today’s Internet).
13. See J.C.R. Licklider, Man–Computer Symbiosis, 1 IRE TRANSACTIONS
ON HUM. FACTORS IN ELECTRONICS 4 (1960), available at http://groups.
csail.mit.edu/medg/people/psz/Licklider.html (explaining the benefits of a
system with “thinking centers” connected to each other by wide-band
communication lines and to individual users); Werbach, supra note 8, at 1793
(explaining that major network operators in the 1960s were cognizant that
computers would increasingly become the technical foundation for the
telecommunications system itself). Werbach notes that some researchers viewed
networked computers as having the potential of being a new class of public
utility. Id. at 1793–94.
14. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other
Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614,
626 (2011) (“It is not just that ‘the Internet is different’; it is that the Internet,
like every major advance in infrastructural technology before it, has made
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outlet that is often intertwined with the physical realm.15 People
keep in touch through a variety of electronic messaging
technologies, including e-mail, text messaging, other instant
messaging over the Internet, and social networking websites.16
Research by the Kaiser Family Foundation suggests that the
average youth between the ages of eight and eighteen spends
every permissible waking moment using electronic devices, many
of which are connected to the Internet, like smart phones and
computers.17 A study by the Nielsen Company found that across
all ages, the average American Internet user is online over fiftyfive hours per month.18
The Internet works because computers on the network use
identical protocols that enable interconnection so that data can be
delivered across the network.19 One of the well-known protocols is
the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), which enabled e-mail
exchanges in the 1980s in the days before the World Wide Web.20
In the mid-1980s, the transfer of e-mail was fairly fragmented,
with communications being transmitted from server to server,
stored at various locations temporarily during the trip before
being downloaded by the recipient.21 Today, webmail still uses
the SMTP protocol, as well as the Internet Message Access
everything different.”).
15. Id. at 639.
16. See John Soma, Melodi Mosley Gates & Michael Smith, Bit-Wise but
Privacy Foolish: Smarter E-Messaging Technologies Call for a Return to Core
Privacy Principles, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 487, 497–502 (2010) (explaining the
five technologies, including telephone systems, e-mail, text messaging, instant
messaging, and social networking); Strandburg, supra note 14, at 655–56
(explaining how social media promise to change social interactions by
supplementing physical interaction or replacing it).
17. Andrea Cascia, Don’t Lose Your Head in the Cloud: Cloud Computing
and Directed Marketing Raise Student Privacy Issues in K–12 Schools, 261
WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 883, 894 (2011).
18. Paul Lanois, Caught in the Clouds: The Web 2.0, Cloud Computing, and
Privacy?, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 29, 29 (2010). About half of that time is
spent on social networking, e-mails, games, and instant messaging. Id.
19. See Werbach, supra note 8, at 1769 (explaining the functionality and
concept of the Internet).
20. OKIN, supra note 12, at 212.
21. See Robison, supra note 4, at 1205–06 (explaining the functionality of
electronic communication services).
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Protocol (IMAP). IMAP allows e-mails to be accessed from
anywhere with an Internet connection, with e-mails being
perpetually stored on the provider’s servers.22 The ability to
access information from anywhere is important for mobility and
mobile computing.
2. Mobile Computing
Computers have shrunk in size over the last fifty years, from
room-size computers to thirty-pound desktops to five-pound
laptops to smart phones weighing just a few ounces. The early
1980s saw the invention of the first laptop and the first cellular
phone, and the first personal digital assistant (PDA) was released
in 1993.23 This increase in mobility has been helpful for both
personal and professional tasks. The Blackberry became a
popular office tool after its release in 1999, functioning as both a
cell phone and a PDA that permitted remote access to office email.24 Today’s smart phones go beyond the original Blackberry,
giving users access to e-mail, the Web, appointment calendars,
and even software that allows the users to review word
processing files and full color PDFs in the palms of their hands. It
is estimated that by 2013, about half of the mobile phone market
will be smart phones,25 and many if not all of these are likely to
have access to 3G or 4G data networks that do not require a
separate wireless connection.26
22. See IMAP & POP, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA E-MAIL AND INTERNET
ACCOUNTS GUIDES, http://www.oit.umn.edu/email/imap-pop (last visited Feb. 3,
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
23. Kimberly L. Rhodes & Brian Kunis, Walking the Wire in the Wireless
World: Legal and Policy Implications of Mobile Computing, 16 J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y 25, 27–28 (2011). The first laptop computer was invented in 1981, and
Motorola invented the first cellular phone in 1983. Id.
24. Id. at 28.
25. Daniel Zamani, Note, There’s an Amendment for That: A
Comprehensive Application of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence to Smart
Phones, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 169, 170 (2010).
26. Strategy Analytics: Global LTE Phone Shipments Will Surge Tenfold to
67 Million Units in 2012, BUS. WIRE (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.virtualstrategy.com/2012/03/23/strategy-analytics-global-lte-phone-shipments-will-surgetenfold-67-million-units-2012 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the
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The desire for technologies that can go anywhere makes
cloud computing more appealing. Even with improvements in
personal computing technology, increased mobility generally
requires a tradeoff with the hardware abilities of the device. This
is where the value of the cloud becomes clearer: there are fewer
tradeoffs from having smaller and cheaper end-user devices
because these devices can tap into the power of network-based
services.27
However, mobile devices are vulnerable to the same sorts of
security threats as full-sized computers, including spyware and
viruses, and data transmitted using these devices may not be
secure.28 For this reason, and because of the significant security
concerns that arise in the cloud computing context, we turn to
this topic next.
3. Security
The security of any information in the cloud is often unclear.
There was an uproar when Scott McNealy of Sun Microsystems
dismissed online privacy concerns by proclaiming in 1999, “You
have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.”29 But regardless of
whether consumers will be persuaded by assertions about the
nature or extent of privacy, active efforts by third parties to
infringe on privacy should properly raise red flags.
One threat to devices accessing the cloud is spyware. One can
define spyware as software that installs itself, runs, and uses its
host computer, all without the owner’s permission.30 Similar
software has been called “adware,” an example of which was the
software produced by Gator, which was ad-supported and sent
Washington and Lee Law Review).
27. See Werbach, supra note 8, at 1816 (explaining how cloud computing is
changing the way people think about computers and computer networks).
28. See Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 32–33 (noting the existence of
malware that targets mobile devices, worms with the ability to monitor and
record cell phone conversations, and the exploitation by hackers of information
transmitted using wi-fi hotspots).
29. See Robison, supra note 4, at 1196 (quoting John Schwartz, As Big PC
Brother Watches, Users Encounter Frustration, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2001, at C6).
30. Schwartz, Property, supra note 10, at 2065.
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information about the user and his computer back to the
company.31 In 2004, sources indicated that Gator software was
installed on about thirty-five million computers located in the
United States.32
4. Related Regulations
The degree to which the Internet is or should be regulated is
the subject of much debate.33 Werbach traces the origins of the
broadband regulation debate back to the 1960s, when the FCC
launched the Computer Inquiries to determine when and how
data processing services would become sufficiently intertwined
with communications that they would be covered by the
Communications Act.34 In the first of the Computer Inquiries,
Computer I, the FCC concluded that there was “no public interest
requirement for regulation by government of such activities”
because of the competitive nature of the market for data
processing services.35 However, the FCC did recognize that the
communications circuits that carried these services might need to
be regulated.36
31. Id. at 2066.
32. Id. at 2065.
33. See Shawn Hess, Research Shows America Hates Gov’t Regulation,
WEBPRONEWS (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.webpronews.com/research-showsamerica-hates-govt-regulation-2012-03 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (addressing
attitudes toward search engine regulation) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
34. See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); Werbach, supra note 8,
at 1804; see also Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the
Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities
(Computer I Final Decision), 28 F.C.C. 2d 267 (1971) (final decision and order).
35. See Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence
of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities (Computer I Tentative
Decision), 28 F.C.C. 2d 291, 297 (1970) (tentative decision); see also Werbach,
supra note 8, at 1804 (discussing Computer I and the Communications Act).
36. Computer I Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 269 (“[W]ithout appropriate
regulatory safeguards, the provision of data processing services by common
carriers could adversely affect the statutory obligation of such carriers to
provide adequate communication services under reasonable terms and
conditions and impair effective competition in the sale of data processing
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At the turn of the century, questions about regulating these
communications circuits came to the fore. The Telecommunications
Act of 199637 established a category of services called “information
services,” which the Act defines as “the offering of a capability for
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing,
retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications.”38 Information services are not regulated as a
common carrier under Title II of the Telecommunications Act. In
2002, the FCC designated cable Internet as an “information
service” instead of a “telecommunications service,” a designation
that was upheld by the Supreme Court,39 and later expanded to
include DSL service.40 The National Cable & Telecommunications
Ass’n v. Brand X case was regarded by some as marking a decision
to not regulate the Internet, given the lesser degree to which
information
services
were
regulated
compared
to
telecommunications services.41
B. What Is Cloud Computing?
Up to this point, we have referenced “the cloud” in the
context of cloud computing as a new computing paradigm. In this
subpart, we will go into more detail about cloud computing and
what it is.

services.”); Werbach, supra note 8, at 1825.
37. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
38. 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006).
39. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X, 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
40. In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 14864 para. 15 (Aug. 5, 2005) (report,
order, and notice of proposed rulemaking).
41. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 967; Note, How Chevron Step One Limits
Permissible Agency Interpretations: Brand X and the FCC’s Broadband
Reclassification, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1021 (2011) (“The Supreme Court
affirmed the FCC’s authority to deregulate cable broadband service in Brand
X . . . .”).
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1. Defining Cloud Computing
The term “cloud computing” has become popular and trendy,
but there are many concepts behind this idea. On a general level,
“cloud” is used as a metaphor for the “ethereal Internet” and the
virtual platform that it provides.42 Some view cloud computing
abstractly as the result of the convergence of computing and
communications,43 or more practically as a “scalable network of
servers,”44 as “IT as a service,”45 or as the convenience of being
able to access a shared pool of computing resources over a
network like the World Wide Web.46
42. See David A. Couillard, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth
Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93
MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2205, 2216 (2009); Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 1
(noting that “cloud” is essentially a metaphor for the Internet).
43. Werbach, supra note 8, at 1811.
44. See Konstantinos K. Stylianou, An Evolutionary Study of Cloud
Computing Services Privacy Terms, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 593,
594–95 (2010) (stating that most business executives, lawyers, and computer
technicians understand cloud computing as a scalable network of servers on
which users store data that would traditionally reside on a local computer).
Werbach also embraces this interpretation. Werbach, supra note 8, at 1811
(“Cloud computing is an approach that places application processing and storage
in network-based data centers, rather than in end-user devices such as personal
computers.”); see also Timothy D. Martin, Hey! You! Get Off of My Cloud:
Defining and Protecting the Metes and Bounds of Privacy, Security, and Property
in Cloud Computing, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 283, 292–94 (2010)
(explaining cloud computing as “Infrastructure-as-a-Service”).
45. See Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 30 (stating that at its core, cloud
computing is an IT service because providers “rent” their services to customers).
Wittow and Buller similarly note that definitions of cloud computing typically
involve a third party provider who supplies a subscription-based service for
computing and storage needs. Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 5.
46. See Couillard, supra note 42, at 2216 (“Cloud platforms give users
‘anywhere access’ to applications and data stored on the Internet.”); William R.
Denny, Survey of Recent Developments in the Law of Cloud Computing and
Software as a Service Agreement, 66 BUS. LAW. 237, 237 (2010) (describing cloud
computing as technology that gives users convenient network access to a shared
pool of computing resources); Lanois, supra note 18, at 29 (referring to cloud
computing as being based on the idea of storing software and data on Internet
servers instead of locally); Martin, supra note 44, at 287 (quoting a definition for
cloud computing as “a platform for the delivery of software services and other
applications through remote file servers” in which the data and software stay on
remote servers and are accessible from any computer anywhere); Fernando M.
Pinguelo & Bradford W. Muller, Avoid the Rainy Day: Survey of U.S. Cloud
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Denny maintains that there is not a uniform definition of
cloud computing.47 On the other hand, many commentators also
authoritatively cite the definition of cloud computing put forth
by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST),
which currently defines it as “a model for enabling ubiquitous,
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers,
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or
service provider interaction.”48 For our purposes, we accept the
NIST’s definition because it is broad enough to encompass the
variety of uses for cloud computing.
2. Growth of Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is a growing segment of technology
services, thanks in part to the availability of high speed Internet
service.49 A study by the Pew Internet and American Life Project
concluded that about 69% of Internet users in the United States
already use webmail, other software programs located solely
Computing Caselaw, 2011 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 1 (defining cloud
computing as “a computer networking model that gives users on-demand access
to shared software applications and data storage.”); Robison, supra note 4, at
1200 (drawing a parallel between “dumb” terminals in the mainframe paradigm
and how personal computers are used in the cloud paradigm); Soghoian, supra
note 5, at 364 (applying the term “cloud computing” to “software offerings where
the application is executed in a web browser, via software code that is
downloaded (as needed) from a remote server that also stores users’ files.”);
Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 1 (defining cloud computing as when “an
Internet connection delivers hardware power and software functionality to users
regardless of where they are or which computer they are using”).
47. Denny, supra note 46, at 237.
48. See Peter Mell and Tim Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud
Computing, Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech. (Sept. 2011), http://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf; see also David S. Barnhill, Cloud
Computing and Stored Communications: Another Look at Quon v. Arch
Wireless, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 621, 638–39 (2010) (discussing the NIST
definition of cloud computing); George Jiang, Rain or Shine: Fair and Other
Non-Infringing Uses in the Context of Cloud Computing, 36 J. LEGIS. 395, 412
(2010) (discussing the NIST definition of cloud computing); Kattan, supra note
8, at 620–21 (discussing the NIST definition of cloud computing).
49. Robison, supra note 4, at 1201.
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online, or online data storage.50 A survey of technology insiders
and critics in 2010 reflected a view by the majority that cloud
computing technologies will be heavily used in work
environments by 2020, with most expecting the PC model to
decrease in importance.51 Some suggest that as cloud computing
grows and more activities transition onto the Internet, there will
be a greater focus on interoperability between cloud platforms
and applications.52
As a result of more people using cloud services, the revenue
in this industry is expected to grow substantially. The cloud
services industry saw revenue of $58.6 billion in 2009, and some
analysts are anticipating that the industry’s revenue will
increase between $40 billion and $160 billion over the next few
years.53 Because of these large growth forecasts, many
companies are pushing to be at the forefront of this movement.54

50. See John B. Horrigan, Cloud Computing Gains in Currency, PEW RES.
CTR. (Sept. 12, 2008), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/948/cloud-computing-gains-incurrency (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). A majority of those responding in the Pew study also indicated that
they were very concerned about the use of their personal data by cloud
providers. See id.; see also Martin, supra note 44, at 298 (discussing the Pew
Research Center study); Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 5 (same).
51. Kattan, supra note 8, at 620. Some have noted that cloud computing
has the potential to partially replace the desktop computer. See Stylianou, supra
note 44, at 604; see also Werbach, supra note 8, at 1813–14 (discussing how the
rise of smart, connected mobile devices will increase incorporation of cloud
computing).
52. See Stylianou, supra note 44, at 597 (stating that some platforms and
applications will allow interoperability, which will allow users to transfer
content easily).
53. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 30 (citing a study anticipating growth to
$148.8 billion in revenue by 2014, and a study anticipating over a 20% increase
in spending on cloud services by organizational customers); Soghoian, supra
note 5, at 361 (citing analyst expectations of industry revenue growth between
$40 billion and $160 billion).
54. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 30 (referring to a “recent bidding war
between Hewlett-Packard and Dell to acquire cloud storage firm 3PAR”).
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3. Uses of Cloud Computing

There are a lot of uses of cloud computing and a lot of
aspects to those uses. One of the earliest forms of cloud
computing was server-side e-mail storage.55 There are many
companies offering cloud services.56 Webmail in particular is very
popular, and sometimes an organization may contract with cloud
providers for e-mail in order to save money over running its email system in-house.57 Google provides such services to
organizations through its Google Apps service,58 as well as free
services to individuals over the Web. Google’s services to the
public include webmail through Gmail and Web-based
productivity software through Google Docs.59
There are also a number of other uses that are not as
immediately visible. Users can take advantage of the cloud to
improve the functionality of locally run software, like the Weave
add-on for the Firefox Web browser, which allows users to
synchronize bookmarks, saved passwords, and cookies across
multiple computers by storing this information on Mozilla’s
servers.60 Additionally, Ford is working on a system that would
bring features of cloud computing and social networking to new
cars, perhaps including things like traffic alerts and real-time
fuel consumption monitoring.61 Cloud computing could also be
useful in education to increase student engagement and provide

55. See Couillard, supra note 42, at 2218 (explaining that server-side email was one of the first iterations of cloud computing); Robison, supra note 4, at
1203 (referring to server-side e-mail storage as one of the first cloud computing
services available to the public).
56. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 30 (listing offerings of companies,
including Amazon, Microsoft, IBM, and VMWare).
57. Soma, Gates, & Smith, supra note 16, at 516.
58. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 367–68 (describing services offered by
Google Apps).
59. John T. Kivus, Spring Training for Electronic Search: Examining U.S.
v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. with Regards to Evolving Trends in
Computing, 11 N.C.J.L. & TECH. ON. 115, 128–29 (2009).
60. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 397 (explaining the characteristics of
Firefox, Mozilla’s browser).
61. Lanois, supra note 18, at 32.
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students with additional tools like online forums and storage
space in the cloud.62
The cloud is also leading to many innovations in
entertainment. Some gaming services are appearing in the cloud,
like OnLive and Gaikai, and some posit that the cloud has the
potential to let gamers play games with high-end graphics
without having high-end computers.63 Other entertainment uses
of the cloud include subscription or ad-supported video streaming
services like Netflix and Hulu.64 There are also social networking
websites, like Facebook, that behave in ways consistent with the
NIST’s definition of cloud computing.65
The providers of cloud services may take a variety of
approaches to service provision, differing in areas like cost
models, user interfaces, and treatment of user data. Because
cloud services are still fairly new, some companies may also seek
to ease the transition to the cloud by making their services
resemble software that is run locally on a computer.66 In addition
to easing the transition by focusing on the user experience, cloud
service providers also may make their services more appealing by
offering them for free. There are many cloud services that are
already provided for free, and these services can remain
profitable by relying on ad support.67 Companies that do so often
62. See Cascia, supra note 17, at 884 (discussing the benefits of integrating
cloud computing in schools). The Department of Education takes the position
that cloud computing, data mining, and data aggregation could play valuable
roles in increasing student performance and keeping school districts
accountable. Id. at 887.
63. Lanois, supra note 18, at 31. OnLive launched in June 2010, but is said
to already be worth $1.1 billion. Id.
64. Netflix, How Netflix Works, https://signup.netflix.com/MediaCenter/
HowNetflixWorks (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Hulu, More About Hulu, http://www.hulu.com/about (last
visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
65. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the NIST
definition of cloud computing).
66. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 369–70 (explaining single-site browser
technology). A cloud service provider, looking to ease the transition between
local computing and cloud computing, might also choose to provide support for
offline access, such as Google’s Gears browser add-on that allows limited access
to Gmail. Id. at 370–71.
67. See Jiang, supra note 48, at 415 (explaining different business models
for cloud computing).
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use customer information to generate targeted advertisements,
which some criticize as effectively monetizing users’ private
data.68
Providers may also take very different approaches to data
protection and encryption depending on the service, and we argue
that the public should be made aware of data protection issues.
Remotely stored data that is not intended for public access is
likely to be encrypted, password protected, or have unlisted
links.69 Other data, especially data that is not considered
“sensitive,” are typically stored in an unencrypted format.70
Because cloud computing technology is still emerging, added
features like increased security would cost more for early
adopters, and this cost plus the current lack of market demand
means that cloud service providers currently do not have much
incentive to invest in enhancing security for a lot of the data
involved.71 One of the things that current customers demand,
however, is reliability, so cloud service providers often go to great
lengths to have their services available at least 99.9% of the
time.72
4. Types of Cloud Computing Services
Cloud services may be private, public, or some hybrid of the
two.73 Private clouds may also be referred to as “internal” clouds,
and are located solely within that organization and use only that

68. Soghoian, supra note 5, at 396.
69. Couillard, supra note 42, at 2217. Mozy asserts that it uses encryption
technologies when user data is transmitted and stored, which is different from
most other companies that say that they use SSL encryption for the exchange of
data but do not specify whether data in storage is encrypted. Stylianou, supra
note 44, at 603.
70. Stylianou, supra note 44, at 605. Because Google does not encrypt
stored e-mails, for example, Google’s software can scan e-mail content for key
words for the purpose of targeted advertising. Id.
71. Id. at 606.
72. Id. at 607.
73. Barnhill, supra note 48, at 640.
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organization’s infrastructure.74 Public clouds are offered over the
Internet and are supported by ads or fees.75
There are three primary models for public cloud services:
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS),
and Software as a Service (SaaS).76 Companies that provide
servers and storage for remote use are providing IaaS, while
companies that provide platforms on remote servers to run
applications are providing PaaS.77 A company that makes
software applications available over the Internet, including
webmail, is providing SaaS.78 Gmail and Facebook are examples
of SaaS cloud services.79 SaaS goes much further, however, and
includes services like online gaming and online legal research.80
SaaS is arguably the level that consumers are most familiar
with. The other types of cloud computing services may be more
appealing to developers and computing professionals. PaaS, for
example, gives customers (often software developers) the ability
to deliver their own software applications over the Web to end
users at a lower cost to the developer since they are using
someone else’s servers to do so.81 IaaS, on the other hand,
involves cloud providers giving customers access to raw
computing resources in a manner similar to a utility service.82
Because this Article focuses on individual consumers, the most
relevant category of cloud service for our purposes is SaaS.

74. Couillard, supra note 42, at 2216; Martin, supra note 44, at 287.
75. See Martin, supra note 44, at 287 (explaining how cloud computing
works).
76. Barnhill, supra note 48, at 639–40.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 639; Denny, supra note 46, at 237.
79. Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 31.
80. Martin, supra note 44, at 287–88 (“Under the SaaS model, a user
interacts with an online service through the Internet, and the online service’s
vendor provides the necessary software applications and remote data storage.”).
81. See id. at 289 (explaining the lower costs of PaaS compared to SaaS);
Robison, supra note 4, at 1203 (noting the use of PaaS by third-party
developers).
82. Robison, supra note 4, at 1204.
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C. Advantages and Disadvantages of Cloud Computing

Moving more services onto the cloud has many promises and
pitfalls. It is possible that the future success of cloud services will
depend on how these advantages and disadvantages balance with
each other and, more importantly, with the public’s
expectations.83
Advantages of the cloud paradigm include data
preservation,84 high levels of expertise on the part of cloud service
providers,85 scalability,86 affordability,87 and availability.88
Additionally, some studies have shown that businesses that adopt
SaaS enjoy a return-on-investment of almost 600%.89 Cloud
providers are benefited because they have control over content,
can set access terms, and can also monitor usage statistics.90
83. Stylianou, supra note 44, at 606 (“In effect, the combination of the
sensitive nature of information that cloud services usually attract, the lack of
adequate security from cloud services, and the intensification of governmental
intrusiveness, stands as an impediment to the spread of cloud services.”).
Stylianou also suggests that if cloud services implemented stronger security
measures, like encrypting stored data, such changes could make cloud services
more attractive to business customers. Id. at 609.
84. See Martin, supra note 44, at 294 (describing the benefit of being able
to access applications and data from anywhere at any time).
85. Id.; Stylianou, supra note 44, at 603.
86. See Cascia, supra note 17, at 888 (citing the Department of Education’s
position that the scalability of cloud-based IT services would help schools cut
costs); Jiang, supra note 48, at 413; Martin, supra note 44, at 294 (stating that
cloud computing offers rapid and intelligent resource adjustment as well as
economies of scale); Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that cloud
computing allows a system’s capacity and capability to be increased without
additional infrastructure or personnel investments). Wittow and Buller cite the
example of Animoto, which went from 25,000 users to 250,000 users over the
course of just three days and was able to keep pace with this very high rate of
growth by acquiring more virtual servers. Id. at 5–6. The scalability advantage
works both ways, allowing small companies to easily expand their technological
resources, and allowing downsizing companies to easily cut unnecessary IT
costs. Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 31.
87. Barnhill, supra note 48, at 640–41; Martin, supra note 44, at 289;
Soghoian, supra note 5, at 366.
88. Jiang, supra note 48, at 413; Soghoian, supra note 5, at 366.
89. Martin, supra note 44, at 289
90. See Jiang, supra note 48, at 413; see also Soghoian, supra note 5, at
364–65 (listing the ability to terminate user access and make sure that users
are always running the current software version as two advantages of the cloud
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These additional advantages for cloud providers also make cloud
services attractive to copyright holders because the control
exercised by the cloud provider can provide additional security
and protect the copyright holder from infringement.91
There are also many disadvantages to the cloud paradigm,
and many of these disadvantages arise in part because of
consumers’ loss of control over data. Because consumers are
entrusting their data to a third party, they are relying on that
third party to adequately secure the information,92 have the
services and data available at all times,93 and allow the consumer
to move their information between providers freely,94 all in a
context in which it is unclear how modern privacy law (including
the Fourth Amendment and laws related to confidentiality) may

to the service provider).
91. See Jiang, supra note 48, at 422; Soghoian, supra note 5, at 364–65
(noting the value of the cloud for helping content owners better protect
copyrights and trade secrets).
92. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 374 (“[N]early all [] leading cloud
providers offer products that are by default vulnerable to snooping, account
hijacking, and data theft by third parties.”). Soghoian suggests that the reason
that hackers are a threat to users of cloud services is because cloud providers
have not yet adopted strong encryption technologies. Id. at 361. Businesses are
likely to be very concerned about the potential security issues of the cloud, so
they will have to balance the financial benefits of moving to the cloud against
the costs of data security like encryption and key management. Couillard, supra
note 42, at 2217.
93. See Kattan, supra note 8, at 623 (explaining how cloud computing
creates dependency); Martin, supra note 44, at 294 (describing the benefit of
being able to access applications and data from anywhere at any time). While
cloud services strive for reliability, the technology is still developing and thus is
still very susceptible to human error and programming bugs, like the leap day
bug that caused Microsoft’s Azure service to be unavailable all day on February
29, 2012. Bill Laing, Summary of Windows Azure Service Disruption on Feb 29,
2012, WINDOWS AZURE TEAM BLOG (Mar. 9, 2012, 6:03 PM PST),
http://blogs.msdn.com/b/windowsazure/archive/2012/03/09/summary-ofwindows-azure-service-disruption-on-feb-29th-2012.aspx (last visited Feb. 3,
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
94. Martin, supra note 44, at 297–98; see also Kattan, supra note 8, at 623
(noting that a customer who moves data storage and processing onto the cloud
may have difficulty if he later decides to revert to the PC model). Martin notes
that this lock-in problem is likely to not apply to IaaS because a customer of an
IaaS provider will typically have everything on a virtual machine over which the
customer can exercise full control. Martin, supra note 44, at 294.
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apply.95 Another disadvantage is related to the risk of loss. If a
provider fails to secure data and a consumer’s information is
compromised, the risk of loss is likely to fall on the consumer
rather than the cloud service provider.96
In this Article, we emphasize the need for data control in the
cloud, which we define as consisting of the ability to withdraw
data (data withdrawal) and move data to a new location (data
mobility). We argue that data control is essential for meaningful
consumer choice. Consumers will inherently have less control
over data stored in the cloud,97 but being able to choose (and
switch to) providers that are more reliable or that offer stronger
security measures is important for preserving consumer
95. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 44 (citing a publication of the World
Privacy Forum). Privacy is likely to be especially important to consumers in the
context of electronic health records. See Colin P. McCarthy, Note, Paging Dr.
Google: Personal Health Records and Patient Privacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2243, 2253 (2010) (discussing the potential problems of personal health records).
These concerns are not just limited to health services. Confidentiality is a
significant concern to a number of other professions when considering the
adoption of cloud services as well. See Cascia, supra note 17, at 884 (noting that
outsourcing IT management to third parties may make it more difficult for
schools to make sure that the personal information of students remains private);
Martin, supra note 44, at 295. Martin mentions the legal field by name as one
industry that should be hesitant at this point when considering whether to use
cloud services in support of its practices. Id. at 300. It is also unclear how the
Fourth Amendment will apply to information held by third party cloud service
providers. See id. at 295–96; see also Soghoian, supra note 5, at 361 (noting that
cloud computing leaves users vulnerable to invasions of privacy by the
government, resulting in “evisceration of traditional Fourth Amendment
protections of a person’s private files and documents”). Martin also notes
concerns that the federal statute governing electronic messaging may be
difficult or unable to apply to modern technology. Martin, supra note 44, at 295–
96.
96. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 378–79 (discussing why cloud computing
providers have little incentive to protect users); see also infra Part IV.A
(discussing contents of TOS agreements, including explicit limitations on
providers’ legal liability).
97. See Kattan, supra note 8, at 623 (noting the customer’s dependence on
cloud service providers to protect the customer’s data); Martin, supra note 44, at
289 (noting customers’ lack of control over data and the security practices of the
cloud vendor); Stylianou, supra note 44, at 595 (explaining that some private
data will be transferred away from the user’s immediate physical control);
Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 6 (noting the lack of control that users have
over data in the cloud and the importance that the user be able to trust the
cloud service provider).
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autonomy. Currently, there are systemic limitations to
meaningful choice. SaaS customers may experience lock-in
problems because a cloud provider may store the customer’s
information in a format unique to the cloud provider and thus
make it difficult for the customer to switch cloud providers
later.98 This control over content also leads to some concerns
about private censorship. Werbach notes the existence of
concerns over cloud services having too much power to censor
controversial causes, such as when Amazon Web Services
dropped Wikileaks as a customer.99
D. Cloud Computing Legal Issues
For our purposes, there are two important categories of legal
issues raised in the context of cloud computing: data use and
procedural issues. Data use issues could include the use of both
public and private information, thus our use of the term “data
use” also includes privacy concerns, examined in more detail
below. Procedural issues relating to cloud computing can include
E-Discovery and jurisdiction questions. The appropriate degree of
regulation is also in controversy, so even if we could identify all of
the possible legal issues related to cloud computing, it may prove
difficult to effectively regulate the industry.100
One data use issue is the problem of “scraping,” specifically
the question of how courts should deal with the unauthorized,
automated collection of information by, for example, auction
services that list relevant auctions in one search across multiple
98. Martin, supra note 44, at 297–98; see also Kattan, supra note 8, at 623
(noting that a customer who moves data storage and processing onto the cloud
may have difficulty if they later decide to revert to the PC model). Martin notes
that this lock-in problem is likely to not apply to IaaS because a customer of an
IaaS provider will typically have everything on a virtual machine over which the
customer can exercise full control. Martin, supra note 44, at 294.
99. See Werbach, supra note 8, at 1820 (“From a broader perspective,
though, the rise of cloud computing changes a default assumption that data will
be within the control of the user.”).
100. See id. at 1766 (referring to network neutrality as the “final hurrah” of
the regulatory framework under the Telecommunications Act, as views of the
industry have shifted “from regulated monopoly to managed competition within
defined industry segments”).
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auction websites.101 Claims relating to scraping have been
brought based on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),102
the tort of trespass, and a “hot news” theory.103 An analysis of
these options and whether they provide adequate means of
redress for companies whose data is mined poses an interesting
research question for future research. Our concern about the
privacy of individual users also makes us question whether
recourse for “scraping” might also apply to protect individuals
whose data is mined without their consent, though this is outside
the scope of our research.
1. Privacy
Our primary focus in this Article is on the implications of
cloud computing and corresponding privacy agreements on
personal privacy. There are several legal issues relating to
privacy and cloud computing, including the uncertain
applications of the Health Information Portability and
Accessibility Act (HIPAA),104 the Stored Communications Act,105
and the Fourth Amendment, especially the third-party doctrine of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.106 If a legal regime is put into
place to provide stronger privacy protections, it is unclear
101. See Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 8–9 (discussing how the scraping
issue impacts cloud computing).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
103. See id. (discussing how the scraping issue impacts cloud computing).
104. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1181 et seq.; 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300gg, 1320d et seq. (2006)); Denny, supra note 46, at 239–40 (“Yet another
statutory hurdle to cloud computing in the United States is the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (‘HIPAA’).”).
105. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.);
Werbach, supra note 8, at 1819 (noting that a search warrant is required to
access e-mail stored on a user’s hard drive, but that under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, a lower standard would be applied if that same email had been stored on Google’s Gmail servers for more than six months).
106. See Stylianou, supra note 44, at 596–97 (“[I]t is still debatable whether
access to online stored data should be considered a search . . . or whether by
communicating data to a remote server the subject is considered to have
knowingly exposed the information.”).
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whether data collection should be addressed based on the
quantity collected or the type collected, and there is also a lot of
uncertainty about how to address the transfer of data between
countries with different privacy laws.107
Many aspects of the privacy debate rely on an understanding
of privacy theories. Several things influence privacy protections
online, including social norms, website architecture, and the
law.108 Some note that there are societal obstacles to
strengthening privacy protections online, arguing that the
younger generation values the interconnectedness and low cost of
cloud services more than they value their personal privacy.109
Werbach asserts that the range of concerns about cloud providers’
information practices goes beyond our current concept of
“privacy,” and suggests referring to it as “information
governance.”110 In lieu of creating a new category, Solove suggests
revising the concept of “privacy” to encompass these concerns.111
It is likely that there will be an increase in public policy activity
in this area in the near future,112 underscoring the importance
and timeliness of this topic. A significant problem that arises
when dealing with technologically sophisticated policy issues,
however, is that some judges and other policy makers may be ill107. See id. at 595–96 (discussing whether access to cloud data is a search).
108. See Michael Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, Does Law Matter Online?
Empirical Evidence on Privacy Law Compliance, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L.
REV. 337, 339–41 (2011) (“Certain non-legal mechanisms can affect online
privacy and shape the power of individuals to control their personal data.”).
109. See Robison, supra note 4, at 1237–38 (“[Y]ounger users are more likely
to embrace the Internet’s interconnectedness and convenience by participating
in social networking, sharing digital content, and using cloud services.”). But see
Chris Hoofnagle, Jennifer King, Su Li, & Joseph Turow, How Different Are
Young Adults from Older Adults When It Comes to Information Privacy
Attitudes & Policies? 20 (Working Paper Series, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1589864 (noting that their study results failed to show
the expected significant differences between the behavior of young adults and
older adults online with regard to privacy).
110. Werbach, supra note 8, at 1833.
111. See generally Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 477 (2006) [hereinafter Solove, Taxonomy] (setting forth a new taxonomy
for the understanding of information privacy).
112. See Werbach, supra note 8, at 1835 (“Public policy activity in this area
seems bound to increase.”).
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informed about the underlying technology, leading these policy
makers to hesitate when faced with current issues.113
There may also be legal harms arising from data gathering
practices. Richards discusses the “database problem,” in which
there are very large databases that make it efficient and valuable
for businesses to use consumer information, but the legal rights
of the consumers in these databases are unresolved.114 Stylianou
acknowledges that cloud computing does result in more private
information being collected and this could be harmful, but
concludes that most of this increase in information collection
happens voluntarily, and that the compromises in privacy appear
to be no greater than necessary for the delivery of cloud
services.115 Some were critical of the settlement in Authors Guild
v. Google116 for its lack of restrictions concerning data gathering,
arguing that privacy issues should be addressed in the settlement
to protect people from having their reading choices readily
available to third parties.117
2. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction issues concerning a court’s ability to hear a
claim will arise in the context of the cloud for two reasons: (1) the
113. For example, in the oral arguments of City of Ontario v. Quon, Justices
Roberts and Scalia noted their confusion as to how wireless communications are
transmitted, with both indicating that they were not aware that these messages
were inherently processed by a third party. See Transcript of Oral Arguments at
48–50, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (No. 08-1332),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1332.
pdf (exemplifying the confusion of Justices Roberts and Scalia as to how wireless
communications are transmitted).
114. Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment,
52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1150, 1156–65 (2005).
115. See Stylianou, supra note 44, at 594–96 (discussing voluntary
information collection).
116. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
117. See Denny, supra note 46, at 238–39 (“Much of the recent debate
surrounding cloud computing and privacy stems from a settlement in Authors
Guild v. Google Inc.”); Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 7 (“Privacy concerns
also have been raised in the context of the pending Authors Guild v. Google
[Inc.] book search settlement, which creates a cloud-based database of
searchable books.”).
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lack of borders in cyberspace; and (2) the vast differences between
privacy laws in different locations.118 If a conflict arises with
respect to a cloud service, where could that conflict be resolved? If
there is a conflict between a customer and cloud provider within
the United States, the customer might be bound by arbitration
language in a TOS agreement, or by a choice of law or venue
clause.119
But what about more geographically vague situations? Some
discussions about jurisdiction assume that the applicable law will
be determined by the physical location of the data, but this
information is often unknown to the customer.120 Sometimes, a
defendant may claim that he has insufficient contacts with the
forum state for a particular court to exercise jurisdiction.121
Because of these jurisdictional problems, it is important that the
TOS agreements for cloud services specify where data will be
stored and which laws will apply.122 Otherwise, the uncertainties
related to jurisdiction in the cloud may chill some online activity
by discouraging people from engaging in electronic commerce.123
Approaches to informational privacy can vary between
nations, and the United States as a whole has a privacy law
118. See Stylianou, supra note 44, at 596 (discussing the transfer of data
between countries).
119. See Christopher Kuner, Data Protection Law and International
Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part 1), 18 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 176, 178 (2010)
[hereinafter Kuner, Part 1] (noting the overlap between choice of law and
jurisdiction).
120. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 44 (“[D]ata that might be secure in one
country may not be in another, and in many cases, users of cloud services do not
know where their information is being held.”); Stylianou, supra note 44, at 602
(“Because different national laws accord different levels of protection to personal
and private information, it is important that users know where their data is
stored.”).
121. See Pinguelo & Muller, supra note 46, at 1 (“It is apparent that the use
of a cloud can potentially increase the number of ‘contacts’ a party is found to
have for personal jurisdiction purposes, and thus raise its exposure to lawsuits
in multiple forums.”).
122. See Denny, supra note 46, at 239 (“According to the Privacy Authors, if
readers were worried that information about their reading habits could be
disseminated to the government, divorcing spouses, or other interested third
parties, these readers would be less likely to view books on controversial
topics.”).
123. Kuner, Part 1, supra note 119, at 178.
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regime that is much less protective of personal privacy than that
of the European Union.124 Can a court in the European Union
exercise jurisdiction over a U.S. company that violates the
personal privacy of EU citizens? Generally, the answer will be
yes, based on principles of jurisdiction.
In the international context, jurisdiction can be described as
the right of one country to regulate actions that are not solely
conducted within that nation’s borders.125 Three categories of
international jurisdiction are legislative jurisdiction, under which
a nation’s laws can apply to cases with a foreign element;
adjudicative jurisdiction, when the nation’s courts have the power
to try cases involving a foreign element; and enforcement
jurisdiction, when the nation has the power to act in another
nation’s territory to enforce its own laws.126
Exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction may be justified when
the acts were committed or completed within the nation’s
territory, when the perpetrator or victim was a citizen of that
nation, when the act has effects within that nation (a justification
that is commonly criticized for its open-endedness), or when the
act jeopardizes the nation’s sovereignty.127 Because adjudicative
jurisdiction can be found when the victim of a wrong is a citizen
of the adjudicating nation, this means that service providers in
124. See Stylianou, supra note 44, at 597 (noting that the use of the Safe
Harbor agreement allows U.S companies to process the data of European
citizens). This agreement is in lieu of a privacy law overhaul to make the U.S.
approach to privacy match the approach of the EU. Id.
125. See Kuner, Part 1, supra note 119, at 178–79 (defining international
jurisdiction as “the State’s right under international law to regulate conduct in
matters not exclusively of domestic concern.” (citation omitted)).
126. See id. at 184 (discussing categories of jurisdiction). Generally, direct
enforcement of one nation’s laws in another nation is not permitted, though a
nation may apply its domestic law to conduct that occurs elsewhere, provided
recognized legal grounds exist for doing so. Id. at 185. Enforcement jurisdiction,
however, is rarely found. See Christopher Kuner, Data Protection Law and
International Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part 2), 18 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH.
227, 232 (2010) [hereinafter Kuner, Part 2] (“[A] State may not carry out an
investigation in another State, if the purpose is to enforce its own
administrative, criminal, or fiscal law. These restrictions apply even if the
persons or entities in the second State consent to the first State’s enforcement
actions.”).
127. See Kuner, Part 1, supra note 119, at 188–90 (examining adjudicative
jurisdiction in detail).
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the United States must act carefully to comply with the privacy
laws of other jurisdictions when a customer is a foreign citizen.
E. Calls for Action in the Cloud
The current legal regime applicable to cloud computing has
drawn a lot of criticism from organizations that want the law to
consider current technologies.128 Legislative reform will likely be
necessary to address the new environment created by cloud
computing, but such reform will need to take into account many
different concerns.129 For example, reforms will need to take data
protection into consideration because customers are likely to
want data stored in the cloud to be protected the same as it would
be on the customer’s own tangible storage devices.130
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)131 is
examined in detail below in Part III.B.2. Several institutions
have urged lawmakers to amend the ECPA. Microsoft proposed
the Cloud Computing Advancement Act (CCAA)132 in 2010, and
the Center for Democracy and Technology has also recommended

128. See Kattan, supra note 8, at 645 (suggesting revision of the Stored
Communications Act and referencing the position of the nonprofit Digital Due
Process that the ECPA should be modernized and clarified); Martin, supra note
44, at 286 (noting recommendations made by Microsoft and the Center for
Democracy and Technology). Digital Due Process is an organization that is
focused on modernizing the approaches of law enforcement to electronic data,
and they encourage the reformation of the ECPA to take into account recent and
emerging technologies. Lanois, supra note 18, at 45.
129. See Werbach, supra note 8, at 1826 (“The solution to the contemporary
challenges of cloud computing likely requires some legislative reform in addition
to FCC action.”).
130. See Couillard, supra note 42, at 2205–06 (“Despite the shift in Internet
usage, users expect their information to be treated the same on this virtual
cloud as it would be if it were stored on their own computer, phone, or iPod.”).
131. See Electronic Commc’n Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2712 (2006)).
132. See Brad Smith, Gen. Counsel, Microsoft Corp., Speech at the
Brookings Institute Policy Forum: Cloud Computing for Business and Society
(Jan. 20, 2010) available at http://download.microsoft.com/download/C/0/
0/C00D24A5-A686-4109-9DB8-14A29E058069/Building_Confidence_in_the_Clo
ud_General_Counsel_Brad_Smith_Brookings_Speech.docx.
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legislative action to address cloud computing issues.133 The CCAA
would strengthen the privacy protections of the ECPA, unifying
the concepts of “electronic communications service” and “remote
computing service,” and would also enhance the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (CFAA)134 by presuming a loss of $500 for each
count of unauthorized access.135 The CDT proposal, on the other
hand, focuses more on civil liberties, urging Congress to amend
the ECPA to require probable cause before a seizure of online
information can be executed without notice.136
1. Transparency and Control
Other calls for revisions of the system have focused on the
need for transparency.137 To say that practices of cloud providers
should be transparent about information use means that
customers should be well-informed of what companies are doing
with the customers’ personal data. In examining Internet issues,
the FCC maintains that transparency is important for consumer
protection in the telecommunications context.138 Martin suggests
that when addressing cloud computing concerns, it will be
important to ensure that the practices of cloud providers are
understood and that customers have the ability to exercise
control over their data.139 Transparency could have additional
advantages by encouraging cloud platforms to be more
interoperable, allowing for greater data portability.140 If the
133. See Martin, supra note 44, at 286 (discussing recently proposed
legislation, standards, and governing principles).
134. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
135. Martin, supra note 44, at 309–10.
136. Id. at 310.
137. See, e.g., Werbach, supra note 8, at 1767 (“To achieve its public interest
mandates, the FCC must consider . . . [and examine] transparency.”).
138. See id. at 1837 (discussing the FCC’s adoption of a transparency
mandate in its Open Internet Order).
139. See Martin, supra note 44, at 286 (“Any solution needs to incorporate
guarantees that data owners would be able to gain control of their data in a
usable form should their service providers become inoperable.”).
140. See Werbach, supra note 8, at 1839 (noting the ancillary benefits of
transparency).
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industry takes an approach to personal data that focuses on the
ability of users to control their data, transparency may prove
beneficial and alleviate some of the information asymmetry
between cloud providers and their customers.141
Industry leaders are conscious of transparency concerns. A
consortium of industry leaders put forth the Open Cloud
Manifesto, advocating the use of standardization and
collaboration to develop an “open cloud.”142 The Open Cloud
Manifesto focuses on transparency and interoperability between
cloud providers, with one of the goals being to minimize the lockin issue.143 If implemented, this manifesto might mitigate some of
the data control issues that we are concerned about in this
Article.
It could also facilitate transparency for users to be proactive
about seeking information. The European Network and
Information Security Agency (ENISA) suggests that users ask
cloud providers about things like the provider’s personnel
security procedures, use of subcontractors, operational security
procedures, disaster recovery protocol, and miscellaneous legal
issues like data location, jurisdiction issues, and how the
customer can recover data upon termination of the service.144 We
posit that users who are given the right to control their
information are likely to be more involved in the process of
controlling their own data.
F. Cloud Services in Different Industries
There are a number of professions in which practitioners are
required to handle client or patient data with care, making data
protection in these sensitive industries very important. One of these
industries is the legal field, in which attorneys and their staff

141. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1882.
142. Martin, supra note 44, at 286.
143. See id. at 310 (discussing the Open Cloud Manifesto in detail).
144. See id. at 311 (examining the European Network and Information
Security Agency report, which recommends a series of user procedures that can
be employed for self-protection).
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are required to take great steps to protect client confidentiality.145
Still, some state bar associations may recognize the convenience
of cloud services and may be inclined to approve of attorney
practices in which client information is stored using public cloud
services.146 Martin, however, suggests that the ABA should
establish ethical guidelines relating to topics like document
storage, e-mail, and confidentiality in the cloud.147
In the health care industry, there has been a shift toward
using electronic medical records (EMR) as an alternative to paper
records.148 A more recent push is toward maintaining personal
health records (PHR) online through services like Epic,
Microsoft’s HealthVault, and Google Health, in which the patient
will have control over her records.149 However, PHR providers do
not fall within one of the statutory categories of “covered entities”
under HIPAA, so the storage and transmission of personal health
information is not currently regulated by HIPAA or any of the
related rules.150
In addition to control, security of health information is also of
paramount concern. McCarthy notes that the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act151 requires
users to be notified if there is a breach threatening PHR data,
145. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 5.3 (1983) (discussing
confidentiality and the duties of nonlawyer staff, respectively).
146. See Martin, supra note 44, at 300–01 (citing a New York bar opinion
about using e-mail services that scan e-mail content to generate targeted
advertising).
147. See id. at 313 (“[T]he ABA should move quickly to establish ethical
guidelines for lawyers who use cloud computing services . . . [including]
document storage, e-mail, collaboration, due diligence for confidentiality, and
breach notification related to cloud services.”).
148. McCarthy, supra note 95, at 2250–51. EMRs, however, are generally
limited to that specific provider, with no sharing of information. See id. (“Each
health care provider maintains its own EMRs—physician’s offices maintain
their EMRs, hospitals maintain their EMRs, and so on.”).
149. See id. at 2245, 2251–54 (“Until now, patients could request a copy of
her [sic] medical records from their health care providers but have not had the
opportunity to control them in the way that PHRs offer.”).
150. Id. at 2258.
151. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act,
Pub. L. 111–5, Div. A, Title XIII, Div. B, Title IV, 123 Stat. 226, 467 (2009)
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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and that the HHS has also promulgated a rule that requires PHR
vendors to comply with notification requirements if a breach
occurs.152 The increased vulnerability of data in the cloud
necessitates strong protections for PHR, like encryption,
password protection, and authentication requirements.153 One of
our recommendations for regulating cloud providers focuses on
establishing baseline standards for data protection, which could
help address some of these issues.
III. Privacy Fundamentals
A. Privacy Theories
“Privacy” is an example of a word that can mean many
different things.154 It can be a handmade sign on the door of a
teenager’s room prohibiting entry by parents and little brothers.
It can be the right to make one’s own decisions without undue
burden imposed by the government. On the Web, some people
might consider social networking posts “private” if they are only
viewable by the poster’s four hundred closest friends,155 while
others do not consider anything that they do on the Web “private”
unless all data is heavily encrypted and all of their traffic is
routed through an anonymizer.156
152. See McCarthy, supra note 95, at 2263–64 (discussing new federal law
governing PHR privacy and security).
153. See id. at 2267 (“PHRs should be required to employ best practices in
data encryption, password protection, and authentication in order to safeguard
PHI stored on their servers.”).
154. See Anita L. Allen, Privacy-As-Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and
Moral Limits of the Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 861, 864 (2000) [hereinafter
Allen, Data Control] (noting the wide variation in how “privacy” is defined, even
among people who seemingly are talking about the same privacy paradigm of
privacy being data control).
155. Some argue, however, that such postings are still functionally private
because of the boundaries that exist by making a posting viewable only by
certain people. See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1920–21 (citing Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919
(2005)). This view arguably does not consider the potential of screenshots of
“friends only” postings being reposted elsewhere.
156. These three categories of privacy have been referred to as physical and
proprietary privacy, decisional privacy, and informational privacy. Allen, Data
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Some view privacy as a negative freedom, providing a
freedom from something instead of a claim to something else.157
Perhaps the most prevalent view of privacy over the years has
been the secrecy paradigm of privacy, where privacy is limited to
things that are secret.158 There is also an “invasion conception” of
privacy, where privacy violations are viewed as invasions of an
interest.159 Some view privacy as referring to inaccessibility,
when a person or information about her is inaccessible to
others.160 Some also address what sort of harm is necessary to
find a privacy violation. Solove asserts that there can be an
infringement of privacy “even if no secrets are revealed and even
if nobody is watching us,” connecting the concepts of privacy and
human dignity.161
The importance of privacy is sometimes stated in grandiose
terms, tying the concept of privacy to democratic ideals like
Control, supra note 154, at 865–66.
157. See Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 747–
48 (1999) [hereinafter Allen, Coercing Privacy] (discussing conservative and
liberal interpretations of the right to privacy).
158. See Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 111, at 497–98 (“Under the secrecy
paradigm . . . if the information is not previously hidden, then no privacy
interest is implicated by the collection or dissemination of the information. In
many areas of law, this narrow view of privacy has limited the recognition of
privacy violations.”). This paradigm can be seen in the approach courts have
taken to the Fourth Amendment, as well as in the tort of intrusion upon
seclusion. Id. Solove takes the view that the secrecy paradigm approach to
information privacy law is outmoded. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at
143.
159. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 8 (defining the invasion
conception of privacy). Solove says that the Warren and Brandeis theory of
privacy falls within this conception of privacy, with a focus on the existence of
discrete wrongs to individuals. See id. at 93–94 (discussing the two models for
the protection of privacy). Solove also criticizes the invasion conception of
privacy by arguing that it overlooks the structural nature of certain privacy
problems that affect not just an individual, but also society as a whole. See id. at
97.
160. See Allen, Data Control, supra note 154, at 867 (“[O]ther than in
contexts in which ‘privacy’ holds its decisional and proprietary meanings,
privacy refers to a degree of inaccessibility of a person or information about her
to others’ five senses and surveillance devices.”); Allen, Coercing Privacy, supra
note 157, at 724 (“Privacy obtains where persons and personal information are,
to a degree, inaccessible to others.”).
161. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 44, 55.
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independent thought and the right to take political actions.162
Alan Westin, an early information privacy scholar, defined
privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others.”163 The law
has taken a number of approaches to address different concerns
associated with privacy. The right to privacy has been recognized
in the United States for over a century, though coherent
definitions have generally been lacking.164 Solove views privacy
as a concept that encompasses many different kinds of distinct
but interrelated issues.165
The concept of privacy also overlaps with constitutional
protections under the Fourth Amendment, where the focus is on a
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”166 This legal concept is
connected to several philosophical questions: what is privacy,
where does it exist, and is it reasonable to expect a particular
action to be private? If the government conducts surveillance
somewhere that there is an expectation of privacy, a warrant is

162. See Allen, Coercing Privacy, supra note 157, at 734 (“Liberal theorists
claim that we need privacy to be persons, independent thinkers, free political
actors, and citizens of a tolerant democracy.”); Solove, Taxonomy, supra note
111, at 489 (citing Julie Cohen and Paul Schwartz for the argument that
“privacy is a constitutive element of a civil society”).
163. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
164. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1155 (discussing the sometimes
uneasy coexistence of privacy and speech); Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus
Peifer, Prosser’s Privacy and the German Right of Personality: Are Four Privacy
Torts Better than One Unitary Concept?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1925, 1963 (2010) (“[I]n
their comprehensive work, Privacy, Property and Personality, [the authors]
argue that the right of privacy in the United States ‘remains somewhat
conceptually uncertain and poorly defined.’” (quoting HUW BEVERLEY-SMITH ET
AL., PRIVACY, PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY 207 (2005))); Solove, Taxonomy, supra
note 111, at 562 (“But our understanding of privacy remains in a fog, and the
law remains fragmented and inconsistent.”).
165. Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1914–15; Solove, Taxonomy, supra
note 111, at 562.
166. See Rebecca N. Cordero, No Expectation of Privacy: Should School
Officials be Able to Search Students’ Lockers Without Any Suspicion of Wrong
Doing?, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 305, 308 (2002) (“In his concurrence, Justice Harlan
coined the term a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ to describe an area subject
to the protection of the Fourth Amendment.”).
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necessary to protect against unreasonable intrusion.167 Generally,
public surveillance is not viewed as an intrusion because
behaviors are being exposed to the public, but there may be
exceptions when such surveillance is overzealous.168 As one court
said, “The mere fact that a person can be seen by someone does
not automatically mean that he or she can legally be forced to be
subject to being seen by everyone.”169
The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the protections afforded to electronic
communications under the ECPA, and privacy torts are three
large legal categories for the concept of privacy.170 As we examine
in later sections, the application of the Fourth Amendment and
the ECPA to the Information Age is far from clear. Additionally,
there is also a sense that privacy tort law is ineffective at
addressing these issues.171 The traditional model for privacy
protection simply does not address the sorts of privacy problems
that have arisen recently.172
The desire for privacy is arguably an innate human trait, and
privacy theorists thus often make philosophical or literary
allusions when explaining the importance of privacy. One of the
most vivid images for the modern information privacy problems is
Jeremy Bentham’s design for a prison that he called the
167. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
168. See Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 111, at 498 (“In some cases, however,
courts have recognized a harm in public surveillance.”).
169. Sanders v. Am. Broad. Comps., Inc., 978 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1999).
170. Other relevant elements of constitutional law include the freedom of
association and the freedom of anonymous speech under the First Amendment.
See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 64–65 (discussing the right to
privacy).
171. See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1889 (“Today, the chorus of
opinion is that the tort law of privacy has been ineffective, particularly in
remedying the burgeoning collection, use, and dissemination of personal
information in the Information Age.”).
172. See id. at 1918 (“Tort law has not emerged as the leading protector of
privacy.”). Solove argues that many of the privacy problems we confront today
are systemic in nature, stemming from information flows, with multiple actors
being responsible for these problems. Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy,
and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1232 (2003)
[hereinafter Solove, Architecture].
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Panopticon.173 In the Panopticon, prison cells are distributed
around a central observation tower, and someone placed in the
tower can monitor all of the prison cells without the prisoners
knowing when they are being observed, and this fear of
observation leads to the prisoners behaving better.174 In the
context of the Internet, Schwartz has argued that there is a
danger both of a government Panopticon and private Panopticons
operated by private entities that collect and use information
while resisting attempts at transparency.175
Privacy concerns gained more public visibility in the early
1980s, perhaps due to the era’s relationship with George Orwell’s
dystopian novel Nineteen Eighty Four.176 Similar to the
Panopticon, the telescreens of Nineteen Eighty Four allowed the
government to monitor citizens without their knowledge that
they were being observed.177 Perhaps thanks in part to this work
of fiction—and the fact that it is required reading for many high
school seniors—U.S. citizens are keenly aware when government
action has the potential to intrude on privacy and lead to an
authoritarian state.178
173. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON 201 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (listing the essential elements of the
Panopticon’s effectiveness being visibility and unverifiability, visibility referring
to that of the tower, and unverifiability referring to the prisoners’ inability to
know whether they are being observed).
174. Id. at 201; Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1240. Solove also
notes Foucault’s argument that the Panopticon represents power relations in
society. Id. at 1240.
175. See Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV.
815, 852–53 (2000) [hereinafter Schwartz, State] (discussing the creation of a
privately operated Panopticon in the context of Internet privacy).
176. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1825–26 (“Part of this attention
was driven, in turn, by the arrival of George Orwell’s titular year, 1984.”).
177. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 31.
178. See James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy
Center (Watch What You Say), WIRED (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.
wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/all/1 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013)
(describing a massive new National Security Agency data collection center
under construction) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Solove
takes issue with the frequent comparisons to Nineteen Eighty Four, instead
arguing that because the privacy threats are distributed across private
companies and government bureaucracy, a better comparison would be to
Kafka’s The Trial. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 7–9 (“[F]or a more
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1. Warren and Brandeis

Theoretical discussions of privacy law often begin in 1890,
when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published their article
about privacy as a right of personality.179 Warren and Brandeis
were especially concerned about the use of private information by
the media and the implications of technological developments like
new and cheaper photography technologies.180 Warren and
Brandeis also argued that a person’s intellectual property was
not a matter of private property, but rather was related to the
person’s “inviolate personality.”181
Warren and Brandeis were supportive of the idea of applying
the common law to protect a right to privacy, which they
famously summarized as a “right to be let alone.”182 In their
article, they supported enforcing the right of privacy using tort
damages to provide individuals with compensation for the
“mental suffering” caused by the privacy invasions.183 This view
complete understanding of the issues, I turn to . . . Franz Kafka’s depiction of
bureaucracy in The Trial.”). In The Trial, the protagonist is under arrest and
does not understand why because the bureaucratic government has a large
amount of information about the protagonist that it refuses to share with him.
See id. at 8–9 (discussing Kafka’s novel The Trial).
179. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890); see also Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1888
(writing that Warren and Brandeis popularized privacy in American law with
their famous article in 1890); Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1819
(recognizing the Warren and Brandeis article as a famous example of privacy’s
early jurisprudence).
180. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1198 (“[M]odern thinking about the
right of privacy is often traced to Warren and Brandeis’s privacy article, in
which their concern was not primarily data privacy, but rather media use of
private information.”); Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1819 (“The
paradigmatic privacy invasion for Warren and Brandeis concerned the press
intruding on the privacy of individuals by printing gossip about them.”). This
position leads to a balancing of the interest in privacy against interests under
the Freedom of the Press Clause of the First Amendment. Richards & Solove,
supra note 1, at 1892; Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1229.
181. Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 164, at 1944.
182. Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1891.
183. Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1229–30. Warren and Brandeis
expressed a preference for money damages over injunctions, which they noted
may be appropriate in narrow circumstances, and asserted that narrower
circumstances would be required for criminal penalties to be appropriate. Id. at
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of privacy harms focuses on dignitary harms, like harm to
reputation, based on the concept that privacy violations are a
type of invasion to the victim’s dignity.184
Case law on privacy was heavily influenced by the Warren
and Brandeis article, especially when the dispute involved the
use of photographs of ordinary people to promote a company’s
product.185 However, by the time the Warren and Brandeis article
was fifty years old, privacy was still a very minor doctrine in tort
law. Only twelve states recognized the right of privacy by
common law, and only two recognized it by statute.186
2. Prosser
For modern privacy scholars, the next major development in
the privacy law of the United States was the 1960 publication of
William Prosser’s article, Privacy.187 In this article, Prosser
argued that there were four categories within privacy tort law:
appropriation privacy, intrusion privacy, unauthorized public

1230.
184. See Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 111, at 487; SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON,
supra note 2, at 93–94 (referring to the privacy theory of Warren and Brandeis
as being based on an “invasion conception” of privacy, which turns on the
existence of discrete wrongs to individuals).
185. See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1892–93 (“Warren and
Brandeis’s approach to privacy was in one sense profoundly conservative, as it
was part of a broader legal strategy employed by late-nineteenth-century elites
to protect their reputations from the masses in the face of disruptive social and
technological change.”).
186. See id. at 1895 (discussing the number of states that recognize certain
common law privacy rights).
187. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960); see also
Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 164, at 1926 (“Today, Prosser’s verdict on the
momentous article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis can fittingly be
applied to his own work: ‘It has come to be regarded as the outstanding example
of the influence of legal periodicals upon the American law.’” (quoting William L.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960))).
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disclosure of private facts, and false light.188 In constructing these
four categories, Prosser analyzed hundreds of privacy cases.189
Prosser’s approach was thus fairly comprehensive, but the
categories he created were also narrow and rigid.190 The rigidity
was perhaps based on Prosser’s concern that privacy torts might
swallow up established doctrines like defamation law and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.191 In some ways,
Prosser seemed to be skeptical of privacy laws because of their
potential to interfere with the flow of information, and he would
have been concerned with the balance between newsworthiness
and conflicting privacy interests.192 Unfortunately, this rigidity
also makes it difficult to apply these torts to modern information
privacy problems.193

188. Richards, supra note 114, at 1198–99; see also SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON,
supra note 2, at 58; Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 164, at 1941; Schwartz &
Solove, supra note 3, at 1820.
189. Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1889.
190. See id. at 1890 (“His skepticism about privacy, as well as his view that
tort privacy lacked conceptual coherence, led him to categorize the law into a set
of four narrow and rigid categories.”).
191. See id. at 1890, 1900 (describing Prosser’s concern that privacy law’s
“haphazard development threatened to swallow up established doctrines, such
as defamation law, as well as new doctrines, such as intentional infliction of
emotional distress, that he felt had more promise”). The intrusion into seclusion
tort includes, as its main element, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
but does not require a showing of extreme outrage, serious mental harm, or a
showing that injuries were nontrivial. Id. at 1890. Prosser expressed concern
that the false light and disclosure of private facts torts involved an examination
of reputation, overlapping with defamation law. Id. Prosser was also concerned
about privacy torts being overbroad and interfering with freedom of speech and
of the press. Id.
192. See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 164, at 1956–57 (“Due to Prosser’s
strong belief in liberal flows of information, moreover, his article reflects a
strong undercurrent of skepticism about the legal protection of privacy.”).
193. See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1904 (“[W]hile Prosser gave tort
privacy a legitimacy it had previously lacked, he also fossilized it and eliminated
its capacity to change and develop.”). But see Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 164,
at 1929 (disagreeing with some of Richards and Solove’s criticism of Prosser,
asserting that if it had not been for Prosser, privacy would likely be much less
protected in the United States); id. at 1983 (“Rather than creating an ossified
privacy concept, Prosser’s contribution generated useful doctrinal categories
where there previously had been unclassified cases and a lingering air of
skepticism towards the tort.”).
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Breach of confidentiality has been described as a tort that
addresses privacy violations in specific contexts.194 Though the
concepts are related, Prosser did not include breach of
confidentiality in his categories of privacy torts.195 This may be
because Prosser drew a line between privacy and what would be
addressed under agency or contract law. Compared to Warren
and Brandeis, Prosser was also less focused on the idea of
personality as a justification underlying privacy protections.196
a. Prosser’s Privacy Torts and Information Privacy
Prosser’s torts differ significantly from each other. In
Prosser’s article, he points out that intrusion and disclosure both
require an invasion into something secret, which is not required
of false light or appropriation.197 Disclosure and false light have
publicity as an essential element, while intrusion and
appropriation do not (though appropriation usually involves
publicity).198 Additionally, only false light requires falsity, and
only appropriation requires that the defendant have gained some
advantage from the use.199
The tort of appropriation has evolved somewhat from
Prosser’s time. When Prosser originally wrote Privacy, he noted
194. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 77 (“The common law tort
of breach of confidentiality . . . enables people to sue for damages when a party
breaches a contractual obligation (often implied rather than express) to
maintain confidentiality.”).
195. See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1909 (“A second notable
omission from Prosser’s taxonomy was the tort of breach of confidence.”). In
Prosser’s treatise, Prosser addressed this concern by stating, “The right of
privacy, as such, is to be distinguished from liability found upon the breach of
some confidential or fiduciary relation . . . .” Id. at 1910 (quoting WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1062 (1st ed. 1941)).
196. One of Prosser’s contemporaries was Edward Bloustein, who differed
from Prosser in the degree to which the former argued for the idea that privacy
law protects an “inviolate personality.” Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 164, at
1945.
197. See Prosser, supra note 187, at 407 (discussing and defining common
facets of privacy).
198. See id. (examining false light in relation to privacy generally).
199. See id. (discussing false light in detail).
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that under the common law, all four of the recognized categories
of privacy claims were specific to the individual and were not
assignable, though three states at the time did recognize under
statute that a publication-based claim could be brought after a
person’s death.200 On the other hand, the modern right of
appropriation allows a likeness to be treated as descendible
property.201
These torts have questionable utility in the modern context
of information privacy. The privacy tort of invasion typically
requires the invasion to be of an offensive nature, but a lot of
information collection appears largely innocuous.202 In Shibley v.
Time, Inc.,203 the litigation concerned the magazine’s sale of their
subscriber information to advertisers, but this sale was found to
not meet the injury requirements for Ohio’s common law invasion
of privacy tort.204 Courts have also rejected the theory that the
tort of appropriation could apply to the data collection problem.205
Thus, it is likely that addressing personal privacy issues will
require either the revision of privacy torts or the introduction of
new alternatives.
3. Modern Informational Privacy Theory
While there are many types of privacy, the type that we are
most concerned with is informational privacy and the right of a
person to keep information about herself from being used by
200. See id. at 408 (discussing the qualities of invasion that would constitute
a tort).
201. See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 164, at 1965 (“The overwhelming
majority of states in the United States have also recognized a postmortem
dimension to the publicity right.”). Schwartz and Peifer point to the example of
Elvis, whose publicity rights have been sold and resold multiple times since his
death. Id. at 1966.
202. See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1919 (stating that many
“privacy torts—public disclosure, intrusion, and false light” require a showing
that the privacy invasion be highly offensive).
203. Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
204. See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1919.
205. Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(ruling that there was not an appropriation claim when American Express sold
customer names to merchants); Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1919.
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others. Our understanding of informational privacy in the
modern context also needs to take social norms into
consideration. In the United States, the younger generation
seems to value privacy much less than the older generations,206
though some empirical research casts doubt on the idea that
there is a meaningful difference between how different age
groups view and prioritize privacy.207 Solove has become a leader
in modern informational privacy theory, with some scholars
asserting that Solove is Prosser’s modern heir.208 Not entirely
dissimilar from Prosser’s approach, Solove divides privacy
problems into four categories: information collection, information
processing, information dissemination, and invasion.209
Informational privacy implicates the potentially conflicting
interests of content owners and content users. If protections of
personal privacy are too strong, businesses that use customer
information to target people who would be interested in a new
product may be prevented from doing so. There are some First
Amendment concerns as well. Chiefly among them is to what
extent do I have the right to use the law and the courts to prevent
you from speaking about me?210 There is also a question of
accountability to prevent legitimate privacy regulation from
applying in ways that are not optimal for society.211
Schwartz argues that privacy is a “constitutive value” that is
valuable not for its own virtues or effects, but because some
degree of protection for personal privacy is a necessary condition
206. See Allen, Coercing Privacy, supra note 157, at 736–37 (“Generational
differences in the taste for privacy may be significant in the United States, as
younger Americans appear to be learning to live reasonably well and happily
without privacy.”).
207. Hoofnagle, King, Li & Turow, supra note 109, at 20.
208. See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 164, at 1940 (“In this sense, Daniel
Solove proves the modern heir of the Berkeley Dean.”).
209. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 111, at 489.
210. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52
STANFORD L. REV. 1049, 1049 (2000).
211. See Allen, Data Control, supra note 154, at 861 (citing Schwartz for two
important normative questions facing contemporary privacy theorists: how to
protect privacy while preserving accountability, and the appropriate role of the
state in regulating personal privacy).
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for a society that values individual identities and deliberative
democracy.212 Taking the view that privacy is of vital importance,
Allen argues that privacy can be lost through voluntarily giving it
up, and that this raises similar moral and policy implications as
someone who voluntarily sells himself into slavery.213 In the same
way that people are forced to be free by being prohibited from
selling themselves into slavery, Allen argues that people should
be forced to be private to better allow them to “reap the full
dignitarian and political consequences of privacy.”214
a. Concepts of Privacy
Different approaches to privacy find the value of privacy in
different things. Under a communitarian view of privacy, privacy
is valuable because it protects a social good by allowing citizens to
more effectively participate in a deliberative democracy.215 The
liberal approach to privacy focuses on the individual and on
personal autonomy.216 A liberal concept of privacy could be

212. See Schwartz, State, supra note 175, at 834 (“Informational privacy,
whether on or off the Internet, should not be considered a right of control.
Instead, it should be conceptualized as a constitutive value.”). A constitutive
value is one that derives its value not from the causal effects of the value’s
existence or from the existence of the value for its own sake, but for its role in “a
larger complex that is itself valued.” GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 80 (1988). The value of privacy is occasionally the
subject of discussion, with some scholars asserting that privacy is not generally
worth protecting except for people who have something to hide. JEFFREY H.
REIMAN, CRITICAL MORAL LIBERALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 171 (1997).
213. See Allen, Data Control, supra note 154, at 869 (discussing the moral
and political implications associated with privacy loss). Allen has also examined
whether people could be forced to be private in the same way they can be forced
to be free. See Allen, Coercing Privacy, supra note 157, at 728 (“We are forced to
be free. Liberal governments cannot permit us to sell ourselves into slavery. Are
we forced to be private?”).
214. Allen, Coercing Privacy, supra note 157, at 752.
215. See Schwartz, State, supra note 175, at 836 (“In searching for ways to
construct this strong democracy, these thinkers emphasize common
participatory activities, reciprocal respect among political equals, and the
development of consensus about political issues.”).
216. See Allen, Coercing Privacy, supra note 157, at 739 (“Liberal moral
philosophers maintain that respecting the many forms of privacy is paramount
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further broken down into categories including physical privacy,
informational privacy, proprietary privacy, and decisional
privacy.217
Some view control over data as central to privacy.218 Solove
points to the lack of control over data as one of the systemic
problems that enables identity theft.219 One potential privacy
right related to controlling data is a right to prevent access to the
data.220 After personal information is collected, the person to
whom the information refers typically has no control over future
use of the information.221 Even if courts or policy makers decree
that a person has a “right” to control his personal data, he still
may lack the ability to meaningfully control his information.222
Our recommendations address similar issues under the broad
label of “data control,” including the need for data mobility and a
right of data withdrawal.
It is unlikely that an individual will ever be able to exercise
absolute control over his data. The government can readily access
to respect for human dignity, personhood, moral autonomy, workable
community life, and tolerant democratic political and legal institutions.”).
217. Id. at 723–25. Allen notes that the concept of “private choice” is
stronger than the general liberal concept of “privacy.” Id. at 727–28. Allen
defines informational privacy in this way: “Informational privacy obtains where
information actually exists in a state of inaccessibility, whether it is locked in a
file drawer, computer, or in someone’s mind. Anonymity, confidentiality,
reserve, and secrecy—not merely having the choice to bring these about—are
forms of privacy.” Allen, Data Control, supra note 154, at 869.
218. See Allen, Data Control, supra note 154, at 863 (defining privacy as
data control, and the right to privacy as the right to control, and asserting that
the central aim of privacy regulation should be to promote individuals’ right to
control their personal data).
219. See Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1258 (“Therefore, the
problem runs deeper than identity theft. It is the fact that we have so little
participation in our personal data combined with the fact that it flows so
insecurely and carelessly without sufficient control.”).
220. See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 344 (“There are two
principal understandings of the right to privacy in personal data: privacy as a
right to control data (‘privacy as control’) and privacy as a right to prevent
access (‘privacy as access’).”).
221. See Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1234 (“[P]ersonal
information is not only outside our control but also is subjected to a bureaucratic
process that is itself not adequately controlled.” (citation omitted)).
222. Id.
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individuals’ financial information, and medical privacy is subject
to the sharing of medical information between medical
professionals and health insurance companies.223 It is thus
probably fair to say that to the extent that privacy involves the
control of data, this control is qualified in certain circumstances.
In the online context, Schwartz goes so far as to say that control
over personal information on the Internet is an illusion.224 When
consumers are presented with take-it-or-leave-it TOS agreements
on websites, there is typically no negotiation of terms, and thus
no ability to exercise meaningful control.225 Schwartz argues that
informational privacy is not just a matter of having a right to
control, but instead is a matter of line drawing to shape behaviors
and thus either encouraging or discouraging the use of certain
categories of expression and action.226
b. The First Amendment Critique
Some argue that a right of “data privacy” would conflict with
the First Amendment by interfering with the dissemination of
truthful information.227 Volokh is the most prominent proponent
of the First Amendment critique, arguing that data privacy
regulation amounts to “a right to have the government stop you
223. See Allen, Data Control, supra note 154, at 872 (discussing moral
accountability, control, and privacy). However, though the federal government
may have access to detailed financial records, this does not necessarily mean
that the government can then disclose the information. In Wine Hobby USA,
Inc. v. IRS, the court declined to order the government to disclose registered
home wine producers under FOIA, concluding that such a disclosure would
violate the registered parties’ privacy. Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. United States
IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 135 (3d Cir. 1974); Allen, Data Control, supra note 154, at
873–74.
224. See Schwartz, State, supra note 175, at 832 (arguing that simply
declaring a property right in personal information will not resolve any of the
major issues relating to information privacy); see also Allen, Data Control, supra
note 154, at 869 (discussing the limits burdening the privacy control paradigm).
225. Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1235.
226. See Schwartz, State, supra note 175, at 858 (“As a result, information
privacy should not create data fortresses, but shifting multidimensional data
preserves that insulate personal data from different kinds of observation by
different parties.”).
227. Richards, supra note 114, at 1150–51.
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from speaking about me.”228 Cate argues that there should be full
First Amendment protection for electronic information flows, and
that truthful data should be allowed to flow unimpeded to
prevent violations of the First Amendment.229 Richards counters
these arguments, arguing that data privacy properly concerns
economic rights, and that bringing the First Amendment into the
debate wrongly makes it into a civil rights issue.230 Richards also
points out that the First Amendment critique is weak because it
does not consider the many types of “speech” that are outside the
First Amendment’s protection, like fraud, solicitation, antitrust
law, threats, and libel.231
There is some case law support for the First Amendment
critique. In U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC,232 the Tenth Circuit analyzed
the constitutionality of the FCC’s interpretation of a statutory
confidentiality provision, which required customers to opt in
before a carrier would be permitted to share the customers’
confidential information.233 In that case, the Tenth Circuit stated
that privacy “imposes real costs on society.”234 The court
concluded that the opt-in regime for the sharing of confidential

228. See Volokh, supra note 210, at 1050–51; see also Richards, supra note
114, at 1161 (discussing the First Amendment and privacy regulation (citation
omitted)).
229. FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1–4 (1997); Richards,
supra note 114, at 1161.
230. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1151 (“This Article takes issue with
the conventional wisdom that regulating databases regulates speech, that the
First Amendment is thus in conflict with the right of data privacy, and that the
Constitution thereby imposes an insuperable barrier to basic efforts to tackle
the database problem.”).
231. See id. at 1171–73 (discussing the fact that much “speech” is outside
the scope of the First Amendment and providing an alternative approach).
232. U.S. West, Inc. v. F.C.C., 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
233. See id. at 1230.
234. See id. at 1235 (stating that privacy does not inherently constitute a
substantial state interest for First Amendment commercial speech analysis
purposes, and further justification is required). As part of its analysis, the court
concluded that the FCC’s regulation was not narrowly tailored because it did not
adequately consider a less restrictive alternative, specifically an opt-out regime.
Id. at 1238–39.
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information promulgated by the FCC violated the First
Amendment commercial speech rights of the carriers.235
Ultimately, the First Amendment critique has many flaws,
but it illustrates the sort of theoretical balancing that Prosser,
Warren, and Brandeis were concerned about. Whether
informational privacy is truly more of an economic or First
Amendment issue is outside the scope of our research. We
mention the First Amendment critique here only to emphasize
that the balancing of interests is a pervasive theme in discussions
of privacy theory.
c. Privacy as a Commodity
Some theorists have suggested understanding privacy as a
property right.236 Property can be described as an interest in an
object in which the owner can enforce that interest against all
others.237 To law students, the concept of property is often
described as a bundle of rights. A lot of property is freely
alienable; that is, it can be sold, traded, and gifted as the owner
sees fit.238 Some property, like human tissue, can be donated but
not sold.239 With regard to privacy, views differ about the extent
to which privacy should be alienable at all.240 Some scholars
advocate propertizing personal information, while others
235. See id. at 1230, 1240.
236. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 77 (noting that Alan
Westin took this view). But see Schwartz, State, supra note 175, at 832 (arguing
that simply declaring a property right in personal information will not resolve
any of the major issues relating to information privacy).
237. Schwartz, Property, supra note 10, at 2058.
238. One scholarly definition of inalienabilities posits that inalienabilities
amount to “any restriction[s] on the transferability, ownership, or use of an
entitlement.” Id. at 2095 (citing Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the
Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931 (1985)).
239. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 498 (Cal. 1990)
(Arabian, J., concurring) (viewing the question of property rights in human
tissue as a moral issue).
240. For example, Allen argues that privacy should not be viewed as
optional, and that people should be restrained from trading away their privacy
because of privacy’s importance in a society that values personal identity. Allen,
Coercing Privacy, supra note 157, at 729.
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advocate an outright ban on data trade.241 Schwartz suggests a
category that he calls “information property,” which is itself a
bundle of interests made up of five areas: “inalienabilities,
defaults, rights of exit, damages, and institutions.”242
Allen argues that the expectations of people with regard to
privacy have been decreasing, with people being willing to
prioritize informational privacy lower than they prioritize other
goods.243 There is also some disconnect between what people say
they want in terms of privacy, and then what people actually do,
often being quick to accept something in exchange for their
personal information.244 Currently, no value is consistently
assigned to personal information, and Schwartz suggests that
this lack of a value contributes to the lack of appreciation that
people have for their private data.245

241. See Schwartz, Property, supra note 10, at 2057 (recognizing that “a
strong conception of personal data as a commodity is emerging in the United
States” but that some legal scholars have been “suspicious of treating personal
data as a form of property”).
242. Id. at 2060. Schwartz suggests implementing a system that has usetransfer restrictions and an opt-in default. See id. (“This Article’s model of
propertized personal data involves the development of a hybrid inalienability
consisting of a use-transfer restriction plus an opt-in default.”).
243. See Allen, Coercing Privacy, supra note 157, at 729–30 (arguing that
consumer behavior and popular culture show that people prefer less privacy
when using technology than other goods). Allen also notes that because of the
deprioritizing of privacy, people may be more willing to trade privacy for things
like entertainment, personal profit, medical care, and access to a certain
community. See Allen, Data Control, supra note 154, at 871 (noting that people
may disclose private information for various benefits and in doing so either send
strong messages to policymakers that people do not value privacy in their
technological encounters or stimulate them to paternalistically “coerce” privacy).
An antipaternalist approach to privacy would say that privacy is a good if people
desire it, but that it should not be forced upon them. On the other hand, the
paternalist approach would impose privacy on people who might not want it.
There are a number of laws that mandate privacy, like laws requiring people to
wear clothes in public and building codes regulating the placement and design
of residential housing. See id. (noting that the idea of privacy coercion is not
foreign in American law).
244. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 80–81 (noting that,
despite people’s reflexive desire to protect their private data, most people take
minimal precautions and would relinquish their data for money).
245. See Schwartz, Property, supra note 10, at 2076 (noting a higher
appreciation for one’s personal data may accompany higher market value for it).
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In their book, Hagel and Singer proposed the use of
“infomediaries,” a label used to describe companies that would
serve as intermediaries between consumers and companies that
collect their data.246 While discussion of this idea has not been
pervasive over the last decade, the ideas underlying it form the
basis for some start-up companies.247 Though the impact of such
efforts has not yet been seen, infomediaries might be an effective
private market solution to the problems related to the decline of
privacy on the Internet, provided it does not prove
counterproductive to view privacy as a commodity. In a similar
vein, Ayres and Funk have suggested implementing a system for
telemarketers in which telemarketing is shifted to an opt-in
paradigm in which customers can opt in to be contacted and are
also compensated for receiving telemarketing calls.248 Solove
argues that compensation for information would not solve the
problem, however, arguing that the real problem is a lack of
control over data, lack of meaningful participation in the process,
and lack of transparency about future data use.249
B. Privacy Law
Because intrusions into privacy on the Web are so prevalent,
some argue that the government should regulate the Internet to
promote consumer privacy, but others worry that this could harm
246. See JOHN HAGEL III & MARC SINGER, NET WORTH: SHAPING MARKETS
WHEN CUSTOMERS MAKE THE RULES 28 (1999) (suggesting a role of
intermediaries in helping consumers obtain the most value in exchange for their
personal information and also protecting that information from being abused).
247. See Joshua Brustein, Start-Ups Seek to Help Users Put a Price on Their
Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at B3 (noting the existence of startups that would allow people to control and maybe even profit from their “digital
trails”).
248. See Schwartz, Property, supra note 10, at 2079 (noting that
telemarketing is presently inefficient because it reaches an “excessively broad
audience” and suggesting that opt-in programs would “add incentives to target
likely customers”).
249. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 89–90 (noting that, if
people only have the right to sell their data, the result is an “all or nothing”
exchange in which the consumer is not left with a viable choice between the two
alternatives).
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the online advertising industry and other interests.250 In this
subpart, we will first review some of the issues that emerge when
discussing privacy regulation, before turning to existing bodies of
law to evaluate the extent to which data control issues, like data
mobility and data withdrawal, may fall within current law.
1. Steps Toward Regulation of Privacy
When a social issue has to be addressed, there are two
primary options: address the problem through the market and
self-regulation, or have the government regulate it. The
dichotomy of self-regulation versus government regulation also
arises in the privacy context. Some say that the government
should not regulate privacy, suggesting that it would be too
paternalistic to assume that the government knows best, though
others argue that self-regulation is not a viable option because of
the lack of mechanisms in the market to enable the exercise of
informed, meaningful choices by individuals.251
There are a number of arguments in favor of self-regulation
of privacy issues online. Birnhack and Elkin-Koren concluded
from their data that law was not important in the shaping of
website behavior and privacy practices, suggesting the market
forces may be more effective than law at protecting privacy.252
Others say that rules to protect privacy could have negative
250. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 34 (noting that Internet tracking and
selling of personal data has pushed the government to promote greater
consumer privacy and others to seek relief through the courts, resulting in
sizable awards).
251. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 90–91 (recognizing that
although proponents of market-based solutions to privacy concerns criticize the
government for paternalism, the market fails to provide adequate mechanisms
for the protection of privacy).
252. Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 378 (arguing that the “law
does not appear to play an important role” in Israeli Internet privacy practices).
However, the authors do not think that law is completely irrelevant, arguing
that there is a circular relationship between privacy regulations and what
amounts to a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” See id. at 379 (“In the United
States, data protection law plays another role. Given . . . the ‘reasonable
expectations’ test within U.S. privacy law, concrete regulations help shape these
expectations . . . . The fact that the law requires certain measures has a large
effect on data subjects’ expectations and . . . the reasonability of expectations.”).
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effects like decreasing the information available and increasing
transaction costs.253 If the private resolutions to privacy conflicts
are preferred, Solove suggests that fiduciary relationships could
be recognized under the law when a company collects and uses
personal information.254
On the other hand, government intervention can be very
helpful in advancing change. Consider, for example, the
importance of civil rights legislation in ending institutional
segregation. If remedying discrimination had been left to the
market to self-regulate, improvements may have been much
slower. With respect to online privacy, we disagree with the
conclusions of Birnhack and Elkin-Koren concerning the value of
government oversight, and assert that the enforcement part of
the law is of the utmost importance and was not something that
these researchers examined in adequate detail.255 Additionally,
while it is true that government regulation might have negative
effects, this is just as true of trusting market self-regulation. In
virtually any context, when faced with multiple options, there
will be potential downsides to every option. Thus, the most
important thing is to balance the positive and negative.
Fair Information Practices (FIPs) are often referenced as a
guide for privacy regulations. When examining the core principles
of privacy regimes of different governments, some patterns
emerge, including an emphasis on notice, confidentiality, and
data security.256 These principles also underlie the idea of FIPs,
which address how to handle and use personal information,257
and often focus on responsibility and participation in the
collection and use of data.258 The Federal Trade Commission
253. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1159–60 (noting that this is the view of
some law and economics scholars).
254. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 103 (recognizing that the
disparities in knowledge between consumers and market participants of how
consumer data is used may support a court’s finding of a fiduciary relationship).
255. See supra note 252 and accompanying text (discussing Birnhack and
Elkin-Koren’s views on privacy law and the cloud).
256. See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 350 (noting that
foreign governments, like those of members of the European Union, exhibit data
protection standards similar to those contained in U.S. law).
257. See Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1266 (describing FIPs).
258. See id. at 1268 (describing the two focuses of FIPs: responsibility and
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(FTC) views FIPs as being based on five core principles: (1) notice
and consumer awareness; (2) consumer choice and consent;
(3) access and participation in the process; (4) data integrity and
security; and (5) enforcement and redress.259 Schwartz and Solove
suggest using FIPs to varying degrees, dependent on whether the
personal information is identified or identifiable.260
Whether new regulation is needed at all ultimately depends
on whether the current regulatory scheme is too flawed to offer
meaningful guidance. For this reason, we turn now to an
examination of current U.S. privacy law.
2. Federal Privacy Statutes and State Laws
Federal privacy law focusing on consumer protection is
typically narrow, often focusing on the type of records in issue or
a particular industry.261 Early congressional action on privacy
includes the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)262 in 1970 and the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)263 in
1974.264 Other federal statutes addressing specific privacy issues
participation); SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 105 (same).
259. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7
(1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23.shtm (reporting
to Congress on five core principles of privacy protection).
260. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1880–81 (suggesting that, for
example, full notice, access, and correction rights would probably not be
necessary if only identifiable data is at issue, whereas FIPs concerning data
quality, data security, and transparency should apply to both identified and
identifiable data).
261. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 71 (“Thus, the federal
privacy statutes form a complicated patchwork of regulation with significant
gaps and omissions.”); see also Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 349
(describing the focus of U.S. privacy laws in contrast to EU systems).
262. 15 U.S.C. § 168b (2006).
263. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006).
264. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1821 (explaining the history of
congressional action on privacy laws). FCRA applies to consumer reporting
agencies that furnish consumer reports about the creditworthiness or personal
characteristics of a consumer, and limits the circumstances and purposes under
which consumer reports may be provided to other parties. See id. (explaining the
scope of FCRA). The focus of FERPA is student privacy, and it is the first federal
statute that uses the term “personally identifiable information.” See id. at 1822–
23 (explaining the historical context of FERPA).
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include the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),265
the Health Information Portability and Accessibility Act
(HIPAA),266 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA),267 and the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA).268 Several
federal statutes focus on the presence of personally identifiable
information (PII),269 while others focus on transparency and
access to information,270 on protecting consumers from
inappropriate use of their personal data,271 or on imposing duties
of confidentiality.272 Federal statutes often include requirements
for administrative agencies to promulgate regulations. HIPAA
requires HHS to enact regulations to support the Act.273 Under
265. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6501–6506 (2006) (preventing websites from, among other acts, collecting
data from children using the Internet without giving notice of the type of data
that will be collected, obtaining parental consent, and providing parents with an
opportunity to refuse websites’ requests to collect data).
266. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C., 42
U.S.C.) (providing the laws governing the privacy and security of health data,
including guidelines for the collection of data related to electronic healthcare
transactions).
267. See Electronic Commc’n Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2712 (2006)) (protecting
wire, oral, and electronic communications while in transit, extending
restrictions on government use of wire taps to computer-based communications,
and preventing the government from accessing data on electronic storage
devices under some circumstances).
268. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2006) (protecting financial data).
269. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1827 (explaining the differing
focuses of electronic privacy legislation). Statutes concerned with PII include the
Cable Communications Policy Act, the Video Privacy Protection Act, and the
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act. See id. at 1824, 1829, 1830 (detailing the
characteristics of CCPA, VPPA, and GLBA).
270. See Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 111, at 525 (listing the Privacy Act,
CCPA, FCRA, and COPPA as examples).
271. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1167 (listing statutes that protect
consumers’ PII from inappropriate uses); see also Kuner, Part 1, supra note 119,
at 176 (“Data protection law gives rights to individuals in how data identifying
them or pertaining to them are processed, and subjects such processing to a
defined set of safeguards.”).
272. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1196 (listing statutes that impose
confidentiality on handlers of PII).
273. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 44, at 297 (providing an example of a
regulation promulgated under and supporting HIPAA (citation omitted)).
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the GLBA, agencies regulating financial institutions are required
to promulgate rules setting requirements for safeguarding
customers’ personal information.274
States also adopt their own privacy laws to protect
consumers. For example, there is a statute in Massachusetts that
requires detailed data security procedures,275 and forty-five states
have statutes requiring customer notification in the event of a
security breach.276 Minnesota has a merchant liability statute,
under which a merchant can be held liable if there was a security
breach and customer credit card information was insufficiently
protected.277 California’s Song–Beverly Act278 protects PII by
prohibiting merchants from requiring customers to give personal
information like their address and phone number “as a condition
to accepting the [customer’s] credit card.”279
There are several federal statutes aimed at protecting
children as a vulnerable population, including COPPA, FERPA,
and the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment.280 COPPA
274. See Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1274 (explaining the
GLBA).
275. See Denny, supra note 46, at 240 (explaining a Massachusetts Internet
privacy law); see also Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 50–51 (describing the
Massachusetts law as being controversial because of the high bar that it sets as
a minimum threshold for security).
276. See Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 49–50 (explaining that most
states have followed California’s passage of laws requiring businesses to notify
customers in the event of a security breach); Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at
1884–85 (noting that forty-four states have enacted laws requiring that
businesses notify customers when they experience a security breach).
277. See Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 50 (noting the existence of a
Minnesota law imposing liability for negligent handling of consumer financial
data).
278. Song–Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08 (2009).
279. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1831. The California Supreme
Court also held that asking for a zip code would be sufficient to violate the
Song–Beverly Act if the zip code was being requested as a condition of accepting
a credit card. See Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 246 P.3d 612 (Cal.
2011) (“In light of the [Song–Beverly Act]’s plain language, protective purpose,
and legislative history, we conclude a ZIP code constitutes ‘personal
identification information’ as that phrase is used in section 1747.08. Thus,
requesting and recording a cardholder’s ZIP code, without more, violates the
Credit Card Act.”); see also Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1834 (explaining
the outcome of Williams-Sonoma Stores).
280. See Cascia, supra note 17, at 891 (identifying federal laws that protect
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imposes limitations on the types of information that a website
may collect from children younger than thirteen, and privacy
policies must address the website’s information collection
practices with regard to children.281 COPPA explicitly spells out
what elements are required for notice to be valid.282 There are
also state laws aimed at protecting children’s online privacy, like
a law in Maine that requires parental consent before someone
collects, transfers, or sells a minor’s personal or health-related
information for product promotion purposes.283
Some privacy-related laws do not focus on consumer
protection, but on procedural elements of government
investigations. The Privacy Act of 1974284 regulates how federal
agencies can collect and use personal records,285 the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001286 grants a right to the U.S. government to
demand data in the interest of protecting homeland security,287
and the ECPA sets out conditions under which the government
can obtain a variety of electronic communications.288 Beyond
statutes, the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
student privacy).
281. See id. at 892 (discussing COPPA). COPPA is why the terms of service
or privacy policies in our sample typically contained language about not
collecting data from or marketing to children under thirteen. FTC, Frequently
Asked Questions about the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule,
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/coppafaqs.shtm (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (answering
common questions from website providers about how to keep within COPPA
regulations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
282. See Schwartz, State, supra note 175, at 855 (describing ways that
COPPA changed the previous practices of using data collected from children).
283. See Cascia, supra note 17, at 899 (discussing laws that states have
enacted to support COPPA).
284. 5 U.S.C. § 522a (2006).
285. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 68 (describing the
Privacy Act of 1974). The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 is similar and
prohibits states from selling personal information from motor vehicle records to
marketers. See id. at 69 (describing the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994).
286. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 367–68 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of U.S.C. (2006)).
287. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(j)(1) (2006); Lanois, supra note 18, at 45 (stating
that the USA Patriot Act is a “hurdle to the international adoption of cloud
computing” and explaining the Act’s expansion of federal power to collect data).
288. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (setting out procedures for compelling
providers to disclose information).
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searches and seizures.289 However, Fourth Amendment protection
is also likely to be weaker in the cloud than it would be if the
same information were stored solely on a personal computer in
the suspect’s home.290
a. Electronic Communications Privacy Act
The ECPA was passed partly in response to the findings of
the Office of Technology Assessment that the protections of emails were “weak, ambiguous, or nonexistent.”291 The ECPA and
a major update to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)
were both passed in 1986, though in subsequent decades, the
criminal provisions of the CFAA have been expanded much more
than the electronic privacy protection provisions of the ECPA.292
The ECPA consists of three federal statutes: the Stored
Communications Act (SCA),293 the Pen Register statute,294 and
the Wiretap Act.295 Its protections supplement those of the Fourth
289. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
290. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 386–87 (noting that law enforcement
agencies have “essentially deputized” technology companies to monitor endusers’ use of their applications operating on the cloud).
291. Kattan, supra note 8, at 627–28.
292. See Reid Skibell, Cybercrimes & Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 912 (2003)
(noting that the CFAA was amended eight times between 1986 and 2003); see
also Martin, supra note 44, at 308 (listing provisions of the Act that criminalize
Internet-based conduct); Robison, supra note 4, at 1196 (describing the ECPA
and one component thereof called the Stored Communications Act (SCA)).
293. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–10 (2006).
294. Id. §§ 3121–27.
295. See id. §§ 2510–22; see also Andrew William Bagley, Don’t Be Evil: The
Fourth Amendment in the Age of Google, National Security, and Digital Papers
and Effects, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 153, 167 (2011) (identifying the three
parts of the statute and highlighting court decisions that have interpreted the
statute); Casey Perry, U.S. v. Warshak: Will Fourth Amendment Protection Be
Delivered to Your Inbox?, 12 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 345, 349 (2011) (identifying the
three parts of the statute and explaining the contents of the SCA). A “pen
register” is a device that records phone numbers dialed, though the language of
the statute also applies to other technological means. See “Pen Registers” and
“Trap and Trace Devices,” ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE
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Amendment.296 The application of each depends on what type of
information is sought and where it is in the transmission
process.297 The Wiretap Act covers interception of wire, oral, and
electronic communications.298 Under the Wiretap Act, obtaining
e-mail contents in real time requires a Title III order to be issued
with Department of Justice (DOJ) approval and a grant by a
federal judge, and the order must be renewed every thirty days.299
Under the Pen Register statute, obtaining real time subscriber
data requires an ex parte pen register order.300 Stored electronic
information and the requirements for obtaining each type are
addressed under the SCA,301 which we analyze in more detail in
the section below.
PROJECT, https://ssd.eff.org/wire/govt/pen-registers (last visited Feb. 3, 2013)
(defining pen registers and trap and trace devices and explaining how they are
used) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
296. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 167 (explaining the ECPA’s expansion of
the Fourth Amendment’s general requirement of warranted searches); see also
Perry, supra note 295, at 349 (noting that the ECPA supplements the Fourth
Amendment). Congress had two main purposes when it adopted the SCA as part
of the ECPA: to address privacy concerns that might hinder technological
development, and to apply Fourth Amendment privacy principles to computer
networks. Robison, supra note 4, at 1224 (identifying the two primary purposes
behind the SCA). The legislative history of the SCA indicates that Congress
acknowledged that e-mail and computer networks were analogous to first class
mail. See id. at 1106, 1225 (explaining the legislative history of the Act and
noting that Congress analogized e-mail to traditional postal mail).
297. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act,
and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1231
(2004) (defining the legal difference between stored communications and
communications in transit). The Wiretap Act’s requirement for a search warrant
is stronger than the requirements under the SCA, so law enforcement personnel
arguably have incentives to use the SCA’s retrospective authority instead of
complying with the Wiretap Act for prospective surveillance. See id. at 1232
(explaining a possible weakness in the SCA’s privacy framework and court
action on the issue).
298. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 411 (explaining the coverage of the
Wiretap Act).
299. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006) (mandating procedures for the interception
of electronic communications with a pen register); Bagley, supra note 295, at
179 (explaining the procedures provided by the pen register statute).
300. See 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (setting out procedures for obtaining pen register
or trap and trace device orders); Bagley, supra note 295, at 179 (explaining the
procedures provided by the pen register statute).
301. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 179 (explaining the procedures provided
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(1) Stored Communications Act
The status of the SCA is problematic because much of the
language is very unclear or outdated and interpretations of the
statute by courts have varied significantly.302 The two most
important sections for our purposes are: (1) § 2702, which
addresses the circumstances under which a provider can
voluntarily disclose customer information to others;303 and
(2) § 2703, which addresses how the government can compel a
provider to produce stored information.304 This sounds simple
enough, but there are so many exceptions, subcategories, and
additional requirements that the statute quickly becomes
unwieldy. For example, one commonly referenced exception to the
prohibition on disclosure allows for disclosure when the
subscriber or customer (depending on the type of service)
consents to disclosure,305 but the question then arises as to what
actions can amount to consent. For example, is it consent under
by the SCA).
302. See Kerr, supra note 297, at 1208 (calling the statute “dense and
confusing” as well as “outdated”); Perry, supra note 295, at 361 n.82 (noting that
although most believe that the SCA deals with retrospective surveillance only,
the court in Warshak stated that the language of the statute on its face does not
compel this reading (citing United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 290 (6th
Cir. 2010))); see also Soma, Gates, & Smith, supra note 16, at 526–27
(suggesting that incremental changes to the ECPA could help address these
issues).
303. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (establishing prohibitions on the disclosure of
customer data and establishing exceptions to these prohibitions).
304. See id. § 2703 (outlining cases in which the government can require
disclosure of customer communications or records); see also Perry, supra note
295, at 350–51 (explaining the effect of §§ 2702 and 2703 of the SCA).
305. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (2006) (providing the consent exception).
While one might assume that the originator and subscriber would be the same
person, this is not always so, such as in the 9th Circuit case of Quon v. Arch
Wireless, in which the issue was whether the employer-subscriber’s consent for
Arch Wireless to disclose the contents of text messages was valid, or if the
messaging service was an ECS, and thus the originator or recipient (in this case,
the employee Quon) would have to consent for the disclosure to be valid under
this exception. Quon v. Arch Wireless, 529 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008) (ruling
that summary judgment for Arch Wireless on employee-plaintiffs’ claim of
nonconsent was improper because a genuine dispute of material fact existed as
to whether Arch was a “remote computing service” as opposed to an “electronic
communication service” under SCA Sections 2701–2711).
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the SCA to accept the terms of a very broad privacy policy
without reading these terms? Another exception in § 2702 that
raises new questions in the cloud computing context is the
exception for disclosure to persons who provide the service.306 The
definition of remote computing service in the Wiretap Act
supplements this exception, permitting service providers to
monitor activities on their networks in real time.307 This
exception allows private employers to internally share
information about the online activities of employees when the
employer provides these services in-house,308 but will employers
lose the right to monitor their employees’ online activities if they
outsource IT to a cloud service provider? There is also some
possible overlap between compelled and voluntary disclosures,
such as when the government merely tells the provider about an
ongoing investigation, and then the provider gives the
government relevant information without a formal request being
made for the information.309 In such circumstances, which set of
exceptions or requirements should apply?
To determine the propriety of a disclosure under the SCA,
the government must first determine whether the sought
information is stored as part of an electronic communications
306. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(4) (providing the service provider exception).
307. See id. § 2711(2) (defining RCS and excluding from limitations on
interception devices such as those “being used by a provider of wire or electronic
communication service in the ordinary course of its business”); Kerr, supra note
297, at 1226–27 (explaining the advantages of a narrow definition of RCS for
nonpublic service providers that want to monitor their networks); see also Soma,
Gates, & Smith, supra note 16, at 516 (noting problems with the ECS/RCS
dichotomy when applied to service providers that outsource their
communications services).
308. See Soma, Gates, & Smith, supra note 16, at 516, 521 (“The key to legal
[e-messaging] monitoring by closed community service providers, such as
employers, is providing notice and [obtaining] consent.” (internal quotations and
citation omitted)).
309. See Kerr, supra note 297, at 1224–25 (calling this overlap a “gray
zone”). Kerr offers up these examples: If an ISP finds files and contacts law
enforcement pursuant to one of the exceptions in § 2702, but the ISP requests a
subpoena before turning over the files so that it has a paper trail, is that
voluntary or compelled? On the other hand, if the police contact an ISP and ask
the ISP if they would like to help in the investigation of a child molester, and
the ISP says yes and turns over its files, is that voluntary or compelled? See id.
(providing examples of the gray zone).
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service (ECS) or a remote computing service (RCS). An ECS is
defined as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability
to send or receive wire or electronic communications,”310 while an
RCS is defined as a “provision to the public of computer storage
or processing services by means of an electronic communications
system.”311 In the provisions prohibiting voluntary disclosure,
ECS providers are prohibited from knowingly disclosing
communication contents that the provider holds in “electronic
storage,”312 and RCS providers are prohibited from knowingly
disclosing communication contents that the provider maintains
for the sole purpose of providing the subscriber or customer with
“storage or computer processing services.”313 Some cases have
thus turned on a party’s ability to establish the difference
between when communications are in “electronic storage” and
when communications are just in “storage.”314
The process required to obtain information also varies with
the type of information sought, with notice required prior to the
disclosure of some information types, some of which require a
warrant, while others require a special court order under
§ 2703(d), and still others require only a subpoena.315 These three
310. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).
311. Id. § 2711(2).
312. Id. § 2510(17) (defining “Electronic storage” as: “(A) any temporary,
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the
electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by
an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such
communication”). Intermediate storage is thus covered by the ECS rules, while
long-term storage is covered by the RCS rules. Kerr, supra note 297, at 1216
(noting that intermediate storage is covered under the ECS rules and long-term
storage is covered by the RCS rules).
313. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006) (mandating restrictions on providers of
RCS). Insofar as RCS providers are prohibited from disclosing contents held for
“storage or computer processing” purposes, these protections go away if the
provider is authorized to access the communication contents for any purpose
other than “storage or computer processing.” See id. § 2702(a)(2)(B) (delineating
the scope and context of the prohibition).
314. See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004)
(reversing dismissal of plaintiff’s claim that an Internet service provider
disclosed e-mails in violation of the SCA on the grounds that the e-mail
messages were in “electronic storage” and therefore afforded SCA protections);
see also Kerr, supra note 297, at 1229 (discussing the Theofel case).
315. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (requiring, for example, a warrant for disclosure of
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methods of compelling information are listed in descending order
of the strength of the showing required to obtain them. To obtain
a § 2703(d) court order, the governmental entity must show
“specific and articulable facts” establishing “reasonable grounds”
to believe that the information sought is “relevant and material
to an ongoing criminal investigation.”316 This standard is less
than the “probable cause” standard for obtaining a warrant, but
greater than the “reasonable relevance” standard for obtaining a
subpoena.317 The type of information sought also determines
whether a § 2703(d) order or subpoena must be accompanied by
prior notice to the target.318 For example, the statute explicitly
states that only a subpoena, and no prior notice to the customer, is
required to compel an ECS or RCS provider to disclose
noncontent, basic subscriber information, including the customer’s
name, address, phone records (including session times and
durations), length and type of service, phone number, and how the
customer pays for the service.319 Most of this same noncontent
subscriber information, it should be noted, can be freely disclosed

contents of electronic communications in storage or a subpoena with prior notice
from the governmental entity seeking disclosure, a court order for disclosure of
electronic communications in an RCS, and a subpoena for disclosure of records
concerning an ECS or RCS).
316. Id. § 2703(d).
317. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Kattan, supra note 8, at 631 (discussing the
reasonable relevance standard); Kerr, supra note 297, at 1218–19 (discussing
the specific and articulable facts requirement).
318. See Kattan, supra note 8, at 629–30 (noting that different requirements
pursuant to a demand for disclosure exist depending on the way information is
stored). The SCA also permits notice to be delayed in certain circumstances. See
18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(2) (allowing the delay of notice when prompt notice would
“[endanger] the life or physical safety of an individual; [risk] flight from
prosecution; [lead to] destruction of or tampering with evidence; [lead to]
intimidation of potential witnesses; or otherwise seriously [jeopardize] an
investigation or unduly [delay] a trial”).
319. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2006) (detailing instances when the
government has the power to require a provider of ECS or RCS to disclose
records related to a subscriber or customer of its services); Kerr, supra note 297,
at 1219 (explaining the disclosure rules that cover records). Information about
how a customer pays for the service can include disclosure of the customer’s
credit card or bank account numbers. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (allowing a
government entity to compel disclosure of credit card information).
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to nongovernmental entities pursuant to an explicit exception in
the voluntary disclosure provisions.320
Considering the many avenues for uncertainty within the
SCA, it should come as no surprise that disclosures under the
SCA are often a source of contention. A disclosure in violation of
the SCA may give rise to a civil cause of action.321 However, good
faith reliance on a seemingly lawful document compelling
disclosure acts as a complete defense to a civil action against a
provider who is compelled to disclose communications.322
(2) Applying the SCA to the Cloud
Orin Kerr has written a very detailed and well-received
article analyzing and explaining the SCA.323 The SCA is a
complex statute that Congress wrote based on how early
computer networks operated.324 The category of RCS provider was
intended to address the business model in which companies
320. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c) (permitting disclosure to the National Center
for Missing and Exploited Children). The SCA thus leaves a hole for the
disclosure to private parties of personally identifiable information, so the
privacy policies of these providers would thus be more applicable to the
protection of PII than the SCA. Because there is no explicit exception for
subpoenas in civil litigation, courts interpret this omission as meaning that
private litigants cannot obtain data other than noncontent information from
ECS and RCS providers. See Robison, supra note 4, at 1208–09 (citing a number
of cases that have so decided). However, because of the importance of civil
discovery, courts may promote alternative methods of obtaining information
held by an ECS or RCS provider, such as a Rule 34 motion to compel the party
to produce data held by these providers. See, e.g., Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252
F.R.D. 346, 349–55 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (concluding that the SCA does not
preclude civil discovery for electronic stored communications that are
maintained by a nonparty service provider because the other party has control
over that information and thus can be compelled to produce it under Rule 34).
321. See 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (creating a private cause of action for knowing
or intentional violations of the law).
322. See id. § 2707(e)(1) (extending the good faith exception to “a court
warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative authorization, or a
statutory authorization”).
323. See Kerr, supra note 297, at 1213–33 (analyzing and explaining the
SCA).
324. See Robison, supra note 4, at 1205 (explaining the legislative history of
the SCA).

406

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 341 (2013)

outsourced a lot of storage and processing functions due to the
high cost of doing this in-house.325 It is thus likely that the RCS
category would easily apply to commercial cloud services that
provide options for outsourcing IT, but in most other contexts,
there is substantial overlap between RCS and ECS. In part
because of the rigid language of the statute and the substantial
changes that have come about in the electronic communications
field, it is unclear how the privacy protections of the SCA apply to
other communications in the cloud.326 Kerr suggests eliminating
the categories of ECS and RCS to address some of the
confusion.327
Currently, the degree of privacy in an e-mail likely depends
on whether it is stored on a hard drive or in the cloud.328 E-mails
downloaded from a service provider are easily covered by the
requirement in the SCA that requires a warrant to obtain
unopened e-mails fewer than 180 days old, but it is unclear
whether a webmail provider would be considered an “electronic
communication service” or a “remote computing service.”329 Some
industry actors seem to oppose the 180-day rule because people
now leave information on webmail services for long periods of
time.330 Generally, many support the proposal to revise the SCA
to better address cloud computing.331
Some question whether the SCA would protect free cloud
services at all because advertising-supported business models
325. See id. at 1206–07 (explaining the legislative history of the SCA).
326. See Kattan, supra note 8, at 619 (recognizing the uncertainty of the
SCA’s protections of cloud-based electronic communications).
327. Kerr, supra note 297, at 1209 (calling the categories “confusing” and
suggesting their removal); see also Kattan, supra note 8, at 653 (echoing this
recommendation and suggesting that Congress consider whether it even makes
sense to continue to distinguish between ECS and RCS).
328. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 45 (discussing cloud privacy issues).
329. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 167–68 (noting the SCA’s ambiguous
relationship to webmail services).
330. See Kattan, supra note 8, at 642–43 (noting Microsoft’s objections to the
180-day rule).
331. See id. at 645 (noting that Digital Due Process, a consortium of privacy
advocates, are lobbying for amendment of the ECPA); see also supra Part II.E
(discussing the need for legislative reform to create adequate privacy protections
for the cloud).
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often give the providers access to communication contents for
targeted advertising purposes.332 This may prevent these services
from being considered RCS providers because the provider is
authorized to access communication contents for purposes other
than rendering storage and computer processing services.333 TOS
agreements and privacy policies thus have potentially significant
effects on the extent to which the SCA protects the customer’s
privacy because these terms may give the provider explicit
authority to take actions that would disqualify the provider from
being considered a provider of RCS.334
3. Case Law
While there is not an explicit clause in the U.S. Constitution
that states the existence of a general right to privacy, courts have
held that such a right exists and is protected by the Constitution.
Much discussion of Supreme Court privacy jurisprudence focuses
on decisional privacy; that is, the right of individuals to make
decisions free of government intervention.335 In Whalen v. Roe,
the Supreme Court recognized “the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters,”336 which has influenced
many lower courts in recognizing a constitutional right to
information privacy.337
332. See Kattan, supra note 8, at 638–40 (arguing that Gmail might not be
considered an RCS provider because the privacy policy allows Google to access
user communications for advertising purposes); Robison, supra note 4, at 1196
(noting that this quid pro quo violates the SCA’s provisions).
333. See Robison, supra note 4, at 1213 (noting that cloud services may not
qualify as RCS because these services allow advertisers access to customer
data).
334. See id. at 1215, 1220–21 (identifying three varieties of terms-of-service
agreements and explaining how courts have interpreted terms-of-service
agreements).
335. Some of the best known examples of decisional privacy cases in the
Supreme Court over the last fifty years concern contraception and abortion. See,
e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (citing a right to privacy under the
Constitution in prohibiting states from outright banning abortion); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (ruling unconstitutional a Connecticut
law that prohibited the use of contraception).
336. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977).
337. See Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 111, at 558 (discussing the privacy
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U.S. courts have often examined the distinctions between the
public and private spheres. The public-disclosure-of-private-facts
tort, for example, has been found to not apply to the republication
of public postings on the web, even when the original posting is
deleted a few days after it was first posted.338 In contrast to public
postings, courts may be more protective of seemingly nonsensitive
private data, like search queries.339
Courts have also examined privacy in the context of the
Fourth Amendment and statutes that relate to privacy, like the
ECPA. Also relevant to our research, some courts have examined
the implications of TOS agreements and privacy policies. It is to
these topics we now turn.
a. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment declares that people have a right “to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”340 The Fourth Amendment
also applies to seizure of digital evidence, though seizing digital
evidence stored in the cloud is likely to be much easier than
seizing identical data that is stored solely on a suspect’s personal
computer within the suspect’s home.341
doctrine’s effect in lower federal courts).
338. See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 862–63 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that initial publication was not sufficiently obscure
or transient). The Moreno court concluded this in spite of the fact that the public
backlash did not rise to unacceptable levels until after the college student’s
MySpace posting about the town was republished in the local newspaper. See id.
at 861–62.
339. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Google, 234 F.R.D. 674, 687–88 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(declining to compel disclosure of 5,000 search queries and noting the potential
privacy concerns of such disclosures).
340. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Typically, this protection requires a search
warrant to be issued, though in some circumstances it is acceptable for the
warrant to be executed by parties other than law enforcement. See United
States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1068 (8th Cir. 2002) (permitting an ISP’s
technicians to execute a search warrant outside the presence of law
enforcement).
341. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 386–87 (noting that digital search and
seizure is far easier because of the development of the cloud).
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Fourth Amendment cases often focus on the need for a
warrant, the issuance of which requires a finding of probable
cause by a judicial officer.342 When searches are executed without
a warrant, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence requires courts to
decide if the target of the search had a subjective expectation of
privacy that society recognized as reasonable.343 Much turns on
the existence of this “reasonable expectation of privacy” (REOP).
Courts recognize a REOP in papers and effects sent in the mail,
and some courts have held that e-mail is analogous to postal mail
and thus a sender has a REOP in e-mail.344 A REOP might not
exist, for instance, in a library’s shared computers that are
available for public use, but may exist in a personal Yahoo!
webmail account.345 A REOP is generally recognized in locked
containers, and password protected computers may be considered
analogous to locked containers.346 On the other hand, a public
employee may have a reduced REOP in equipment provided by

342. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (ruling that a
warrant is deficient for failure to show probable cause if the facts articulated on
the face of the warrant are “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”); supra note 340 and
accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Amendment).
343. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (espousing the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine).
344. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010)
(extending Fourth Amendment protections to e-mail). But see Rehberg v. Paulk,
611 F.3d 828, 847 (11th Cir. 2010) (ruling in favor of immunity because there is
not a “clearly established” constitutional right to privacy in e-mail content
“voluntarily transmitted over the global Internet and stored at a third-party
ISP”).
345. See Wilson v. Moreau, 442 F. Supp. 2d 81, 104, 108 (D.R.I. 2006) (citing
cases that declared a lack of reasonable expectation of privacy when using
public library computers); see also United States v. D’Andrea, 648 F.3d 1, 5–14
(1st Cir. 2011) (analyzing a government search of a password protected website
used to store private images). On the other hand, courts might not find a REOP
in information disclosed in a chatroom with other individuals. See United States
v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
346. See United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 193 (2d Cir. 2004) (ruling
that a probation condition allowing for frequent or random monitoring of
probationer’s computer use may be overbroad and violate a Fourth Amendment
interest); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a
third party’s authority to consent to search of shared spaces did not extend to
the defendant’s password protected files).
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his employer.347 On this point, the Supreme Court recently
examined the issue of a public employer-issued pager and the
extent to which the Fourth Amendment protected text messages
sent over this pager, concluding that a search that is justified by
noninvestigatory work-related purposes is reasonable.348 In City
of Ontario v. Quon,349 the Court assumed, but did not conclusively
determine, that there was otherwise a REOP in text messages.350
If a warrantless search is conducted where a REOP exists, a
court will examine if one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement applies, and if one does not, the evidence derived
from the violation may be suppressed at trial. One of the
exceptions is when the party with a REOP is the object of the
search, or a third party with adequate authority, gives consent to
the search.351 The scope of the permission is also important.
Suppression may be an option when investigators seize more
than permitted under the warrant, which is an especially big
danger with e-discovery.352 However, suppression might not be an
available remedy in the case of evidence that was within the

347. Compare United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1134 (10th Cir.
2002) (noting that a public employer’s computer use policy may reduce an
employee’s REOP in the employee’s office computer), with Maes v. Folberg, 504
F. Supp. 2d 339, 347 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (finding a REOP in a public employee’s
work laptop computer).
348. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632–33 (2010) (holding
that the city’s review of a police officer’s text messages did not violate the
officer’s Fourth Amendment rights).
349. See id. at 2619.
350. See id. at 2630 (“Even if Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his text messages, petitioners did not necessarily violate the Fourth
Amendment by obtaining and viewing the transcripts.”).
351. Compare United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 721 (10th Cir. 2007)
(holding that a cotenant had apparent authority to consent to a search of the
computer in defendant’s room when police used forensic software to bypass
possible password protection), with Trulock, 275 F.3d at 402–03 (holding that
third-party consent does not extend to the defendant’s password protected files).
352. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162,
1177 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasizing the importance of procedures to segregate
data covered by the warrant from data that is not covered, including the need to
have disinterested computer technicians go through the information to separate
covered data).
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scope of the warrant, even if the seizure of evidence was outside
the warrant.353
There is also an important distinction between “content” and
“noncontent” information, with the latter category including
things like addresses on the outside of an envelope and phone
numbers dialed on a phone. In the cloud context, a person is
likely to not have a REOP in subscriber information provided to
an ISP.354 Other noncontent information, like e-mail addresses in
the “To” field of an e-mail or IP addresses of visited websites, are
likely to not be protected by the Fourth Amendment.355
The
third-party
doctrine
of
Fourth
Amendment
jurisprudence is the focus of much discussion in the online
privacy context, because the doctrine prevents a REOP from
being found in papers and effects turned over to a third party.356
353. See United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 973–76 (9th Cir. 2006)
(declining to suppress evidence found on storage media seized pursuant to a
warrant that only addressed the seizure of a computer). If digital evidence
within the scope of the warrant has been deleted by the computer owner, it is
not outside of the warrant’s scope for police to restore deleted files when
executing the warrant. See United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir.
1999) (“The seizure of unlawful images is within the plain language of the
warrant; their recovery, after attempted destruction, is no different than
decoding a coded message lawfully seized or pasting together scraps of a torn-up
ransom note.”).
354. See United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008)
(finding that the defendant had no REOP for subscriber information given to
ISP).
355. See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that it is not a Fourth Amendment search to use computer surveillance
techniques to obtain only information concerning the to/from fields of e-mails
and website addresses visited); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 253 F.R.D.
256, 261–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that privacy concerns of disclosing
noncontent information like data logs and IP addresses were only “speculative”).
The Perrine court also suggested that the defendant’s use of peer-to-peer
software also decreased the defendant’s expectation of privacy, especially as to
the files shared over the P2P service. See Perrine, 518 F.3d at 1205 (ruling that
Perrine’s use of peer-to-peer software, which allowed other Internet users to
access files on his computer, partially reduced the expectation of privacy that he
would otherwise enjoy in his computer, therefore leaving Perrine with no Fourth
Amendment interest in subscriber information he gave to Yahoo! and Cox).
356. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436–40 (1976) (finding no
reasonable expectation of privacy in financial records disclosed to a financial
institution in the ordinary course of business); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 335–36 (1973) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in financial
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Bailments of concealed items, however, might not be limited by
the third-party doctrine because the bailee entrusted with
concealed items does not necessarily have the authority to view
the items or to consent to the search of the items by others.357
Thus, much will turn on the authority that the third party has
with respect to the entrusted items. If a private carrier’s terms
retain the right to inspect a package for any reason, acceptance of
these terms by a customer of the private carrier may also result
in a loss of a REOP in packages sent using this private carrier.358
Information privacy scholars often argue that this thirdparty doctrine will prevent Fourth Amendment protections from
applying in the cloud because users must inherently reveal their
information to third parties in order for it to be transmitted or
processed.359 On the other hand, recent case law casts doubts on
this view. In the Sixth Circuit case United States v. Warshak,360
the court distinguished e-mail interception from other third-party
doctrine cases by holding that the e-mail provider was an
intermediary in the communication, not a recipient.361 However,
the Warshak court also noted that if an agreement with a service
provider gave the service provider the authority to “audit,
inspect, and monitor” the e-mails of its subscribers, that might
cause the subscriber to lose a REOP in those e-mails.
records turned over to an accountant for tax return purposes).
357. See United States v. James, 353 F.3d 606, 613–15 (8th Cir. 2003)
(overturning a child pornography conviction because the police obtained the
evidence from a person entrusted with computer disks with specific instructions
to not use the disks).
358. See United States v. Young, 350 F.3d 1302, 1307–09 (11th Cir. 2003)
(finding no REOP when a private carrier retained the right to inspect packages
for any reason and when defendant also violated other terms set out by the
carrier). The court in Young also held in the alternative that reserving a right to
inspect gave the carrier the ability to later consent to a search of the package by
law enforcement. See id. at 1308 (“Just as the ‘right to inspect’ notice defeated
Young’s privacy interest, we believe it also served to defeat Young’s Fourth
Amendment challenge because it authorized Federal Express, as a bailee of the
packages, to consent to a search.”).
359. See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 295, at 173–74 (arguing that Fourth
Amendment protections should be extended to data that is revealed
involuntarily and incidentally to using a service).
360. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
361. See id. at 288 (distinguishing Miller).
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For Fourth Amendment protection to apply to a search, it
must be executed by a state actor because the Fourth
Amendment only protects against intrusions by the state.362
Searches conducted by a private party thus do not inherently
raise Fourth Amendment concerns unless the private party is
behaving as a state actor,363 an analysis that often turns on state
entanglement with the private party’s business.364 Under the
Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Jacobsen,365 if the
papers or effects are secured such that it is clear that the
nonstate-actor searcher does not have a right to look at the
contents, but the searcher executes a private search anyway, a
REOP might not protect the owner of the contents if law
enforcement then duplicates the private search.366 The United
States v. D’Andrea367 case suggests a narrow interpretation of
Jacobsen, however, with the former court implying that a private
search of password protected online storage would not validate a
subsequent warrantless search unless the content owner was
careless with his password security.368
362. See U.S. CONST. amend. 4 (providing protections against unreasonable
and warrantless searches); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)
(stating that the Fourth Amendment is construed as “proscribing only
governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an
unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the
Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental
official’” (citation omitted)).
363. See United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 365–66 (4th Cir. 2010)
(holding that an ISP was not turned into a state actor by a statute that required
ISPs to report to law enforcement if the ISP found child pornography on its
network).
364. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 716–17 (1961)
(finding state action sufficient to implicate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment when a restaurant in a city-operated parking garage
denied service to a customer because of his race).
365. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 109.
366. See id. at 126 (holding that if a third party violates the person’s
expectation of privacy, the government may use that information to the same
extent, but cannot exceed the scope of the private search). But see United States
v. D’Andrea, 648 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2011) (ruling that the private search doctrine
would not apply when the property owner did not give the private searcher
permission or means to search the property, unless the property owner was very
careless about security of the property).
367. See D’Andrea, 648 F.3d at 1.
368. See id. at 8 (noting that the private search doctrine might apply if the
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b. Stored Communications Act

As discussed above, the ECPA includes the Wiretap Act, the
SCA, and the Pen Register statute.369 The SCA is a complicated
statute that courts often interpret differently. The Ninth Circuit,
for example, adopted a broad interpretation of the phrase “for
backup purposes” within the definition of “electronic storage.”
The Theofel v. Farey Jones370 court held that a provider was
holding e-mails in “electronic storage,” and thus the ECS terms
applied rather than the RCS terms that would apply if the emails were merely in “storage.”371 Kerr criticizes the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation of “electronic storage” under the SCA,372
specifically its broad interpretation of “backup purposes” that
may permit more frequent findings that a service is acting as an
ECS provider.373
It is unclear how the SCA will apply to webmail. The Theofel
court itself suggested that storage would not be for “backup
property owner was careless about the security of the property).
369. See supra note 295 and accompanying text (discussing the ECPA’s
three components). When applying the Wiretap Act, courts require the
interception to be contemporaneous with transmission in order to find a
violation. See United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 85 (1st Cir. 2005)
(concluding that the Wiretap Act is violated if a provider intercepts electronic
communications that are in transient electronic storage as part of the
communications process); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36
F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing the contemporaneity requirement). The
Steve Jackson Games court also acknowledged that it is unlikely that Congress
intended for a Wiretap Act violation to also violate the SCA. See Steve Jackson
Games, Inc., 36 F.3d at 461–63 (discussing the legislative history of the Wiretap
Act and the SCA).
370. See Theofel v. Farey Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
371. See id. at 1075 (concluding that “backup purposes” can include when an
ISP keeps a copy of an e-mail on its server in case the user needs to download
the e-mail again later, thus broadening the category of communications to which
the stronger requirements for ECS can apply).
372. See Kerr, supra note 297, at 1218 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation).
373. See id. at 1218 n.61 (providing reasons for the author’s labeling of the
Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Theofel as “implausible and hard to square with the
statutory text”); see also Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075 (providing a broad definition
of “backup purposes”); Quon v. Arch Wireless, 529 F.3d 892, 902–03 (9th Cir.
2008) (concluding that by archiving text messages, Arch Wireless was providing
backup protection instead of storage services, and thus was an ECS provider).
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purposes” if the information were not stored anywhere else.374 In
United States v. Weaver,375 the court held that Hotmail was an
RCS provider, so only a trial subpoena would be required to
compel Hotmail to produce previously accessed e-mails under 181
days old.376 It is also unclear the extent to which the SCA would
prevent a party in civil litigation from seeking records
maintained by a cloud service provider during discovery.377 Even
if a provider does violate the SCA, the remedy for such a violation
is not suppression, as it would be with a Fourth Amendment
violation because the available remedies are explicitly limited
under § 2708.378
The intersection of the SCA and the Fourth Amendment may
also raise issues of the ultimate constitutionality of the SCA.
Because the e-mail acquisition actions of law enforcement in
Warshak relied on the SCA, and the Warshak court viewed e-mail
as having the same Fourth Amendment protection as postal mail,
the Warshak court ultimately concluded that insofar as the SCA
permitted law enforcement to obtain e-mails without a warrant,
374. See supra note 371 and accompanying text (discussing the Theofel
court’s interpretation of the “backup purposes” language contained in the SCA).
375. See United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769 (C.D. Ill. 2009).
376. See id. at 771 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(2)’s subpoena
requirements and ruling that e-mails under 181 days old must be seized using a
subpoena).
377. On its face, the SCA does not include an exception for disclosure for
civil discovery purposes, so adverse parties may be precluded from requesting
stored information directly from service providers. However, because of the
importance of civil discovery, courts are likely to find other avenues for allowing
such information to be compelled, such as by compelling the opposing party to
produce it directly under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 352–53 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (concluding
that the SCA does not preclude civil discovery for electronically stored
communications that are maintained by a nonparty service provider because the
other party has control over that information and can be compelled to produce it
under Rule 34). Thus, because the subscriber requests the information from the
nonparty service provider, the information is being disclosed consistent with the
statutory exceptions.
378. See 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (2006) (“The remedies and sanctions described in
this chapter are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional
violations of this chapter.”); United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th
Cir. 2008) (ruling that violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2708 do not warrant exclusion of
evidence).
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the SCA was unconstitutional.379 Accordingly, if more courts
adopt the reasoning of Warshak, the influence of the SCA in the
e-mail search context may be significantly reduced.
c. Contracts and Privacy
In the cloud context, one should also consider case law
precedent concerning contract law and agreements between
consumers and service providers. As the Warshak court noted,
excessively permissive TOS agreements may deprive a customer
of a REOP in contents stored or transmitted using a service,380 so
the validity of these contracts has implications for privacy law.
Additionally, privacy policies and TOS agreements have
implications for SCA cases because one of the most important
exceptions under the SCA is for information obtained after the
subscriber or customer has given valid consent.381 Thus, a privacy
policy that reserves a license to use the customer’s information
and content for business or marketing purposes may be read as
consent to disclosure under the SCA.382 To the extent that the
consent applies to communications stored for computer storage
and processing purposes, consent renders the SCA completely
inapplicable if the service otherwise only qualified as an RCS
instead of an ECS.
Contract law is typically state law, so standards will vary
across cases. Generally, contracts can be invalidated if they are
found to be unconscionable. Some courts have invalidated
excessively one-sided TOS agreements on unconscionability
379. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (ruling
that the portion of the SCA that allows the government to obtain e-mails
without a warrant is unconstitutional).
380. See id. at 287 (noting that “if the ISP expresses an intention to ‘audit,
inspect, and monitor’ its subscriber’s emails, that might be enough to render an
expectation of privacy unreasonable” (citation omitted)).
381. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b)(3), 2703(c)(1)(C), 2703(c)(2) (explaining the
consent exceptions to the SCA).
382. However, this may be limited to content for which the customer does
not elect stronger privacy protections. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 253
F.R.D. 256, 264–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (concluding that acceptance of Youtube’s
TOS and privacy policy does not amount to consent to the disclosure of private
content).
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grounds, often when the customer was seeking to avoid
mandatory arbitration provisions.383 Courts have also examined
terms not related to arbitration, and may also invalidate terms
that the court finds to be excessively unfair.384
At least one court has held that privacy policies are purely
aspirational, and thus not contracts that are enforceable at law,
when they do not afford any rights or remedies to the customer.385
However, this position does not take into account recent actions
by the FTC to enforce privacy policies against companies on the
grounds that violating its own privacy policy amounts to an
unfair business practice.386 Thus, we do not anticipate that this
“purely aspirational” characterization of privacy policies will be
adopted.

383. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“Reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and
unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers are essential
if electronic bargaining is to have integrity and credibility.”); Bragg v. Linden
Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding procedural and
substantive unconscionability sufficient to invalidate an arbitration provision
that was part of a TOS that amounted to a very one-sided adhesion contract);
People v. Network Assocs., Inc., 758 N.Y.S.2d 466, 470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003)
(holding that some terms of a software license were unenforceable due to their
unfairness when the provisions included terms prohibiting customers from
publishing reviews of the product or benchmark test results without the
company’s permission).
384. See Network Associates, 758 N.Y.S.2d at 470 (holding that some terms
of a software license were unenforceable due to their unfairness when the
provisions included terms prohibiting customers from publishing reviews of the
product or benchmark test results without the company’s permission). Courts
value the rights of parties in contracts, however, so perhaps they are likely to
only invalidate unfair terms that pass a certain threshold. See MDY Indus., LLC
v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging
the contract claim that arises when a user violates a game’s prohibition on the
use of “bots” to automatically play a game); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320
F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (enforcing a shrinkwrap agreement that prohibited
reverse engineering).
385. See Freedman v. Am. Online, 325 F. Supp. 2d 638, 640 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(finding that a subscriber agreement “is plainly aspirational only . . . and is not
intended to confer any rights and remedies upon the subscriber”).
386. See infra note 465 and accompanying text (discussing FTC enforcement
actions).
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4. European Privacy Law

The United States and the European Union take very
different theoretical approaches to privacy. In the United States,
the idea of privacy is often related to concepts like secrecy and
intrusions.387 In the United States, privacy is viewed as an aspect
of liberty, with the goal of protecting against intrusions by the
state.388 The European approach, however, views privacy as a
right of human dignity, with a focus on an individual’s personal
autonomy in deciding how his personal data will be used by
anyone, including the free market.389
European privacy law is very complicated, and a detailed
examination is outside of the scope of this Article. However,
because we now live in a global information economy, cloud
providers must inevitably consider how their services and
practices will need to be altered for a European market. For this
reason, we will give a fairly brief introduction to this complicated
topic.
In the European Union, privacy is considered to be a
fundamental right.390 The first European data protection laws
were enacted in the 1970s, followed by the adoption of the
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data391 in 1981, and the
enactment of the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46 (DPD
95/46)392 in 1995.393

387. See supra Part III.A (discussing fundamental privacy theories).
388. See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 341 (“In the American
model, privacy is understood as a liberty, protecting citizens against the State.”).
389. See id. (“[T]he common European understanding is of a right to human
dignity—an individual right to determine the end uses of our personal data—in
which threats to privacy arise from both the State and the free market.”).
390. Lanois, supra note 18, at 37 (stating that “the European Union has
enshrined the status of privacy as a fundamental right”).
391. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. no. 108, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm.
392. Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EU).
393. See Kuner, Part 1, supra note 119, at 176–77 (providing a discussion of
the early data protection laws in Europe).
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DPD 95/46 focuses on the protection of “personal data,” which
it defines as “information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person.”394 By its terms, it applies EU law to data
controllers that use “equipment” within the EU for the processing
of personal data, but the term “equipment” has been read broadly
to apply to things like cookies and JavaScript.395 Other provisions
that U.S. cloud providers must comply with include DPD 95/46’s
requirements for robust authentication and access safeguards.396
a. The Safe Harbor Framework
DPD 95/46 also governs the transfer of data, permitting data
transfers only to other countries with adequately protective
privacy laws.397 The United States does not have sufficient
privacy laws, but the data of European users can nonetheless be
transferred to the United States if the company handling the
transfer complies with the Safe Harbor agreement between the
394. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 392, at 38; see also Schwartz &
Solove, supra note 3, at 1873–74 (comparing the reduction in privacy law in the
U.S. to its expansion in the EU).
395. See Kuner, Part 2, supra note 126, at 228–29 (explaining the
controversy over the use of the term “equipment” to encompass things such as
“cookies”). Other EU regulations also restrict the use of cookies and similar
technologies, requiring the informed consent of a user to be obtained prior to the
provider commencing to store and access information that is on the user’s
computer. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 40 (discussing the consent requirement
under the EU Data Protection Directive and both the 2002 and 2009 ePrivacy
Directives). Because cookies involve information that is considered personal
data under the Data Protection Directive, which includes IP addresses, a
company that uses cookies in the EU must comply with the terms of both the
Data Protection Directive and the more recent ePrivacy directive of the EU. See
id. at 41 (“[T]he use of cookies or similar devices involving a unique user ID or
an identifier will result in the application of both the Data Protection and the
ePrivacy Directives.”).
396. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 47 (“[D]ata may only be transferred
outside of the EU if that country provides an ‘adequate’ level of
protection . . . .”).
397. See Stylianou, supra note 44, at 596 (noting that “[t]he gravest
expression of the implications of different levels of privacy protection occurred
when the European Union . . . passed the Data Protection Directive, which
allows the transfer of data intended to undergo processing to third countries
only if they ensure an adequate level of protection”).

420

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 341 (2013)

United States and the European Union.398 Because of the limits of
DPD 95/46 on transferring personal data, some cloud providers
have also established segregated EU clouds.399
The Safe Harbor framework provides a method for companies
to certify compliance with European privacy standards without
necessarily using segregated clouds. Under the Safe Harbor
Privacy Principles, organizations must: (1) provide notice about
data collection; (2) give individuals a choice to opt out of the
disclosure of their personal information to third parties or before
their information is put to a secondary use (or to opt in to sharing
if the personal information is considered sensitive); (3) extend
these standards to onward transfers—that is, ensure that third
parties to whom personal information is transferred also adhere
to the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles or have comparable
controls in place; (4) provide individuals with access to their
personal information held by the organization; (5) take
reasonable security precautions to protect personal information;
(6) take reasonable steps to protect data integrity; and (7) provide
adequate measures for enforcement of the principles.400
Adhering to the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles provides a
mechanism for companies in the United States to preserve the
398. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 48 (discussing how the Safe Harbor
program works between the United States and the European Union); Stylianou,
supra note 44, at 597 (explaining the Safe Harbor agreement, “according to
which American companies could transfer data from Europe as long as they
abided by a commonly agreed upon privacy framework set by the United States
Department of Commerce and the European Commission”). The European
Commission has found that membership in the U.S. Safe Harbor system
provides an “adequate level of data protection,” but the Commission suggests
that further transfer of the data beyond the Safe Harbor member must comply
with EU privacy law as well. See Kuner, Part 2, supra note 126, at 231
(discussing personal data protection concerns regarding “onward transfers of
data” from U.S. Safe Harbor members to third parties).
399. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 48 (“The most simple and obvious way to
comply with the EU Data Protection Directive is to ensure that personal data
does not leave the EU . . . which is why certain cloud vendors offer segregated
EU clouds that keep personal data from being transferred outside of the
European Union.”).
400. See Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV (Apr. 26, 2012, 3:08 PM),
http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2013)
(providing an overview of the U.S.–EU Safe Harbor program) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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status quo of a self-regulatory approach to privacy while still
being eligible to serve customers in the European Union.401 We
note that these principles also resemble many of the ideas
underlying FIPs, and that the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles
might provide another model for how companies should handle
personal information belonging to customers located in the
United States.
IV. Companies, Customer Data, and Customer-Company
Interactions
A. Companies and Customer Data
In this Article, we examine the interaction between privacy
theories, privacy law, and the relationships between consumers
and the companies that serve them in the cloud. These
relationships are largely defined by TOS agreements and privacy
policies, and these agreements typically enumerate what a
consumer can expect concerning the use of his personal
information. The concerns about how companies handle customer
data go beyond these agreements, however, and include issues
like data security, identity theft, and behavioral marketing.
1. Terms of Service Agreements
TOS agreements set forth terms governing the relationship
between a service provider and its customers.402 Generally, cloudbased services targeted at individual users are accompanied by
non-negotiable TOS agreements that favor the service provider
401. See James T. Sunosky, Privacy Online: A Primer on the European
Union’s Directive and United States’ Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, 9
CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 80, 85 (2000) (explaining the benefits of the Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles).
402. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Contemporary Issues in Cyberlaw: Nexus
Crystals: Crystallizing Limits on Contractual Control of Virtual Worlds, 38 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 43, 44 (2011) (referring to terms of use and EULAs as the
“social contract of the new millennium,” setting forth the rights and redresses of
citizens).
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over the end user.403 TOS agreements will generally address
things like metering, monitoring, and data backup,404 and often
include clauses in which the provider disclaims liability for harm
and forbids customers from using the company’s intellectual
property without authorization.405 Some also include terms
concerning the retention, control, and ownership of a user’s
information.406 TOS agreements take a variety of approaches to
customer information. Some include terms that allow providers to
access customer information for advertising and other purposes
relating to the business, while others are less transparent about
what the company may do with customer information, and still
others make explicit promises in their TOS agreements that the
companies will not access customers’ data.407
The terms of TOS agreements can have a significant impact
outside the context of the provider–customer relationship,
potentially affecting the consumer’s legal rights. The DOJ has
recently argued that violating a website’s TOS agreement
amounts to unauthorized access under the CFAA,408 and courts
403. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 163 (“Google’s profit model is based on
offering free services to consumers in exchange for their consent to nonnegotiable terms of service.”); Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 7 (“The SLAs of
cloud-based applications and services generally are non-negotiable and much
more favorable to the provider than to the end user.”).
404. See Martin, supra note 44, at 311 (noting the difficulties of providing
good customer service because of the lack of standards to measure a cloud’s
performance).
405. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 178 (“[L]anguage in a TOS agreement
merely disclaims liability for any damage to a user’s computer data and forbids
unauthorized use or redistribution of intellectual property.”).
406. See id. (explaining that TOS clauses “also dictate the terms by which
the entity will retain, control, and own a user’s information”). Google’s TOS
agreement includes a provision giving the company a license to use the
customer’s data in ways that would otherwise violate the customer’s copyright.
See Google Policies and Principles, Terms of Service, GOOGLE (Mar. 1, 2012),
http://www.google.com/policies/terms/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing that
Google may use personal data in accordance with their privacy policies) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
407. See Robison, supra note 4, at 1215–17 (providing an examination of
existing cloud providers).
408. See Declan McCullagh, DOJ: Lying on Match.com Needs to Be a Crime,
CNET (Nov. 14, 2011, 11:58 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-57324779281/doj-lying-on-match.com-needs-to-be-a-crime/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013)
(discussing the DOJ’s stance on CFAA violations in the context of popular
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have also examined whether agreeing to an expansive TOS
agreement or a broad privacy policy may cause a person to lose a
reasonable expectation of privacy.409 As discussed above in Part
III.B.2.a, the terms of TOS agreements may also impact the
application of the SCA.410
It is very important that consumers read and understand the
terms of cloud services’ TOS agreements because of the large
amounts of sometimes sensitive information stored with these
services.411 Consumers should pay special attention to how the
TOS agreements address customer data, including the
information that the company claims rights in, and how the
consumer can terminate his relationship with the cloud
provider.412 Consumers might be storing information solely in the
cloud, making it very important for the TOS agreements to
websites such as MySpace and Match.com) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). The Ninth Circuit, however, recently rejected the DOJ’s argument
on the reach of the CFAA in United States v. Nosal. See United States v. Nosal,
676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the language “exceeds authorized
access” in the CFAA should be narrowly interpreted and is therefore limited to
violations of restrictions on access to information, and not restrictions on its
use); Richard Santalesa, Ninth Circuit Narrows Reach of CFAA in En Banc U.S.
v. Nosal Decision, INFO. LAW GROUP (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.infolaw
group.com/2012/04/articles/computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-c/ninth-circuit-narrowsreach-of-cfaa-in-en-banc-us-v-nosal-decision/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013)
(discussing the decision in United States v. Nosal) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
409. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010)
(stating that such protections likely would not apply to content stored with a
provider that includes terms in an agreement reserving the right to “audit,
inspect, and monitor” e-mail content); Bagley, supra note 295, at 181 (discussing
cases examining the Fourth Amendment in the context of Terms of Service
agreements).
410. See supra Part III.B.2.a (discussing the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act).
411. See Soma, Gates, & Smith, supra note 16, at 534 (examining the
“blurred lines” between work and home life that e-technology has created and
suggesting that “users must make a good faith effort to read, understand, and
ask questions about service provider privacy and terms of use policies”); see also
Stylianou, supra note 44, at 593 (noting that such terms attract greater scrutiny
because of the large amount of data stored with these providers).
412. See Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 7 (asserting that cloud service
TOS agreements should address data migration issues to assure business
continuity and to protect the customer’s continued access to data after the
customer’s relationship with the provider is dissolved).
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include provisions protecting customers’ ability to retrieve their
content if, for example, a service is shut down.413
a. TOS Agreements as Contracts of Adhesion
Under the common law of contracts, forming a contract
requires mutual assent.414 When a contract is not subject to
negotiation and is offered by the more powerful party on a “take
it or leave it” basis, the contract is often referred to as a contract
of adhesion.415 Privacy policies and TOS agreements typically
meet this definition for an adhesion contract.416 Such contracts
are not automatically invalid, but they may be subject to greater
scrutiny.
Excessively oppressive TOS terms may be invalidated if the
court concludes that the terms are unconscionable.417
Unconscionability analysis often has two prongs, and courts
evaluate the circumstances for both procedural and substantive
unconscionability.418 Courts might be more willing to find
413. This issue has come up recently in the context of the shutdown of
Megaupload. Megan Geuss, Megaupload User Asks for His Perfectly Legal
TECHNICA
(Mar.
21,
2012,
10:10
PM),
Videos
Back,
ARS
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2012/03/megaupload-user-asks-for-hisperfectly-legal-videos-back.ars (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (discussing the
shutdown of the file-sharing locker Megaupload and the inability of customers
to access their legally stored videos) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
414. See, e.g., 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 4:1 (4th ed.
2012) (“[M]utual assent is essential to the formation of informal contracts . . . .”).
415. See
Nolo’s
Plain-English
Law
Dictionary,
NOLO,
http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/adhesion-contract-(contract-of-adhesion)term.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing the definition of an adhesion
contract) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Bagley,
supra note 295, at 183 (“[E]lectronic contracts of adhesion are limiting the
private rights of an individual to protect their privacy in services so vital to
daily life.”).
416. Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1235 (arguing that the idea that
users give informed consent to these terms is a fiction, due to the total lack of
negotiation).
417. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 605 (E.D. Pa.
2007) (finding an arbitration provision to be both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable).
418. Id.
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unconscionability when there are no market alternatives, but the
diverse reality of the cloud market makes it unlikely that a lack
of market alternatives will be a persuasive argument.419
The unequal bargaining power between the provider and its
customers means that providers often subject customers to terms
that are more favorable to the provider.420 At least one court has
looked favorably on a provider prohibiting the use of “bots” with
its service,421 and Martin expresses concern that this opens the
door for “predatory software vendor[s]” to prohibit customers
from using third party software with the vendor’s projects,
thereby eliminating beneficial effects of innovation by third
parties.422
2. Privacy Policies
Privacy policies and TOS agreements often overlap, though
for our purposes we consider privacy policies to be more focused
on making the customer aware of the company’s policies
regarding their data instead of the customer’s obligations
concerning the service. Terms in a provider’s privacy policy might
address things like the quantity and nature of collected data and
the company’s policies on data retention and customer control
over data.423 Privacy policies often also address data security
issues, like the use of SSL encryption during data
transmission.424 However, many of these providers insert
419. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 179 (discussing the difficulty of
demonstrating unconscionability “in the search engine, e-mail, and digital
media services market, where there are many companies even though only a few
giants dominate”).
420. See supra note 403 and accompanying text.
421. See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th
Cir. 2010) (finding that the prohibition of the use of “bots” was permitted under
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
422. Martin, supra note 44, at 312.
423. See Stylianou, supra note 44, at 599, 602 (discussing the quantity and
nature of collected data as well as data retention policies and data storage
location).
424. See id. at 603 (providing a discussion of data safety, security, and
integrity).
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provisions in their privacy policies or TOS agreements that
repudiate any liability for data loss, and reserve to the provider
the right to discontinue the service at the provider’s sole
discretion.425
Privacy policies typically consist of information provided by
the service provider about how the provider may gather, use,
disclose, and manage the personal information of its customers.426
Privacy policies, like TOS agreements, are often adhesion
contracts marked by significant advantages being reserved for
the service provider, such as the right to amend its privacy policy
unilaterally with little notice to its customers.427 Privacy policies
may include broad permissions to allow the provider to access
information for its own marketing purposes and to disclose
customer information to its business partners for businessrelated purposes.428 Privacy policies also might not be considered
contracts at all, but purely as notices about a company’s policy.
However, few consumers actually read a company’s privacy
policy, and even fewer understand it.429 Solove criticizes many
425. See id. at 604 (examining Amazon’s, Mozy’s, and Apple’s data
protection disclosures).
426. See Cascia, supra note 17, at 888 (“A privacy policy is a legal agreement
between the user and the provider that discloses some or all of the ways the
provider gathers, uses, discloses and manages a customer’s personal
information.”).
427. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 82–83 (arguing that
privacy policies are not a meaningful contract, with no bargaining over terms
and containing mostly unreliable, vague promises); Cascia, supra note 17, at
889–90 (discussing Google’s privacy policy and noting that “Google reserves the
right to unilaterally amend its privacy policy leaving it essentially
meaningless”). Birnhack and Elkin-Koren argue that if such a term is included,
user privacy is not being effectively guaranteed by upfront notice and consent.
See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 365 (arguing that “if the user
agrees upfront to any use of data as detailed by an adjustable privacy policy, the
user does not exercise real control over the collection and use of personal data”).
428. See Soma, Gates, & Smith, supra note 16, at 532 (noting that providers
often include terms in e-messaging policies and usage agreements permitting
the provider to access the systems for “routine monitoring purposes” and to
comply with lawful requests by the government or litigants); infra Part V
(providing an empirical analysis of agreements and policies in the cloud).
429. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1856 (“[S]tudies have shown
that few consumers read privacy policies, and that those who do frequently fail
to understand them.”).
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privacy policies as being “written in obtuse prose,” containing
large amounts of extraneous information.430
Cloud services collect a lot of data, both through the
customer’s voluntary disclosure of data and through the
provider’s automatic collection of information through its
operations or advertising policy.431 Many privacy policies assure
limited use of customer information.432 Some, however, are vague,
leaving ambiguities and loopholes. Transparency in privacy
policies is very important, and consumers should be informed
about how their data will be collected and used.433 In this Article,
we posit that reserving explicit rights for consumers to control
their data will raise consumer awareness of privacy issues. We
anticipate that this raised awareness, combined with the
increased control that an individual has over the use of his data,
will have a positive effect on the market for cloud services.
a. Sharing Information with the Government
Consumers will often encounter inherent limitations in how
much control they can exercise over their data because of common
policies permitting the sharing of data with government entities.
Privacy policies typically contain provisions reserving to the
provider the right to disclose customer information pursuant to
lawful government requests.434 Companies like Google and AT&T
430. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 82.
431. See Stylianou, supra note 44, at 599 (examining the quantity and
nature of collected data by cloud services). Some companies may also collect
information from other sources that pertains to the user indirectly. See id. at
601 (using Microsoft as an example to demonstrate that the practice of indirect
data collection is increasing).
432. See id. at 601, 604 (discussing Microsoft’s, IBM’s, and Amazon’s privacy
and data protection policies).
433. See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 353 (explaining the
importance of user consent to data collection).
434. See Google Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (July 27, 2012), http://www.
google.com/policies/privacy/ (noting that Google may share user data for legal
reasons) (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also Soghoian, supra note 5, at 393–94 (citing a public statement by
the CEO of Google in which the CEO listed assisting with lawful investigations
as being one of the main reasons that Google keeps detailed data of the online
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collect large amounts of personal user data from customers.435
This sort of information was formerly used for marketing and
research purposes, but recently the U.S. government has been
building national security databases that contain personal user
data provided by cooperating telecommunications companies like
AT&T.436 Sometimes, providers may voluntarily provide data to
government entities to improve the provider’s own security.437
Governments have requested personal user information from
various companies for a variety of purposes over the years.438 This
is not limited to the United States. For example, the government
of the United Kingdom is considering using data obtained by
social networking sites for the purpose of monitoring users to
prevent terrorism and crime.439 Generally, private companies that
turn over information to the government are not considered state
actors by doing so.440 Cloud providers sometimes also are required
activity of its customers).
435. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 155–56 (“[T]hird parties such as
information service provider, Google, and telecommunication giant, AT&T,
amass large amounts of personal user data.”).
436. See id. at 156 (noting that “in recent years the United States
government has built national security databases with personal user data
allegedly obtained from cooperating telecommunication companies” that has
resulted in Fourth Amendment litigation); Soghoian, supra note 5, at 385–86
(discussing wiretaps obtained through telecommunication companies and
Internet providers working with law enforcement officers). Bagley cites the
wiretapping controversy as an example that did not involve warrants or
subpoenas, but instead relied on voluntary agreements with private companies.
See Bagley, supra note 295, at 156–57 (criticizing that the “traditional legal
process was evaded” in this situation because “private companies did the data
gathering and managed the phone calls” and the companies involved waived
their Fourth Amendment rights).
437. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 154 (citing the example of Google
voluntarily providing data to the NSA).
438. See id. at 161–62 (noting that the government sought user information
from airlines after the September 11th attacks and from hotels and car rental
agencies in 2003 to thwart terrorist threats against Las Vegas).
439. See id. at 164 (discussing the United Kingdom’s potential plan to use
data collected by social networking sites).
440. See id. at 162 (“[P]rivate companies are not restrained as state actors
when they voluntarily hand consumer data to the government . . . they are
treated as a third party in whom a consumer is placing their trust.”). But see id.
at 188 (arguing that there may be entwinement sufficient to find state action if
a communication provider assigns employees to work with government agencies
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to comply with certain content laws of other countries, like
Skype’s Chinese counterpart that was required to implement a
filter to prohibit text messages that included phrases like
“Falungong” and “Dalai Lama.”441 There are also some concerns
about the U.S. government’s ability to exploit software
vulnerabilities or even enable the microphones of cellular phones
remotely as part of criminal investigations.442
There are a number of other reasons why government
officials might request information. The federal government
recently used data associated with customer shopping cards to
trace the source of salmonella poisoning.443 The DOJ has also
requested search records from companies like Google and
Microsoft in the course of its investigation into the effectiveness
of child protection legislation.444 However, the court in that case
did not compel Google to turn over actual search queries, noting
in dicta that there may be an expectation of privacy in such
queries.445
In addition to requesting the cooperation of private
companies, the government itself has been collecting personal
information for many years. Solove notes in his book that there
are almost 2,000 databases of personal information maintained

and respond to government requests).
441. Soghoian, supra note 5, at 408. Skype denied allegations that its
Chinese software contained a backdoor to allow surveillance by the Chinese
government, but it came out in 2008 that when text messages using this
software were filtered, the offending message and the identities of the sender
and recipient were forwarded to a publicly accessible server in China. See id. at
408–09 (providing a discussion of the TOM-Software).
442. See id. at 400–02 (discussing the FBI’s use of “roving bug” software).
443. See Martin, supra note 44, at 299 (examining use of consumer data by
the federal government).
444. See Gonzales v. Google, 234 F.R.D. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(examining a subpoena by the U.S. Attorney General to Google to compile and
produce information from the search engine’s index and search queries); Bagley,
supra note 295, at 165 (discussing litigation involving subpoenas for online user
data).
445. See Gonzales, 234 F.R.D. at 684 (denying the motion to order Google to
disclose search queries of its users); Bagley, supra note 295, at 165 (noting that,
“[i]n the end, Google was compelled only to generate a list of URLs, rather than
actual user search queries”).
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by the federal government.446 Personal information collection as
part of the census began in 1790, with the questions becoming
more personal until the 1890 census, which included questions
about things like diseases, disabilities, and finances.447 The
massive databases that are already maintained by the
government and over which citizens have no control might appear
to threaten any attempts to improve informational privacy.
Requiring data control protections in the private sector may seem
like a relatively small issue compared to government databases.
However, private data held by governments generally do not
leave the government’s possession, and thus the circulation of
this information is not as problematic as the circulation of
information collected in the private sector.
3. Effects of Security Breaches
A major reason that we argue for consumers to be in control
of their data is that we think consumers should be empowered to
take proactive steps to protect their information. Consumers, in
our view, should be free to withdraw their data from a service if
they learn of security failings in that service. One of the dangers
of insufficient data security for data in the cloud is the risk of
identity theft as a result of data breaches.448 According to the
Identity Theft Resource Center, in 2009 there were at least 498
publicly reported data breaches, impacting 222 million total
446. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 15. Richards also notes that
the government has huge databases of information about citizens. See Richards,
supra note 114, at 1156 (discussing the history of personal data collection by the
federal government that began as early as the nineteenth century).
447. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 13 (providing a historical
look at the collection of public data by the federal government). The public
outcry in response to the intrusiveness of the questions in the 1890 census
eventually led to legislation to ensure the confidentiality of census data. See id.
(“When the 1890 census included questions about diseases, disabilities, and
finances, it sparked a public outcry, ultimately leading to the passage in the
early twentieth century of stricter laws protecting the confidentiality of census
data.”).
448. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 44 (discussing the increasing amount of
“commercial, personal, and even secret data and other sensitive information . . .
flowing around the globe in the cloud”).
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records.449 A single data breach of a credit card processing
company in 2012 may have resulted in 1.5 million credit card
accounts being compromised.450
Identity theft is a federal crime and has been referred to as
the most rapidly growing white collar crime,451 though some
criticize the law as not being adequately supported by resources
or sufficient criminal sentences.452 Approximately half a million
people are victims of identity theft every year.453 Twenty-six
percent of consumer complaints submitted to the FTC in 2008
concerned identity theft.454
But identity theft is not the only risk related to data
breaches.455 Some breaches can involve very personal and
embarrassing information, such as when a firm accidentally
posted to the Internet the names, addresses, phone numbers,
credit card information, and details of the sex lives of ninety
psychotherapy patients.456 Sometimes, breaches are due to a
serious failing in a company’s procedures. In one instance,
Metromail Corporation hired prison inmates to enter personal
information into Metromail’s databases, and one inmate started
sending sexually explicit letters with information about the
recipients’ lives.457 In another more troubling instance, the
449. Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 9.
450. Credit Card Data Breach Contained, Says Global Payments, BBC NEWS
(Apr. 3, 2012, 5:59 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-17596394 (last
visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
451. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 110 (stating that the FTC
estimated that 10 million Americans were victims of identity theft in 2003).
452. See Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1248 (noting the problems
with viewing identity theft as an exclusively criminal matter).
453. Id. at 1244.
454. Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 9.
455. See Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1258 (“With ever more
frequency, we are hearing stories about security glitches and other instances of
personal data being leaked and abused.”).
456. See id. (providing examples of instances of security breaches of personal
information in recent years).
457. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 53 (discussing
“irresponsible and careless uses of personal information”). In another Metromail
incident, a reporter contacted Metromail and successfully purchased a list of
5,000 children after giving the name of the buyer as a known child molester and
murderer. See id. at 53–54 (illustrating a lack of care and accountability in
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company Docusearch provided a man with information about a
woman named Amy Lynn Boyer, which the man then used in
finding and murdering Boyer.458
Cloud providers might not bear the risk of loss due to fraud,
but companies have many incentives to secure data and prevent
security breaches because large-scale breaches often result in
negative publicity. Security breaches can destroy consumer
confidence and devastate a company’s bottom line.459 However,
this decrease in consumer confidence may not effectively
incentivize the creation of stronger security protocols if cloud
service providers store data in proprietary formats, making it
difficult for current customers to leave. Thus, we argue that data
control and format transparency could have benefits for security
in the cloud by giving providers incentives to keep data secure in
order to retain customers.
4. Protecting Consumer Data—Who Watches the Watchers?
Currently, consumers have fairly little control over their
data, but there are other entities to help address data security
issues. Several private bodies have set standards enabling
companies to either seek certification as to the adequacy of their
privacy practices, or otherwise measure their own actions against
industry standards. These options include SAS 70 certification,
which involves audits of firms’ control mechanisms to protect
information;460 the Payment Card Industry Data Security
corporate data collection).
458. See Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1009 (N.H. 2003)
(finding that Docusearch owed a duty of reasonable care when the company
disclosed Boyer’s information to Liam Youens); SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra
note 2, at 54 (providing the facts of the Docusearch case); Richards & Solove,
supra note 1, at 1923 (discussing the holding in Docusearch and noting duty of
care issues arising from computer databases).
459. See Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 26 (“A security breach affecting
a corporation can destroy consumer confidence and be devastating to the bottom
line.”). There was recently a breach at Heartland Security, leading to a loss of
130 million credit card numbers. Id. at 45. Heartland has suffered major
financial damages since the breach, including a $60 million settlement with
Visa over the breach. Id.
460. See SAS 70 Overview, SAS 70, http://sas70.com/sas70_overview.html
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Standard, which created IT guidelines for the credit card industry
aimed at reducing the risk of a security breach;461 and the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which
requires members to have policies and procedures addressing
customer record safety, protecting against unauthorized access,
and protecting against relevant anticipated threats.462 Companies
on the Web may also seek TRUSTe certification for their privacy
practices.463 These organizations are elements of the selfregulatory framework that U.S. businesses currently use with
regard to privacy. However, these certification authorities are
largely sector-specific, and thus we recommend broader
protections that do not rely on sector-specific self-regulatory
bodies.
When the sector-specific self-regulatory framework fails,
there are sometimes other private solutions available. Customers
may, for example, sue companies in the event of a database
security breach, though courts disagree about whether a
customer has standing based on a mere risk of future identity
(last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing an overview of the standards) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Martin, supra note 44, at 297
(“[P]ublic companies that fail to obtain SAS 70 qualification by adhering to
certain procedures and controls can easily lose the confidence of investors and
customers.”).
461. See PCI SSC Data Security Standards Overview, PCI SEC. STANDARDS
COUNCIL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/ (last visited
Feb. 3, 2013) (providing an overview of the “comprehensive standards and
supporting materials to enhance payment card data security”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at
44 (discussing the PCI DSS guidelines). Rhodes and Kunis note that there is a
lack of direct enforcement of the PCI DSS, but argue that companies have
incentive to enact the standards on their own. See id. at 45 (discussing the
financial incentive to enact standards with the example of a breach at
Heartland Security that resulted in a $60 million settlement with Visa).
462. See About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA, http://
www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing FINRA’s
mission and message statement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 46 (providing background
on FINRA).
463. See Protecting Consumer Information Online, TRUSTE, http://www.
truste.com/why_TRUSTe_privacy_services/privacy_best_practices (last visited
Feb. 3, 2013) (providing examples of the best privacy practices that businesses
can utilize to build trust with their customers) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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theft or if standing requires actual identity theft to have
occurred.464 There are also other organizations that focus on
online consumer protection issues, including the Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and Digital Due Process
(DDP). These organizations are more policy-oriented and may do
things like filing privacy-oriented amicus briefs in relevant
litigation.
In terms of government intervention, the FTC has also
become involved with personal data security and other privacy
issues, using its authority to challenge unfair or deceptive
practices.465 The first FTC action that primarily concerned a
company’s data security practices was in 2004 against BJ’s
Wholesale Club after hundreds of instances of identity theft arose
due to BJ’s data security failings.466 An advantage to FTC
involvement over private litigation by consumers is the ability of
the FTC to bring an action against a company in the absence of
identity theft. For example, the FTC fined Choicepoint in 2006
after a breach resulted in 163,000 private financial records being
compromised, citing Choicepoint’s privacy policy as containing
“inaccurate and misleading assertions about its security
procedures.”467 The FTC may also bring an action when a
company fails to adequately secure its data, even if there has not

464. See Jonathon J. Darrow & Stephen D. Lichtenstein, “Do You Really
Need My Social Security Number?”: Data Collection Practices in the Digital Age,
10 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 1, 30 (2008) (discussing the issue of standing in consumer
data breach cases).
465. See Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 36 (discussing the FTC’s
jurisdiction and enforcement authority); Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 9
(noting that, as of the time of the authors’ writing, the FTC had filed twentyseven enforcement actions concerning the data security practices of companies).
The FTC requires companies to institute “reasonable safeguards” to protect
information, and what is “reasonable” depends on factors like how sensitive the
data is and how costly it would be for the company to avoid potential risks. See
Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 36 (discussing the “reasonableness” standard
applied by the FTC beginning in 2006 to bolster the enforcement of data
security risks).
466. See Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 37 (noting the FTC’s conclusion
that the security failings amounted to an unfair practice in violation of federal
law).
467. Id.
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actually been a data breach.468 The FTC could also potentially
bring an action against a business that uses deceptive practices
to obtain information.469
As an alternative to extending current regulations to new
data issues in the cloud, some argue that the FTC and its current
authorities could be used to enforce a company’s privacy policy
against it.470 However, after examining a number of privacy
policies, we argue that this approach would not be wise given the
reality that many companies adopt vague privacy policy language
regarding the company’s own obligations.471 It is also unclear
whether the FTC would be the appropriate regulatory body in all
instances because the FTC usually regulates e-commerce issues,
but providers whose services count as telecommunications or
information services would also be governed by FCC
regulations.472 We also assert that relying on government
468. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1856–57 (“[T]he [FTC] has
taken actions against companies that fail to provide adequate data security . . .
even in the absence of a data breach, though more typically it acts only once a
data spill has occurred.”). The FTC also settled an enforcement action against
Sears in 2009, based on Sears’s practice of tracking customers without
adequately disclosing details of the tracking program to the customers, and
another action against EchoMetrix in 2010 concerning parental control software
that also provided information to marketers about children’s computer activity.
See id. at 1858 (discussing the “more substantive approach to disclosure of
company behaviors” taken by the FTC in enforcement actions).
469. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1185 (“The use of fraud or other
deceptive practices in obtaining consumer data could also constitute a violation
of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), and would fall within
the powers of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to deter and punish unfair
trade practices . . . .”).
470. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 72 (noting that the FTC
has recently brought actions for “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” against
companies that violate their own privacy policies); McCarthy, supra note 95, at
2260 (discussing the possibility of enforcing PHR vendors’ privacy policies
against them). McCarthy argues, however, that HIPAA would be a stronger way
to address privacy issues with personal health records. See id. at 2261
(contrasting HIPAA and the FTC by stating that “HIPAA mandates that
covered entities take constant concern over privacy and security by continually
auditing, monitoring, and augmenting security when necessary”).
471. See infra Part V.C (providing an analysis of and statistical information
on privacy policies).
472. See Soma, Gates, & Smith, supra note 16, at 490–91 (suggesting the
possibility of a joint rulemaking between the FTC and FCC to address these
issues).
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agencies to address the failure of companies to give consumers
meaningful control over their data would be ineffectual because
the most likely approach would be through adjudication, in which
individual consumers would not be clearly represented, in an
adjudicatory process that by definition would only address
problems on an ad hoc basis. On this point, we argue that
regulating this behavior in advance would be more beneficial to
consumers than case-by-case adjudication.
5. Tracking Technologies and Behavioral Marketing
Another element of privacy policies that is relevant to the
issue of data control is the use of technologies to track consumer
behavior. Privacy policies typically address the tracking
technologies that a website uses for advertising or other
purposes. When tracking users, advertisers may use technologies
like cookies, flash cookies, and Web beacons. The degree to which
companies disclose the use of these tracking technologies
varies.473 The information collected using these tracking
technologies can then be used by companies to profile
consumers.474 Consumers typically have the option to decline
some tracking technologies, often by adjusting the settings of
their Web browsers to decline all cookies. However, we suggest
that this option does not represent a meaningful exercise of
473. See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 372 (providing data
comparing actual privacy practices to declared privacy practices of numerous
websites); Lanois, supra note 18, at 34 (referencing a study that found that the
top fifty websites installed, on average, sixty-four pieces of tracking technology
when a visitor loaded the site, and usually did not provide a warning that they
were doing so).
474. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1157 (discussing the “profiling
industry” and noting that the profiles may include “a person’s social security
number, shopping preferences, health information . . . financial information,
race, weight, clothing size, arrest record, lifestyle preferences, hobbies, religion,
reading preferences, homeownership, charitable contributions, mail order
purchases and type, and pet ownership”); see also SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON,
supra note 2, at 50 (noting private companies’ recent use of information to
categorize people as either angel customers or demon customers, and the
practices of some banks to deny credit card applications from college students
majoring in liberal arts).
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control because many websites require cookies to be enabled for
website functionality.
A cookie is a text file that is downloaded to a user’s computer
when she accesses a website, and it acts as an identifier for the
computer on which it is stored.475 Cookies by themselves do not
contain a user’s personal information under most definitions of
the term,476 but a company called DoubleClick provides a service
to websites, connecting cookies to personal information to enable
more targeted advertising.477 Flash cookies have a similar effect
to text cookies, but some flash cookies may be able to reconstruct
previously deleted browser cookies and cannot be controlled by
the user.478 Recent research revealed that out of the one hundred
most popular websites, fifty-four used flash cookies, but only four
sites mentioned the use of flash cookies in their privacy
policies.479 Web beacons, the third type of tracking technology
noted above, permit the advertiser to observe a user’s website
activity in real time.480
Behavioral marketing is advertising that is targeted at
individuals based on their past behavior patterns.481 The
environment of behavioral marketing has developed substantially
475. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 24 (referring to cookies as
“a form of high-tech cattle-branding”); Lanois, supra note 18, at 33 (explaining
how cookies work and why they are useful for both advertising and consumers).
476. However, because cookies typically collect a user’s IP address, this is
sufficient to find that cookies collect “personal data” for purposes of the EU’s
Data Protection Directive. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 41 (“In practice, almost
all cookies involve the processing of personal data because even if the user’s real
identity remains anonymous, cookies typically involve the collection of the user’s
IP address, the processing of unique identifiers, or both which are personal data
within the scope of the Data Protection Directive.”).
477. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 24–25 (explaining how
DoubleClick functions).
478. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 35 (discussing a lawsuit that involved the
distinction between flash cookies and traditional cookies).
479. Id. at 36.
480. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1851 (“Some technology,
particularly the beacon, or ‘Web bug,’ permits real-time observation of a user’s
activity on an Internet page, including where one’s mouse moved and the
information that one typed, such as search queries or personal information that
an individual filled into a form.”).
481. See id. at 1849 (introducing the concept of behavioral marketing).
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over the last century, becoming more effective as marketers have
gained access to more detailed information.482 Behavioral
marketing has led to advertisers buying access to individuals who
match a particular consumer profile.483 There is a market for
consumer data that is collected and can be used for targeting
advertisements, with information about an individual’s browsing
habits selling for a fraction of a cent on the data exchange.484
Because declining all cookies would likely lessen a user’s Web
browsing experience, researchers have worked to develop a
technology that focuses on collection by third parties, like thirdparty advertisers that collect data for behavioral advertising.
Concerns over such data collection and the possible privacy
implications thereof have led to calls for a “Do Not Track” (DNT)
standard, similar to a “Do Not Call” registry, that would allow
users to opt out of tracking by third parties.485 Mozilla’s Firefox
already includes DNT capabilities.486 Additionally, Microsoft
made DNT the default setting for Internet Explorer 10, and
Google announced that Google Chrome would have DNT
capabilities by the end of 2012.487
482. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 19 (noting that direct
mail has a yield-per-cost ratio double that of television advertisements).
483. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 34 (noting that user profiles are bought
and sold on exchanges that resemble the stock market); Schwartz & Solove,
supra note 3, at 1851 (“Marketers draw on extensive databases . . . . They are
able to cross-reference online activity with offline records including home
ownership, family income, marital status, zip code, and a host of other
information, such as one’s recent purchases as well as favorite restaurants,
movies, and TV shows.”).
484. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1157–58 (noting that in some places,
consumer profiles can be bought for $65 for a thousand names); Schwartz &
Solove, supra note 3, at 1852 (explaining that browsing information sells for as
little as a tenth of a cent but that it adds up to a billion-dollar industry).
485. See Do Not Track, Universal Web Tracking Opt Out,
http://donottrack.us/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing an overview of the “Do
Not Track” policy proposal) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
486. See Do Not Track, MOZILLA FIREFOX, http://www.mozilla.org/en-US/dnt/
(last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing answers to frequently asked questions
about the “Do Not Track” preference) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
487. See Kate Solomon, Chrome Adds Do Not Track, Rolling Out by End of
the Year, TECHRADAR (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.techradar.com/news/internet/
web/chrome-adds-do-not-track-rolling-out-by-end-of-the-year-1099241
(last
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Modern consumers are often uneasy about the pervasiveness
of behavioral advertising,488 and some research questions the
ultimate value of targeted advertising.489 However, there is
currently not much recourse available to consumers whose data is
mined. The privacy torts typically require an invasion to be of an
offensive nature, but most of the time, information collection is of
largely innocuous information.490 For these reasons, one of our
proposals relevant to data control focuses on the possibility of
withdrawing data that was mined using these technologies. A
DNT system, as described above, may also assist with limiting
future unauthorized collection, provided that most websites
eventually adopt it. At the time of this writing, however, many
websites and advertisers have not adopted a DNT-friendly
implementation.491 Even if the market solutions become more
viable, our proposed data withdrawal and data portability rights
are designed to inform and empower consumers, enabling more
meaningful participation in the vigorous market for cloud
services. In our view, such rights would be complementary to, and
not supplanted by, an effective opt-out DNT regime.
visited Feb. 3, 2013) (explaining the DNT option that will be added to the Google
Chrome browser) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
488. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1854 (suggesting that
consumer objections to behavioral advertising should be addressed through
policy).
489. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lori Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy
Policies, 4 J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 540, 541 (2008) (concluding that targeted
advertising “may have negative social utility” after taking into account the
opportunity costs required if everyone read and understood privacy policies).
490. See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1919 (citing Shibley v. Time,
Inc. for its holding that disclosure of subscriber information did not meet the
requirements of causing “mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of
ordinary sensibilities.” (citing Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ct. App.
Ohio 1975))).
491. See Solomon, supra note 487 (“The main problem with DNT, though, is
that not all that many websites and advertisers actually abide by it, since it’s
more of a guideline than an actual rule.”). In fact, some critics say that DNT
simply does not work and, in addition, that advertisers are adopting an
interpretation of DNT that is contrary to the intent of those promoting DNT. See
Ed Bott, Why Do Not Track is Worse Than a Miserable Failure, ZDNET (Sept.
21, 2012, 12:35 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/why-do-not-track-is-worse-than-amiserable-failure-7000004634/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (criticizing DNT and
arguing that it does not work) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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6. Personally Identifiable Information and “Anonymous”
Information

The final concept that we will address in the context of
privacy policies is the treatment of certain types of information.
Arguments about the degree of protection to which information is
entitled often turn on the type of information being protected. In
the context of information privacy, the focus is often on
personally identifiable information (PII), and on information that
is considered sensitive. Computer use in the 1960s led to PII
becoming more of an issue because companies and government
entities were processing a lot of personal data.492 PII is a term
that is often used to describe information that is clearly
connected to a specific person, though there is no uniform
definition of the term.493 Service providers often focus on assuring
customers that their PII will be kept safe.
Regulatory intervention is often focused on protecting PII, in
part because of the threats posed by identity thieves. Statutes
define PII in several different ways. Some define PII as
information that is personally identifiable, some define PII as
information that is not public, and some define it by providing
specific examples of information that is PII.494 With PII, the
question is often whether information is identified or identifiable,
which respectively refers to whether information immediately
connects to an identified person or can be used to lead to an
identified person, given more information.495 In the United
States, the concept of PII is largely limited to identified data,
whereas the European Union takes an expansionist view of PII
that treats identified data the same as data that is only
identifiable.496 Schwartz and Solove argue that the European
492. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1820 (explaining why the PII
became an issue in the 1960s).
493. See id. at 1816 (“Given PII’s importance, it is surprising that
information privacy law in the United States lacks a uniform definition of the
term.”).
494. See id. at 1828 (identifying the competing definitions of PII).
495. See id. at 1817 (setting forth a “PII 2.0” model that proposes “two
categories of PII, ‘identified’ and ‘identifiable’ data,” and treats them
differently).
496. See id. (comparing the United States and European models); see also id.
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Union’s expansionist approach is more consistent with the
technology than a reductionist approach that limits PII
protections to identified personal data.497
The idea of categorizing information as PII, however, has
become more problematic over the years. The line between
identified and identifiable has become increasingly blurred, as
has the line between sensitive and nonsensitive. A social security
number is generally viewed as very sensitive information, but
date of birth may be considered less so. However, computer
science has shown that a person’s social security number can be
estimated to some degree of accuracy if one knows the person’s
date of birth and the city in which they were born.498 If a
database contains a very large amount of nonsensitive
information, the aggregation of the information can track a
person’s whole existence.499 A person’s search queries are an
example of seemingly anonymous information that could
nonetheless lead to an identifiable person, especially considering
common behaviors like searching for local businesses,
information on particular medical diagnoses, and vanity searches
when an individual will often search for her own name to see
what results emerge.500
at 1875 (noting that Canada takes a similar approach to that of the European
Union).
497. See id. at 1875 (“The European Union’s expansionist approach to PII is
more in tune with technology than is the United States’ reductionist
approach.”).
498. See id. at 1846 (citing a recent study by Alessandro Acquisti and Ralph
Gross).
499. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 164 (“The synthesis of data from a user’s
web search history coupled with email, photos, documents, voicemails, phone
logs, and location, creates a profile of an individual that serves as behavior
modeling for advertisers. This same data could just as easily be disclosed to law
enforcement officials for criminal profiling.”); see also Richards, supra note 114,
at 1158 (acknowledging the privacy concern that “uber-databases can be
created, composed of nonsensitive information in such enormous quantities that
the database constitutes a highly detailed dossier of a person’s entire
existence”).
500. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1717–18 (2010)
(providing an example of AOL search queries being used to identify individuals);
Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1848 (explaining that “if the user has
engaged in a highly specific search, or multiple searches, she becomes more
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Even if identifying information is removed, that does not
necessarily solve the privacy problems. Reidentification science is
a new field in computer science research that reattaches
anonymized information to identified individuals.501 Researchers
may reidentify a dataset by, for example, comparing two
databases, one anonymized and one containing PII and some
information fields in common with the anonymized database.502
The FTC has recently acknowledged that the distinction between
PII and de-identified information is often blurred.503 Because of
the ease with which data can be reidentified, Ohm suggests
rejecting the concept of PII entirely, though Schwartz and Solove
instead suggest a reunderstanding of what information should be
considered PII.504

identifiable” and “[a]t some point, a search allows a person to be readily
identifiable”).
501. See Ohm, supra note 500, at 1704 (arguing that the science of
reidentification should be of more concern to policymakers than PII).
502. See id. at 1725–26 (explaining the basic principles of how
reidentification functions). One potential source of databases containing PII is
public records, which many times may be obtained upon a showing that the
request is not for an improper purpose. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note
2, at 133 (discussing the history of public record disclosure laws). Public records
that may be so obtained include a person’s vital records and records of a person’s
interactions with government. See id. at 128–29, 134 (demonstrating the
breadth of personal information contained in public records). When a person
makes a state or federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, the state
may redact private personal information, but the person to whom the
information corresponds cannot object to a disclosure if the state does not redact
such information. See id. at 135 (“The federal FOIA doesn’t require that a
person be given notice that his or her personal information is encompassed
within a FOIA request. Even if an individual finds out about the request, she
has no right under FOIA to prevent or second-guess an agency’s decision . . . .”).
503. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1828 (discussing the core
conceptual problems with PII recently identified by the FTC). The Seventh
Circuit has also noted the problem of reidentification, holding that redacting
patient identities in a series of records about recipients of partial birth abortions
was not sufficient to avoid violating the patients’ privacy rights. See id. at 1844
(recognizing that “de-identified data can readily be re-identified” (citing Nw.
Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2004))).
504. Compare Ohm, supra note 500, at 1742–45 (arguing that the concept of
PII must be replaced to allow for privacy law to move forward), with Schwartz &
Solove, supra note 3, at 1817 (arguing that “PII must be re-conceptualized if
privacy law is to remain effective in the future”).
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Considering the technological issues, theorists who urge
government regulation should evaluate which approach to PII
should be taken. Reidentification science should be examined by
policymakers to determine whether the concept of PII should be
expanded to include both identified and identifiable information.
Schwartz and Solove propose a model in which information is
considered identified when the person’s identity is ascertained,
identifiable when there is a nonremote possibility of future
identification, and nonidentifiable when the risk of identification
is remote and the information is not relatable to a person.505 We
argue that limited government intervention would be beneficial
to set a baseline for protection of PII to mitigate threats to
identity security, but we do not take a position on the identified–
identifiable dichotomy. The existence of such regulations would
likely raise consumer awareness of these threats. Once informed,
we expect that consumers will express a preference for exercising
meaningful control over their PII, whether identified or
identifiable.
V. Empirical Analysis of Agreements and Policies in the Cloud
In the interest of empirically establishing a baseline for the
current status of “data control” terms in contemporary
agreements, we examined the privacy policies and TOS
agreements of several different cloud providers. Our sample size
is fairly small, consisting of twelve TOS agreements and nineteen
privacy policies, but because so many companies use boilerplate
language for these agreements, even though they may include
different types of provisions, our small sample size is nonetheless
very likely to be fairly representative of the industry. In fact,
insofar as our sample emphasizes several enterprise-oriented
companies with fee-based structures, in addition to consumeroriented companies that rely on advertising revenue, our findings
may provide a more generous estimate of the degree to which the
terms of agreements favor the customer.
505. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1878 (discussing their proposed
model of PII).
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A. Methodology

In collecting the privacy policies and TOS agreements, we
first used a report by BTC Logic that identified thirteen
companies that are viewed as leaders in cloud computing.506 In
addition to the BTC Logic report, we also collected TOS
agreements and privacy policies for six additional consumeroriented cloud services whose information was available through
Quantcast’s website.507 Most of these companies made their
privacy policies available on a company website. In addition to
privacy policies for all nineteen companies, we collected twelve
separately labeled TOS agreements and one set of disclaimers
from EMC that did not include other terms commonly found in
TOS agreements.508
506. See BTC Logic Ranks: Top 10 Cloud Companies, BTC LOGIC (2010),
http://www.btclogic.com/documents/BTCLogic_TopTen_Q22010.pdf (providing a
ranking and report of the top ten cloud computing companies). Based on their
appearances in the list of the top thirteen cloud companies, we included in our
sample: Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Cisco, Citrix, EMC, Level 3, Oracle, Red
Hat, Sales Force, Symantec, VMWare, and IBM.
507. The additional six companies whose agreements we analyzed were:
Carbonite, Dropbox, Flickr, Facebook, GoDaddy, and Apple. For Apple, we
specifically looked at the TOS agreement and privacy policy for Apple’s new
iCloud service. Quantcast is a company that is very active in the Web
advertising arena, with a website that provides detailed information about
services on the web. Quantcast also provides a list of the top 100 websites in
terms of visits. Top Sites, QUANTCAST, http://www.quantcast.com/top-sites (last
visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing a ranked list of websites based on the number of
people in the United States who visit each month) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
508. Some companies declined to disclose sample TOS agreements. We
attribute this in part to the different business models of the companies. If a
product is anticipated to be widely deployed to a large number of people, such as
Amazon’s AWS or Google’s ad-supported services, the TOS will most likely be
standardized to address the company’s relationships with a large population.
When a service provider is contracting with an established enterprise that is
paying a large sum for these services, we anticipate that the contracting is likely
to be more balanced, with TOS agreements being tailored to the specific
customer. Some companies such as IBM focus on very customer-specific services
with a target audience of large enterprises, and the terms will change based on
the specific needs of the customer. In those situations, the TOS will be more like
a standard contract between two parties than the click-wrap agreements that
individual consumers are familiar with through installing software on their
systems.
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Table 1

Company

Privacy
Policy

Disclaimers/
Warranties
Separate
from TOS

TOS
Agreement

Amazon

X

X

Microsoft

X

Cisco

X

Citrix

X

EMC

X

Level 3

X

Oracle

X

Red Hat

X

Salesforce

X

X

Symantec

X

X

Vmware

X

X

IBM

X

Carbonite

X

X

Dropbox

X

X

Flickr

X

X

X
X

Facebook

X

X

iCloud

X

X

GoDaddy

X

X

Google

X

X

The remaining six companies, all from the BTC Logic
sample, did not make a boilerplate TOS agreement available to
noncustomers, and these companies often targeted their services
at enterprise customers. In these situations, TOS agreements
may be closer to a traditional contract. However, consumers with
fewer resources, like end users and small businesses, are likely to
have no bargaining power. These consumers are the anticipated
beneficiaries of the changes we suggest. Currently, small
businesses and end users are simply not given reasonable
alternatives for controlling their data. Thus, the current market
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is inefficient, notwithstanding the availability of more involved
contracting when the customer is a wealthy enterprise.
One of the challenges of educating the public about privacy
policies and TOS agreements is that many times, people assume
that these agreements are all the same. We posit that a detailed,
side-by-side comparison of agreement provisions based on
provision categories would prove the most helpful in noting both
similarities and differences between these provisions. Thus, once
we had collected the privacy policies and TOS agreements, we
first carefully read the language of the agreements with an eye to
creating categories and subcategories to permit us to compare the
language of several agreements from a top-down perspective. We
then categorized the different provisions and noted in our
research whether certain provisions were present or absent in a
given company’s available policies.
The purposes of privacy policies and TOS agreements are
very different. Privacy policies generally focus on information
that can identify the individual, whereas TOS agreements
generally focus on matters relevant to potential conflicts between
a company and its customers. Both types of agreement reflect a
company’s policies with regard to data control. Privacy policies
are more directly relevant to data control issues relating to the
control of personal information. TOS agreements, on the other
hand, often address matters like the ownership of intellectual
property and the processes to be followed to obtain stored data
upon termination of service.
Analyzing a collection of nineteen privacy policies and twelve
TOS agreements applicable to cloud services, a number of
patterns emerged. The following subparts will first give a brief
overview of our findings with respect to TOS agreements and
privacy policies, and then discuss the implications of these
patterns.
B. Terms of Service Agreements
TOS agreements typically address potential legal conflicts in
advance. These agreements may use choice of law and venue
provisions to state where litigation must take place, indemnify
the company against third parties, limit damages either by type
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or by setting a cap for damage awards,509 and disclaim warranties
to the extent permitted by law.510 The TOS agreements in our
sample addressed major topics like these. Seven of the twelve
noted that the company might alter the services offered, but only
two of the twelve stated that they would give notice to customers
of such changes. This is significant because that means that most
of the companies in our sample provide little information upfront
about the degree to which customers will be notified of service
changes.
For our purposes, one relevant aspect of this relationship is
the issue of exercising control over data upon termination. Within
our sample, eleven of the twelve TOS agreements set out
conditions for account termination. Ten of the twelve set out
conditions in which the company is authorized to terminate an
account for cause, and two of the twelve set out conditions in
which either party to the contract can terminate an account for
cause, including a breach of the agreement between the parties.
Six of the twelve also include provisions allowing customers to
terminate their accounts for any reason.
Only five of the twelve, however, address the issue of data
access after an account is terminated, and how and when a
customer may access the provider’s servers to back up their files
and delete them from the servers. The removal of information
from the company’s servers also implicates document retention
policy, which is sometimes addressed in a company’s privacy
policy. Eleven of our full sample of nineteen companies address
document retention to some extent, and refer to the company’s
possible limitations under the law concerning permanent deletion
of a customer’s data.

509. See, e.g., Amazon Web Services, Customer Agreement, AMAZON (Mar. 15,
2012), http://aws.amazon.com/agreement/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (disclaiming
liability in paragraph eleven for “direct, indirect, incidental, special,
consequential, or exemplary damages”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
510. States following the Uniform Commercial Code will often not recognize
a contractual waiver of certain implied warranties unless the waiver is
conspicuous within the written contract. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1977).
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Table 2
TERMINATION OF ACCOUNT (out of 12)
Lists when company may terminate for cause

10

Lists when either may terminate for cause

2

Permits customer to terminate without cause

6

Includes provisions for temporary account
suspension

1

Specifies time period for former customer to access
and delete information*

4

TOS does not address
* However, 11 of the 19 in our full sample also
refer to the possibility that they may be required
by law to retain customer information.

2

In TOS agreements, we were especially concerned about the
extent to which the information remains the property of the
customer. All twelve companies in our TOS sample included
statements asserting the company’s rights in its own intellectual
property that it was licensing to its customers, though only six of
the twelve included a provision reiterating that the customer’s
intellectual property remains his own. Three of the twelve
(Amazon, Flickr, and Apple) reserve a license in the customer’s IP
to the company limited to the purpose for which the customer
submitted the content. Another set of three companies in the
sample (Facebook, GoDaddy, and Google) also address the
granting of a license to the customer’s IP, but these latter three
do not include explicit restrictive language that would limit the
scope of the license to the customer’s initial purposes. Eleven of
the thirteen companies for which we had TOS agreements or sets
of disclaimers also include provisions whereby the company
retains full rights in suggestions or ideas submitted by
customers, and can therefore use or implement these suggestions
as they see fit without giving the submitter of the idea any form
of credit or acknowledgment.
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Table 3
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (out of 12)
The company retains full rights in its intellectual
property that it is licensing to the customer

12

The customer retains full rights in his intellectual
property that is maintained on the company’s
servers
The company obtains a license to use the
customer’s content, not explicitly limited to
purpose for which it was originally submitted

3

The company obtains a license to use the
customer’s content for marketing purposes

1

The company owns all rights in any e-mails,
suggestions, or ideas that the customer sends to
the company

6

11

C. Privacy Policies
There are some things that all or almost all of the policies in
our sample addressed. All of the companies that we examined
gave examples of situations in which they would gather users’
personal information and how they would make use of it, such as
obtaining the user’s name, e-mail address, and other contact
information in order to register the user’s account and process the
user’s requests. Eighteen of the nineteen companies in our
sample also purport to give their customers some control over the
collection of their personal information, which may include the
ability to opt out of data collection or the ability to access and edit
personal information already on file with the company. Eighteen
of the providers in our sample also addressed compliance with
either TRUSTe or Safe Harbor, security concerns, changes to the
privacy policy, and included a section about the use of tracking
technologies.
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Table 4
19 out of 19 Privacy Policies
included:

18 out of 19 Privacy Policies
included:

Data gathering by the company

Customer control over
information

How the company uses that data

Security of user information

When may customer data be
disclosed to third parties

Changes to privacy policy
Complies with TRUSTe or Safe
Harbor
Use of tracking technologies

All of the providers in our sample also included information
about sharing customer information with third parties. When the
question turned to with whom and when a user’s personal
information would be shared, however, the differences between
the agreements began to stand out. For example, all nineteen
companies included lawful government requests as a condition for
disclosing customer information, ten said customer information
may be disclosed in order to investigate, prevent, or take action
concerning violations of the law or the company’s TOS, and four
said that customer information may be disclosed so that the
company can defend itself in court or assert its legal rights.
Generally, the enumerated situations in which user information
can be disclosed are fairly rational, with an eye to protecting
customers’ privacy interests. However, two companies noted in
their privacy policies that they may disclose customer
information to the company’s business partners for the partners’
direct marketing purposes.
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We identified eleven total categories of situations for
information disclosure, and noted that out of our nineteen privacy
policies, the companies listed between two and nine of these when
describing information disclosure. Listing more categories of
disclosure does not necessarily mean that a company is less
protective of privacy, but it does underscore the variety and
complexity inherent in analyzing these agreements.
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People have been told for years to be careful of how much
they disclose about themselves online in public forums,511 so it is
not a surprise that many of the companies that provide chat
forums and bulletin boards for their customers also include
disclaimers in their privacy policies that information disclosed in
these forums is not protected by the company’s privacy policy.
Another fairly common-sense provision that fifteen of the
nineteen providers include in their privacy policies is a disclaimer
that the company does not control the privacy policies of third
parties whose websites the customer may access through links on
511. See, e.g., David Gregorio, Be Careful What You Post Online, Career
Counselors Warn, REUTERS (Aug. 6, 2009, 1:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2009/08/06/us-careers-socialmedia-tech-life-idUSTRE5754U220090806 (last
visited Feb. 3, 2013) (describing how online interactions “present numerous
opportunities to sabotage [one’s] hunt for a job or promotion”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Michelle Singletary, Be Careful Online: Not
Everyone Is a True ‘Friend’, THE COLOR OF MONEY (May 14, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/13/AR20090513034
39.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (“Like a pickpocket working a crowded public
venue, cyber thieves may be collecting information that makes victimizing you so
much easier with all the personal data you provide.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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the company’s website. These provisions usually advise the
customers to read the privacy policies of the third-party websites.
Of the nineteen, only Symantec and Citrix explicitly stated
that their customers’ information may be disclosed to the
company’s business partners for direct marketing purposes.
Fifteen of the nineteen policies state that the company will not
step outside the language of the privacy policy unless the
customer gives consent. Disclosure to business partners is
generally covered by another button on a form that a customer
either checks or unchecks to give permission to the company to
share information with these business partners for marketing
purposes. Generally, the companies in this sample seem very
aware of the negative press associated with selling user
information to data farming firms.512 Four companies in our
sample note that they may disclose aggregated information for
statistical purposes. Red Hat is one of the four, but its privacy
policy also assures that once this information is aggregated, it is
no longer traceable to the original individual.
Another element found in all but one of the privacy policies
was a discussion of security measures to protect customer data.
Data security is not directly related to data control, but as we
noted above in Part IV.A.3, giving customers the power to
withdraw and move their data may result in security-driven
decisions to change services, thus giving companies incentive to
implement stronger security measures to retain customers.
Thirteen of the nineteen companies in our sample referred to
their use of industry standard or commercially reasonable
security measures. Some of these companies also listed specific
technological or organizational measures in place, but others
512. See, e.g., Mitch Lipka, Twitter Is Selling Your Data, REUTERS (Mar. 1,
2012, 11:35 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/01/twitter-dataidUSL2E8DTEK420120301 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (“Twitter users are about
to become major marketing fodder, as two research companies get set to release
information to clients who will pay for the privilege of mining the data.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jason Morris & Ed Lavandera, Why
Big Companies Buy, Sell Your Data, CNN (Aug. 23, 2012 3:42 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/23/tech/web/big-data-acxiom/index.html (last visited
Feb. 3, 2013) (“Acxiom . . . is just one of hundreds of companies who are peering
into your personal life, collecting data that is generated from everything you do
online . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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simply included a vague statement about implementing industry
standards. Another common element of security is encryption,
and twelve of the nineteen stated that they use SSL encryption
during the transfer of data. Twelve of the nineteen also stressed
the importance of customers being proactive with the security of
their own systems, and six emphasized that no electronic storage
or transmission would ever be 100% secure. Only one company,
Oracle, gave any information about what steps would be taken in
the event that a customer’s user information was compromised.

Because information will be governed by different laws when
it is located in different countries, companies also must keep
jurisdictional issues in mind when describing their privacy
practices. A majority of the companies (fifteen of nineteen)
include a provision in the privacy policy notifying the customer
that their data may be transferred to and processed in other
countries. Only Amazon appears to give customers a meaningful
choice of where their information is stored and processed, with its
privacy policy stating that data will not be moved to other regions
without the customer’s consent.
The question of where data is stored is significant, especially
when the company has customers within the European Union.
Because the European Union has strict privacy requirements,
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U.S. companies that wish to transfer personal information from
the European Union to the United States must certify compliance
with the Safe Harbor program.513 Sixteen of the nineteen
companies in our sample certify in their privacy policies that they
are in compliance with this program. Two of the three companies
that do not state compliance with Safe Harbor do, however,
certify compliance with TRUSTe standards. Of the nineteen
companies, eight certify compliance with both Safe Harbor and
TRUSTe. Only one company, Citrix, does not refer to either the
Safe Harbor program or adherence to TRUSTe standards in its
privacy policy.
To exercise meaningful data control, consumers should be
informed about how data is collected. Most of the companies in
our sample detailed their use of Web tracking technologies within
their privacy policies. Eighteen of the nineteen companies
disclosed their use of cookies on their websites, sixteen of the
nineteen disclosed that they used IP logs to track user behavior,
and thirteen of the nineteen indicated that they used Web
beacons to track user behavior. Sixteen of the nineteen also listed
other information that they collected from users, including
information on the user’s browser and operating system, and
other information that can be obtained using Javascript. Only
four of the nineteen companies include flash cookies in the list of
technologies utilized. However, as earlier research has noted, the
use of flash cookies is sometimes unreported by companies.514

513. See Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive
95/46/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7 (EC); see also EXPORT.GOV, supra note 400.
514. See supra note 473 and accompanying text (“The degree to which
companies disclose the use of these tracking technologies varies.”).
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Privacy policies and TOS agreements for services in the cloud
may also change periodically to reflect new priorities or activities
on the part of the provider. When companies are empowered to
change the terms of agreements unilaterally in material ways,
this can undermine user efforts to control data at the outset of
the contractual relationship. The privacy policies of eighteen of
the nineteen companies in our sample addressed changes to the
privacy policy. All eighteen indicated that notice of material
changes would be posted on the company’s website. Only six of
those, however, gave any indication of either how long the notice
would be posted or whether it would be posted before the changes
went into effect. Eleven of the eighteen also indicated that the
company might contact the customers directly to notify them of
material changes to the privacy policy. These varying approaches
to keeping consumers informed of changes are troubling, and are
also reminiscent of our findings in the TOS agreement portion of
this study, where we found that of the seven companies that
discussed changes to the service, only two indicated that the
company would notify current customers of the changes.
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D. Analysis and Discussion
In analyzing these documents, we placed the provisions into
broad categories. For privacy policies, the categories included
provisions listing how and why personal information would be
gathered, when and with whom it would be shared, security of
information, whether personal information is transferred to other
jurisdictions, the collection of non-personally identifying data,
provisions addressing third party content and advertisements,
and provisions addressing customer control over information. In
terms of these larger categories, the companies that we looked at
generally have similar priorities. With respect to security, the
companies that we examined were more likely to speak in vague
terms, with little specific detail (with the exception that most
companies referenced SSL encryption). The TOS agreements that
we analyzed tended to be more detailed, but this may be because
TOS agreements are designed to protect specific rights of the
companies. In a TOS agreement, a company will generally
address the company’s liability for harms to the customer and
what recourse a customer may have. A company is also likely to
address intellectual property issues, though their primary
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interest is typically on protection of the company’s rights rather
than the customer’s rights.
As noted above in Part IV.A.4, consumers are likely to be
unable to enforce a company’s privacy policy against it. Under § 5
of the FTC Act,515 however, the FTC is empowered to take action
against companies that engage in unfair or deceptive trade
practices,516 and the FTC has a precedent of using this authority
to take action against companies that fail to comply with their
own privacy policies.517 Given the possibility that a company
could face legal problems for failing to comply with its own
privacy policy, this gives a perverse incentive for a company to
commit to as little as possible and inform its customers of as little
as possible within its privacy policy. This threat of legal recourse
may provide a partial explanation for why the companies that we
examined are generally vague with respect to the rights of their
customers and the methods used to protect their data.
In general, the privacy policies and TOS agreements that we
have examined are much more protective of the company that
wrote them than of the customer that agrees to them. This is not
much of a surprise, especially considering the literature about
asymmetric “click wrap agreements” that customers are often
required to agree to in order to install software or use services
online.518

515. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006).
516. See id. § 45.
517. See supra Part IV.A.4 (describing FTC enforcement efforts).
518. See, e.g., Jared S. Livingston, Comment, Invasion Contracts: The
Privacy Implications of Terms of Use Agreements in the Online Social Media
Setting, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 591, 625 (2011) (“There are several kinds of
asymmetric information in this market: (1) failure to read provided information
about the agreement; and (2) failure to appreciate the risk of loss of private
information.”); Lucille M. Ponte, Getting a Bad Rap? Unconscionability in
Clickwrap Dispute Resolution Clauses and a Proposal for Improving the Quality
of These Online Consumer “Products,” 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 119, 119
(2011) (“In undertaking these online transactions, millions of consumers each
day simply click on ‘I Agree’ to a site’s standard terms of use, often without
reading or understanding the terms and conditions of their purchases.”).
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E. Implications
Publicly traded companies respond to public demand. As long
as consumers ignore privacy policies and TOS agreements, accept
that their control over their own data is subject to the will of the
service provider, and remain uninformed about existing privacy
threats, the companies have little incentive to write privacy
policies and TOS agreements with their customers’ best interests
in mind. On the other hand, if a data control policy became a
legal mandate, the customer service experience of various cloud
providers could see a marked improvement as providers compete
to retain customers. Our research of the literature and our own
analysis of the terms of TOS agreements and privacy policies lead
us to conclude that there is currently a significant failure on the
part of the market to ensure that consumers have sufficient
control over their data in the cloud. We argue that this market
failure is something that must be remedied to ensure the
protection of personal privacy in the cloud.
Given the prevalence of the data trade and the value of
profiles to marketers, consumers who are willing to trade
personal information and privacy for free services are not just
using their own data as currency; to some extent, it could even be
said that they are becoming a commodity themselves. This
commodification is part of a trade-off, and consumers may even
be trading some of their legal rights in exchange for services in
the cloud. Currently, a company that provides services to
individuals and small businesses can demand any number of
allowances as to the use of customer data in its privacy policy,
and can substantially limit customers’ permissible actions in its
TOS agreement. The customer has no bargaining power to
challenge these terms. These terms, in turn, can affect the
customer’s legal rights, limiting the extent to which the Fourth
Amendment and the SCA protect data that the customer entrusts
to the company, and potentially even making the customer
vulnerable to liability under the DOJ’s current interpretation of
the CFAA.
Throughout this Article, we promote the idea that consumers
should have the ability to exercise meaningful control over their
own data, including the ability to withdraw their personal
information and move their data from one provider to another. If
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a regulatory intervention like we propose in this Article gives
consumers the power to exercise control over their data, but the
consumers choose to not exercise these data control rights and
still choose to trade their information for various services, such
informed decisions may indicate that there is not a systemic flaw
in this approach to personal data. However, we argue that the
current utter lack of meaningful control prevents us from
determining if the current data trade business model can be
optimal.
VI. Recommendations—Building a Baseline for Facilitating
Transactions in the Cloud
In the United States, privacy is largely protected using
narrow laws that apply only to specific categories of information.
To the extent that laws of general applicability apply to privacy
in the cloud, like the Fourth Amendment and the SCA, customers
may inadvertently remove their own privacy protections by
agreeing to excessively broad terms in a cloud service’s privacy
policy. Even though the FTC has brought actions against
companies that violate their own privacy policies, these actions
arguably serve only to give the providers incentives to write
privacy policies that are as vague about the providers’ obligations
as possible.
After examining the privacy policies and TOS agreements in
our sample and analyzing a variety of legal issues and privacy
theories, we have arrived at a series of recommendations to what
we see as the failure of the contractarian paradigm to adequately
protect parties that indicate agreement with these terms. We
recommend a new legal regime that would emphasize
empowering consumers by setting a baseline of protection to
ensure that a consumer has control over her own data. The
baseline would be designed to protect the most sensitive
information without hindering market development.
A. Building the Baseline
One of our foundational arguments is that relatively modest
regulatory intervention into the relationship between providers
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and consumers could support positive social change with regard
to privacy protections. To some extent, legal regulations can
provide structure for social interactions, and the strength of the
legal control can affect perceptions of social control and personal
freedom.519 Regulating privacy would involve the regulation of
relationships, perhaps by placing limits on organizational
power.520
When implementing a legislative system to address
problems, policy makers can either choose to implement rules,
which tend to focus on strict requirements, or standards, which
tend to be more flexible and open-ended. In regulating
technologies, standards may be superior to rules because
standards are more adaptable to further technological change.521
Detailed and inflexible sets of rules can either chill technological
development, or in the alternative can quickly become obsolete if
the progress of technology continues unimpeded.522 On the other
hand, if the implemented regulations are too open-ended and
vague, they can end up being entirely ineffective.523 A study by
Birnhack and Elkin-Koren questions the very idea that
regulation of personal data collection and use would be effective
at all.524 While we do not suggest specific language for regulations
519. See Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1240–41 (explaining his use
of the term “architecture” to describe the protection or diminishing of privacy in
our society).
520. See id. at 1242 (“Protecting privacy thus depends upon regulating
relationships, often by enforcing limits on the power of bureaucratic
organizations.”).
521. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1871–72 (describing how
“standards are generally the superior choice for dealing with situations of rapid
change because . . . rules can become obsolete”).
522. See Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1275 (summarizing
research that shows how regulations, “if too specific, can quickly become
obsolete, discourage innovation, and be costly and inefficient”).
523. See id. (“However, rules that are too open-ended and vague can end up
being toothless. Although security standards must not be overly specific, they
must contain meaningful minimum requirements.”).
524. See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 343 (noting a low level
of compliance with information privacy laws across several categories of
websites in Israel). The authors noted that popular websites were more likely to
comply with the privacy protection laws, perhaps because popular websites were
likely to be maintained by organizations with the resources to have legal
departments, and perhaps because complying with the law also serves as a
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in this Article, we encourage policy makers to construct a regime
that strikes a balance between rules and standards to make the
new data protection regime specific enough to address discrete
problems and open-ended enough to allow it to evolve.
1. Baseline Regulation
We recommend a regime that includes baseline privacy
protections that would set a floor for the permissible approaches
of companies that handle consumer information. The variation in
the approaches taken by companies in our relatively small
sample underscores the need for more uniformity.
Many questions exist about the appropriate levels of baseline
protections, posing interesting questions for future research.
Baseline regulations should first identify minimum requirements
in order to protect certain types of sensitive information. Such
regulations should explicitly address the protection of personal
health information, social security numbers, and financial
information like bank account numbers and credit cards. The
baseline regulation could also include a provision that places the
risk of loss for online fraud on a cloud provider.525 Opponents of
our approach may point to the results of the Birnhack and ElkinKoren study, an empirical study of Israeli websites that suggests
that regulations setting a baseline for privacy agreements are not
truly effective due to low compliance rates.526 But the authors of
that study failed to focus on enforcement, and more effective
enforcement would likely improve the efficacy of such regulations.
After establishing categories of sensitive information that
must receive special protection, the next question concerns what
minimum requirements should be included to protect consumer
information. Baseline regulations might, for example, include
signal to consumers that the company is more reliable. See id.
525. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 378–79 (noting that cloud computing
providers do not have the same incentive as banks and online merchants to
protect customers from online fraud because the banks and online retailers
legally bear the risk of loss instead of the consumer).
526. See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 383 (describing how
the authors “found that some areas of the law are simply irrelevant in the daily
practices of websites”).
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requirements for data security. End users are generally ignorant
of many data protection issues, so there is not sufficient market
demand for firms to pay more attention to security issues like the
need to encrypt information.527 This could be addressed using
regulations that require data to be encrypted.528 We envision two
primary options for security baseline regulation: language
requiring the use of “best available security technology,” or
language requiring the use of “industry standard security
technology.” The comparison of these two options is another
possible direction for future research.
We further suggest that baseline regulations should also
address issues related to data breaches. First, the regulation
should include security breach notification requirements in order
to give users the information necessary to assess the negative
consequences of a cloud vendor’s security failures.529 Second,
there should be viable private causes of action for data breaches
to address the current problem of consumers not having standing
to sue a company after a breach in the absence of a distinct injury
like identity theft. Some scholars have suggested finding
companies strictly liable for data leaks,530 creating a new common
law tort based on the use of Fair Information Practices,531 and
527. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 380 (stating that many consumers know
very little about data encryption and describing how this provides “no incentive
to [devote resources] to something for which most customers have not expressed
a want”).
528. See id. at 382–83 (proposing that government regulators require cloud
service providers to use encryption just as this has already been done in the
banking and health industries).
529. Martin suggests a similar approach. See Martin, supra note 44, at 313
(“Congress should create new breach notification requirements that allow users
to assess the exposure, damage, and operational costs of any security failures on
the part of a cloud vendor.”).
530. See Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of
Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
241, 245 (2007) (suggesting “a Rylands strict-liability model to address the
hazards of leaking databases”).
531. See Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the
Misuse of Personal Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 140 (2006) (suggesting “a
new common law tort . . . to force reform and accountability . . . and to provide
remedies for individuals who have suffered harm to their core privacy interests”
and stating that this tort “borrows from . . . the Fair Information Practices from
the Privacy Act of 1974”).
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imposing liability for breach of trust if a company misuses
information.532 Imposing fiduciary obligations in some
circumstances may also provide adequate private causes of action
in response to security breaches. It is possible that some of the
issues relating to information privacy could be resolved through
the common law, such as if privacy tort law were expanded to
take intangible harms into account, including the harm from the
disclosure of data that is not embarrassing.533 We argue that an
emphasis on private enforcement options would preserve the
viability of the market by limiting excessive legislative oversight
of business practices.
B. Data Control
The most important part of our proposal for a new legal
regime that sets a floor for the use of data by private companies
concerns data control, which we have defined in this Article as
encompassing the ideas of data mobility and data withdrawal. In
the cloud context, there are two sets of information that we are
concerned about: PII, and what we call “course-of-business” data
that is stored as part of the customer’s use of the service. Related
to the use of PII, we are also concerned about secondary use of
such information, including secondary use by third parties. We
further argue that data mobility and data withdrawal provisions
as described below would attract consumers who are more risk
averse and who would not use these services in the absence of
these protections, thus leading to a net benefit to the industry.

532. See Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1288 (2000) (“[A] rubric based loosely on breach of
confidence might persuade courts to recognize at least limited data privacy
rights.”).
533. See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1922–23
Courts can readily understand the harm caused by the disclosure of a
naked photograph of a person, but they struggle in locating a harm
when non-embarrassing data is disclosed or leaked. A broader
understanding of harm is needed in order for the privacy torts to
apply to the extensive gathering, dissemination, and use of
information by various businesses and organizations.
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Thus, these provisions should be mandatory, and the regulations
should prevent parties from contracting around these terms.
1. Personally Identifiable Information
Baseline privacy regulations should protect the ability of
consumers to control the use of their PII in the cloud. The
security of PII should be paramount to prevent fraud and identity
theft. This part of our recommendation is by no means
revolutionary, however, because privacy policies are centered on
protection of PII, and most privacy theorists focus on PII as the
class of information that must be afforded the most protection.
We also encourage discussions of PII to consider the
commodification of data. If consumers are free to use their PII as
a form of currency, disclosing it to obtain desired services, should
there be limits on what information consumers can trade? If
privacy is viewed as property, and property itself is really a
bundle of rights, there may be some types of information where it
would be against the best interest of society to permit the free
trade thereof. For example, the relationship between doctors and
patients is typically viewed as sacrosanct. We thus suggest that
personal health information is one category of information that
service providers outside this circle would not be able to seek
under our proposed legal regime.
The problem of reidentification raises additional issues
because it can lead to anonymized, descriptive information about
the consumer being reattached to the consumer’s identity. While
we would not recommend a regime that stifles innovation and
academic creativity, a legal regime to protect PII in the cloud also
needs some forward-looking provisions addressing the possibility
that reidentification science could lead to threats to personal
privacy in the future. These provisions, for example, might
prohibit the use of public records for reidentification purposes
unless the user certifies compliance with some form of privacy
standard.

466

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 341 (2013)
2. Secondary Use

Secondary use of PII is another very important consideration.
Those who argue for limitations on secondary use suggest that
the use of data should be limited to the purpose for which it was
initially collected, absent further consent being obtained.534
Existing rules prohibiting secondary use include legal ethics rules
that prohibit a lawyer from using client information for a purpose
unrelated to the interests of the client, and restrictions in the
Fair Credit Reporting Act that prohibit an employer who obtains
an employee’s credit report from using this information for
nonemployment purposes.535
Once PII is properly collected, we suggest imposing further
limits on secondary use of the PII. One option is to give the
consumer the ability to restrict secondary use of her PII. Privacy
policies often give the customer the ability to access and amend
PII stored on the collecting company’s system, so requiring these
provisions to address secondary use would likely not be
excessively burdensome.
However, privacy policies do not give consumers control over
PII given to third parties unconnected to the consumer. To
address this third-party problem, the baseline regime should
guarantee consumers a right of data withdrawal. By permitting
data withdrawal when a consumer’s information is being used in
a way that goes against the wishes of the consumer, we secure
the right of consumers to control their data and feel more
secure.536 To solidify this data withdrawal right, we recommend
534. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1190 (defining secondary use
prohibitions as “the requirement that data collected for one purpose may be
used for that purpose only, absent consent”); Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 111,
at 521 (“‘Secondary use’ is the use of data for purposes unrelated to the purposes
for which the data was initially collected without the data subject’s consent.”).
535. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1190–91. However, Solove argues that
the restrictions in the Fair Credit Reporting Act do not adequately restrict
secondary uses of covered information. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note
2, at 67–68 (describing how effective lobbying by the credit reporting industry
led to an exemption for “names, addresses, former addresses, telephone number,
SSN, employment information, and birthdate”).
536. Our proposed right of data withdrawal is ideologically similar to the
proposed “right to be forgotten” in European privacy law, which is supported by
the European Commission, though many worry that a right to be forgotten is
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giving consumers the ability to serve a notice-and-takedown order
on third parties to require the removal of the consumer’s PII from
the third party’s system. We recognize that consumers may have
difficulty obtaining information about the secondary use of their
PII, but argue that combining a notice-and-takedown regime with
controls to enable meaningful informed choices could potentially
address some of the problems relating to the secondary use of PII
by third parties. Designing controls to enable meaningful
informed choices is outside the scope of this Article, but it is an
important and related issue that should be the subject of further
study.
Under a regime allowing for notice and takedown of PII, a
party who wants his PII removed from a specific service could
contact the operator of that service to (1) assert his rights in the
PII, and (2) request that the PII be taken down. At that time, the
operator would have to comply and notify the original submitter
of the information about the takedown. The original submitter
would then have an opportunity to contest the takedown and
assert that the PII was not wrongfully made available. This
proposal of a notice-and-takedown approach is patterned after the
procedures of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),537
which permits copyright owners to serve a notice on a website
when infringing material has been posted.538 Our notice-andtakedown proposal would permit consumers to request that
entities take down information that was either posted by the
consumer and then republished elsewhere, or that was derived
from information posted by the consumer. The notice and

impossible to enforce. See European Comm’n, Commission Welcomes European
Parliament Rapporteurs’ Support for Strong EU Data Protection Rules (Jan. 8,
2013), http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/reding/pdf/m13_4_en.pdf (last
visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Our
proposed model for a right of data withdrawal, however, operationalizes this
difficult concept by drawing from the notice-and-takedown procedures of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).
537. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
538. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2006) (establishing a “notice and takedown”
procedure to handle allegations that content on a host website infringes an
owner’s copyright).
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takedown approach could apply to secondary use by the original
entity entrusted with the information, as well as to third parties.
Another option we suggest is for the baseline regulation to
declare that some information, like personal health information,
should never be tradable. Thus, someone within the necessary
circle encompassing the doctor–patient relationship would not be
able to trade health information, even if it is anonymized, to
marketers seeking to create profiles based on health needs. If
some information is not tradable but others are, this can still
leave room for many different business models to survive, as long
as a minimum level of privacy and security are provided.
3. Course-of-Business Data
Recommendations about PII are very common in the privacy
literature, but the information disclosed to cloud providers goes
far beyond PII. One of the elements that we think deserves more
discussion is the control of what we call “course-of-business” data,
which consumers store with cloud providers as part of the service.
Many cloud services permit customers to store photos, writings,
and business data in the cloud. The storage of this information is
often the customer’s purpose for using this service to begin with,
whereas the transfer of PII is typically incidental to the rendering
of service. Because the storage of this information is essential to
the service, the terms relating to such storage should be explicit
as a condition of the contract between the parties.
In Part II, we noted that many private actors have called for
improved transparency and control in the cloud. In the cloud
context, the question of data control does not only involve
targeted advertising, but also the importance of data mobility so
that customers would not lose everything if a service provider
became inoperable or if the data had to be moved to a new service
provider.539 However, as our analysis of TOS agreements and
privacy policies showed, companies often do not address the
handling of such data after the contract has terminated.
539. Martin, supra note 44, at 286 (“Any solution needs to incorporate
guarantees that data owners would be able to gain control of their data in a
usable form should their service providers become inoperable.”).
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Above we emphasized the data withdrawal aspect of data
control. The right of withdrawal may have less application to
course-of-business data like writings and photos because such
data may be protected by intellectual property law (IP law), and
therefore a right of withdrawal may be duplicative of IP law
protection. However, for course-of-business data entitled to lesser
IP law protection, like databases, the right of withdrawal via
notice and takedown should be available.
More importantly, the baseline regulations must require a
minimum level of protection to ensure data mobility. This means
that data must be converted to an acceptable format before being
delivered to a departing customer, such that the customer is not
locked in to a particular service provider, and could easily move
their data from one provider to another. Data mobility focuses on
the access and consumer choice aspects of data control and would
facilitate market transactions by enabling customers to move
their data freely between competing services. What happens if
the customer decides for any reason that she wants to use the
cloud services of a competing provider? Is a user’s course-ofbusiness data stored in a proprietary format such that the user
encounters a “lock-in” problem if she decides she wants to change
providers? Currently, privacy policies and TOS agreements often
may not address these issues at all. As part of the legal regime
that we propose, format transparency would be required, and
providers would also be required to include terms addressing endof-relationship handling of course-of-business data. Under our
proposed regime, a company could still store the data in a
proprietary format, but would be required to convert the data to a
generally accepted format upon account termination to enable the
data to be easily moved to a competing service.
Data mobility is important because it allows consumers to
more fully participate in the features and services that cloud
providers offer. The importance of data mobility in the cloud can
be emphasized by analogizing to mobile phone numbers. In
November 2003, an FCC regulation became effective that
required cell phone carriers to allow numbers to be ported from
one carrier to another.540 There was a great deal of resistance on
540.

See Telephone Number Portability, First Report and Order and Further
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the part of service providers that claimed that this rule would be
too costly to carriers and might not be beneficial to consumers.541
The FCC, however, concluded in 2006 that the number portability
requirement did not significantly increase “wireless churn,” and
did in fact have a positive impact on service quality due to the
need that it created for carriers to devote extra effort to customer
retention.542 We expect that a data mobility requirement may be
met with the same initial resistance as the wireless number
portability requirement, but that like wireless number
portability, data mobility requirements will have a net positive
effect on both the industry and on consumers. By allowing
consumers to “port” their phone numbers into another provider’s
system, cellular subscribers are better equipped to participate in
the market because such porting greatly reduces costs that might
otherwise be associated with switching mobile service
providers.543 Similarly, data mobility in the cloud would facilitate
consumer participation and reduce transaction costs for
consumers when moving from one provider to another.
Protection of course-of-business information could also be
achieved through some application of the principles surrounding
Notice of Proposed Rule, 11 FCC Rcd. 8352 (1996). The first compliance date
was set for June 30, 1999, but after two requests for forbearance, the agency
pushed the deadline for compliance to November 24, 2003. See Cellular
Telecommunications & Internet Ass’n v. F.C.C., 330 F.3d 502, 503–04 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
541. See Caron Carlson & Carmen Nobel, Carriers Resist Porting Numbers,
EWEEK, Apr. 21, 2003, at 20 (describing how “[w]ireless carriers [were] looking
for relief from a requirement that would . . . allow cell phone customers to keep
their numbers when they change phone companies”).
542. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, 21 FCC Rcd. 10,947, 11,006 (2006)
[T]he advent of porting . . . did not lead to a significant increase in
wireless churn, but did appear to have had a positive impact on
service quality by inducing carriers to engage in aggressive customer
retention efforts . . . . Significantly improved retention efforts (better
deals on upgrade handsets, incentives for signing longer contracts,
better customer service, and higher network spending) following the
implementation of local number portability . . . have led to lower
churn rates . . . (citations and internal quotations omitted).
543. See Carlson & Nobel, supra note 541 (noting that the extra cost
associated with changing a cellular phone number was sometimes viewed as the
most important reason to stay with the same provider).
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the law of confidentiality. Confidentiality as a concept is related
to privacy, but primarily arises in the context of contracts
between private parties. When fiduciary relationships exist, the
law often recognizes obligations to keep information confidential.
Solove has pointed out the potential application of fiduciary
relationships in the privacy context.544 If elements of fiduciary
relationships were integrated into the customer–cloud provider
relationship, this would impose on the providers an obligation to
keep not only the customer’s PII secure, but other data stored on
the provider’s servers as well. Consumers could obtain stronger
protections by opting into a fiduciary relationship with the
service provider for a price. The consumer would thus get a
guarantee that if the service provider acts badly, the consumer
has a right of action against them. This differs from Solove’s
proposal because we are more focused on consumer choice than
on making fiduciary relationships into a default rule.
VII. Conclusion
Privacy issues online are not going to disappear overnight.
Changes to the law are necessary to facilitate optimal market
development that takes into consideration the autonomy of
consumers in controlling their personal information. Foucault’s
view of Bentham’s Panopticon as a metaphor for power relations
in society is even more apt today than when Foucault was
originally writing. The market forces peering into private lives
may not be doing so with malicious intentions, but the
corresponding decrease in consumer control of their personal
information is nonetheless harmful.
In this Article, we have examined issues relating to cloud
computing through the lens of privacy theories and privacy law.
In analyzing a sample of terms of service agreements and privacy
policies, we have concluded that these documents have
potentially serious implications for the rights of consumers who
agree to them without reading the terms.
544. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 103 (making the “radical
proposal” that the law should recognize a fiduciary relationship when a
company collects and uses personal information).

472

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 341 (2013)

Ultimately, we recommend the implementation of baseline
regulations to guarantee some minimum level of protection for
consumers in the cloud. These regulations should emphasize the
importance of preserving consumer control of their data, and
these control mechanisms should focus on data mobility and a
right of data withdrawal. Data mobility will require cloud
providers to make consumer data available in a generally
acceptable format such that consumers can freely move their own
data from one provider to another in the interest of maintaining a
healthy, competitive marketplace. For data withdrawal, we
propose a notice-and-takedown approach patterned after similar
provisions in the DMCA, which would permit a consumer to
request that entities take down his personal information.
Our proposal raises a number of interesting new research
questions. One of the most interesting problems is the effect that
our proposals would ultimately have. Once the efficiency of the
market is protected and consumers are in control of their data,
would there actually be any statistically significant changes in
consumer behavior? At the end of the day, if consumers are
empowered to control their data, but behavior is largely
unaltered, this may indicate that the current state of the market
is actually optimal for society. However, the uncertainty that
currently exists with regard to data ownership is harmful to
consumer autonomy and makes it impossible to conclusively
determine the optimality of the current regime. Thus, reduction
of this uncertainty is essential to protecting the interests of
consumers, and sufficient reduction will likely require some
degree of regulatory intervention. We posit, however, that the
degree of this regulatory intervention could be very modest, with
narrow goals focusing on minimum protections and consumer
choice, thus balancing the need to protect consumers with the
need to preserve market vitality.

